Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Active Directory holds the authentication and authorisation decisions for most Windows estates. Securing it means protecting the paths that lead from an ordinary account to Domain Admin.

What Is Active Directory Security?
In a ransomware incident the attacker’s objective is rarely a file server. It is the domain controller, because whoever controls Active Directory controls authentication for every Windows machine, every file share, and every application that trusts the domain. Active Directory security is the work of making the route to that position long, noisy, and expensive.
The service has been in production since Windows 2000, which means most UK estates are running a directory carrying twenty years of accumulated groups, delegations, and trust relationships that no one has read since they were created.
Compromise of Active Directory usually involves no exploit at all. It involves chaining permissions that each looked reasonable on their own. A help desk group holds the right to reset passwords on a server administrators group. A member of that group has a session on a machine where an ordinary user is a local administrator. The attacker lands on the workstation, takes the session, resets the password, and is two steps from the domain.
Tools such as BloodHound make these chains visible by querying the directory and graphing the relationships. Running it against your own environment is the fastest way to discover that the shortest path from a reception desk account to Domain Admin is four hops. Defenders should run it before attackers do.
The single most effective structural change is administrative tiering. Tier 0 contains domain controllers, the directory itself, certificate authorities, and anything that can take control of them. Tier 1 is servers and business applications. Tier 2 is user workstations. The rule is that credentials from a higher tier never authenticate to a lower one—a Domain Admin account does not log on to a laptop, ever, because the moment it does its credentials are recoverable from that laptop’s memory.
Enforce it rather than document it. Authentication policies and silos, logon restrictions on privileged groups, and separate privileged access workstations turn the rule into something the directory itself refuses to break. Pair it with privileged identity management so that membership of Tier 0 groups is temporary and approved rather than permanent.
Start with the inventory nobody has: accounts with passwords that never expire, accounts with old service principal names, users with adminCount set from a group membership that ended years ago, computer objects that have not authenticated since 2019, and trusts to domains whose owners you cannot name. Remove what is dead and document what remains.
Then fix the standing issues. Deploy Windows LAPS so that every local administrator password is unique and rotated, which removes lateral movement by password reuse at a stroke. Use Group Managed Service Accounts in place of static service account passwords. Disable legacy protocols—NTLMv1, LM hashes, and unsigned LDAP—and enforce LDAP channel binding. Monitor for the handful of events that are almost always malicious: DCSync replication requests from a non-domain-controller, changes to AdminSDHolder, and modification of the default domain policy. The NCSC’s guidance on mitigating malware and ransomware attacks assumes you can do this.
Finally, test recovery. An Active Directory forest recovery is a documented, rehearsed, multi-day procedure, and an organisation that has never practised it will discover during an incident that its domain controller backups are system state copies no one can restore. Assume the directory is compromised and plan the rebuild in advance.
At Privia Security, we map and exploit Active Directory attack paths under controlled conditions as part of our infrastructure security testing services.
Because it is the fastest route to mass deployment. Once an attacker holds domain administrator rights they can push an encryptor to every joined machine through Group Policy or a management agent, disable security tooling by policy, and reach backup infrastructure that authenticates against the same domain. Attacking individual servers one at a time achieves far less for the same effort.
Tier 0 is the set of assets that can take control of the directory: domain controllers, the AD CS certificate authority, directory synchronisation servers, backup systems holding domain controller images, and the accounts that administer them. It matters because a credential used on a lower tier can be stolen from that machine’s memory, so Tier 0 credentials must never touch Tier 1 or Tier 2 systems.
Assume every credential is exposed. Rotate the KRBTGT account password twice with sufficient delay between rotations for replication, reset all privileged accounts and service accounts, and review delegation, certificate templates, and group membership for persistence left behind. If forest integrity is in doubt, a documented forest recovery from known-good backups is the only reliable option, which is why rehearsing it in advance matters.
It changes them rather than removing them. Most organisations run hybrid identity for years, so the on-premises directory still exists and the synchronisation server becomes a Tier 0 asset in its own right. Cloud identity also brings its own attack surface around consent grants, service principals, and conditional access gaps, which need the same scrutiny the directory gets.
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