Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
A Golden Ticket attack forges Kerberos ticket-granting tickets with the stolen KRBTGT key, giving an attacker persistent, domain-wide access to Active Directory as any user they choose.

What Is a Golden Ticket Attack?
A Golden Ticket attack is a post-compromise technique in which an attacker who has stolen the secret key of the KRBTGT account forges their own Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGTs). Because every domain controller trusts tickets signed with that key, the forged ticket lets the attacker impersonate any user, including accounts that do not exist, with any group memberships they like, for as long as the key stays unchanged.
It is catalogued in MITRE ATT&CK as T1558.001 and was popularised in 2014 when Benjamin Delpy added the capability to Mimikatz and presented it with Skip Duckwall at Black Hat USA.
In Active Directory, a user who logs on receives a TGT from the Key Distribution Centre (KDC) running on each domain controller. The TGT is encrypted and signed with the KRBTGT account’s key, and it contains a Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) listing the user’s security groups. When the user wants to reach a file share or SQL server, they present the TGT to obtain a service ticket. The KDC trusts the TGT because only it, in theory, knows the KRBTGT key.
That trust is the whole problem. Whoever holds the key can mint TGTs that look genuine in every respect.
ticketer.py, the attacker supplies the domain name, domain SID, the KRBTGT hash or AES key, a target user name, and group RIDs such as 512 (Domain Admins). Mimikatz’s default lifetime for a forged ticket is ten years.A Golden Ticket survives the most common response actions. Resetting the compromised admin’s password does nothing, because the ticket does not depend on any user’s password. Disabling accounts may not help either, as the attacker can name a different or fictitious user. The access lasts until the KRBTGT key itself is changed—and in many domains that key has not been rotated since the domain was built.
| Golden Ticket | Silver Ticket | |
|---|---|---|
| ATT&CK ID | T1558.001 | T1558.002 |
| Key required | KRBTGT account | A service or computer account |
| Forged item | Ticket-granting ticket | Service ticket for one service |
| Scope | The entire domain | That single service |
| Touches the DC | Yes, to request service tickets | No, which makes it stealthier |
Newer variants, known as Diamond and Sapphire tickets, modify or reuse legitimately issued tickets rather than forging them from scratch, making detection based on anomalies harder.
Detection is difficult but not impossible. Useful signals include:
Microsoft Defender for Identity, the successor to Microsoft ATA, raises specific alerts for suspected Golden Ticket usage and DCSync. Forwarding domain controller logs to a SIEM with tuned Kerberos rules gives you a second line of sight.
Prevention means stopping attackers from reaching domain admin in the first place: a tiered administration model, privileged access workstations, the Protected Users group, removal of unnecessary replication rights, and regular attack path analysis with tools such as BloodHound. Rotate the KRBTGT password periodically as routine hygiene.
After a confirmed compromise, reset the KRBTGT password twice. Active Directory keeps the current and previous key, so a single reset leaves forged tickets valid. Allow full replication and at least the maximum ticket lifetime to pass between resets to avoid breaking legitimate sessions; Microsoft publishes a script for this. A full recovery also requires removing every persistence mechanism the attacker created, which is a job for experienced responders.
Golden Ticket attacks are a standard step in our Red Team services, which show how far an attacker could get in your Active Directory and whether your SOC would notice.
The forgery itself does not need privileges, but obtaining the KRBTGT key does. That requires replication rights, which Domain Admins and domain controllers hold by default, or access to a domain controller’s database or backup. Misconfigured permissions sometimes grant replication rights to unexpected accounts, so auditing who can perform DCSync is an important preventive check.
Active Directory remembers the current and the previous KRBTGT password so that tickets issued just before a change keep working. After one reset, the stolen key becomes the previous key and forged tickets are still accepted. A second reset, once replication has completed and existing tickets have expired, removes the compromised key completely and invalidates any Golden Tickets.
Only for identities that no longer rely on on-premises Active Directory. Most organisations run a hybrid model in which the on-premises domain still authenticates users to servers and file shares, so the risk remains there. Hybrid setups also introduce related cloud attacks, such as forging tokens after stealing federation signing keys, which need their own protection.
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