Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
DCSync impersonates a domain controller and asks a real one to replicate password data, extracting every credential in Active Directory without ever logging on to a domain controller.

What Is a DCSync Attack?
A DCSync attack extracts password data from Active Directory by pretending to be a domain controller. The attacker calls the Directory Replication Service remote protocol, asks a genuine domain controller to replicate the credential attributes for a chosen account, and receives the NTLM hash, the Kerberos keys, and in some configurations the password history. MITRE ATT&CK lists it as T1003.006.
What makes it dangerous is what it does not require. There is no code running on a domain controller, no service installed, no file dropped, and no interactive logon to audit. The attack is a legitimate protocol conversation initiated from an ordinary workstation, and to the domain controller it looks like replication.
Replication is governed by three extended rights on the domain object:
By default these are held by Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators, and the domain controllers themselves. The problem in real environments is that they are rarely only held by those. Backup products, identity synchronisation tools, migration utilities, and auditing software all ask for replication rights during installation, and the account they are granted to is often a plain user account with a password set in 2014. Entra Connect synchronisation accounts are a particularly common example.
Two tools dominate. Mimikatz performs it in one command:
lsadump::dcsync /domain:corp.example /user:krbtgt
Impacket’s secretsdump.py does the same from Linux with a supplied credential. Attackers almost always target krbtgt first, because its key enables a Golden Ticket attack and therefore indefinite persistence, and then dump the whole directory for offline cracking and for pass-the-hash use against the wider estate.
DCSync has one of the better detection signatures in Active Directory, provided the auditing is in place.
1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 for Get-Changes and 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 for Get-Changes-All — and the account is not a domain controller computer account or a known synchronisation service account.Tune carefully rather than broadly. Legitimate replication between domain controllers is constant, so the filter on source account is what makes the rule usable.
Get-ACL on the domain object or BloodHound’s GetChanges edges, and remove anything that cannot be justified.krbtgt password twice, as routine hygiene and definitely after any suspected compromise.Treat it as a full domain compromise. Every credential in the directory should be considered known to the attacker, including computer account passwords, service accounts, and the krbtgt key. Recovery means a planned credential reset across the domain rather than a few password changes, and in serious cases a forest recovery. Microsoft’s guidance on recovering from a domain compromise is the right starting point, and it is not a weekend job.
We demonstrate DCSync paths and the detections that should catch them during our Red Team services.
Not necessarily. It requires the replication extended rights on the domain object, which Domain Admins hold by default but which are frequently delegated to service accounts for backup, synchronisation, auditing, or migration products. Any account holding Replicating Directory Changes All can perform the attack, which is why auditing those rights is more useful than auditing group membership alone.
Copying the NTDS.dit database requires access to a domain controller’s file system, usually via volume shadow copies, and leaves clear traces there. DCSync runs from any machine on the network using a legitimate replication protocol and touches no files. The outcome is similar, but DCSync is quieter and needs only the right permissions rather than a domain controller logon.
Windows event 4662 on domain controllers, filtered to entries whose properties include the replication GUIDs beginning 1131f6aa and 1131f6ad, and excluding domain controller computer accounts and approved synchronisation accounts. Directory service access auditing must be enabled for the event to be generated. Keep an explicit allow list so the rule produces few false positives.
Assume every credential in the domain is compromised, including service accounts and computer account passwords. Plan a full credential reset, rotate the krbtgt password twice with sufficient replication time between resets, and hunt for persistence such as forged tickets, certificate-based footholds, and delegation changes. Engage experienced responders, because partial recovery leaves the attacker in place.
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