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What Is Proxmark3?

Proxmark3 is a research device for RFID and NFC systems that can read, analyse, emulate, and clone contactless cards, making it the standard tool for testing access control.

Illustration for the cybersecurity term Proxmark3
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17 November 2026

What Is Proxmark3?

What Is Proxmark3?

Proxmark3 is a handheld radio device built for working with contactless cards at the protocol level. It can read a credential, record the raw signal, replay it, emulate a card to a reader, emulate a reader to a card, and in many cases recover the keys that were supposed to protect the data. For anyone assessing building access control, it is the reference tool.

The design dates back to research published by Jonathan Westhues in 2007. Development since then has been community-driven, with the Iceman firmware fork and the RDV4 hardware revision now the usual combination. The device is openly sold, costs a few hundred pounds, and is as useful to a facilities team auditing its own badges as it is to an attacker.

Two Frequencies, Two Worlds

BandTypical technologiesSecurity position
125 kHz low frequencyHID Prox, EM410x, Indala, AWIDNo cryptography at all; the card broadcasts a fixed number
13.56 MHz high frequencyMIFARE Classic, MIFARE DESFire, iCLASS, NTAG, SEOSRanges from thoroughly broken to genuinely strong

The low-frequency case is stark. A legacy proximity card contains a static identifier and nothing else, so reading it and writing it to a blank card is a matter of two commands. There is no key to recover because there is no key. Any building still running 125 kHz badges should treat its access control as an inventory list rather than a security control.

High frequency is more varied. MIFARE Classic uses the proprietary Crypto1 cipher, which academic researchers broke comprehensively between 2008 and 2009; the darkside and nested attacks implemented in Proxmark3 firmware recover sector keys in seconds to minutes. Older iCLASS deployments have known key weaknesses. By contrast, MIFARE DESFire EV2 and EV3 and HID SEOS use AES with mutual authentication and diversified per-card keys, and are not clonable by reading a card in a corridor.

What a Test Looks Like

In an authorised assessment, the work runs in a predictable order. The tester identifies what technology the site uses, either from the reader model or by presenting a card to the device. They then determine whether the credential is readable at a distance, whether the data is protected, and whether a working duplicate can be produced on a blank or on a programmable emulator card.

Range is the detail that surprises clients. A Proxmark3 held close to a pocket reads most low-frequency cards, and purpose-built long-range readers concealed in a bag or a clipboard extend that considerably. The practical implication is that a badge hanging on a lanyard in a coffee shop near the office is readable without the holder noticing.

Findings normally feed into a wider physical penetration test, because a cloned badge is only interesting if it opens a door that leads somewhere. Related work covers reader tamper detection, NFC and RFID security in general, and the Wiegand wiring between reader and controller, which is unauthenticated in older installations and can be attacked with implants placed behind the reader.

Defending a Card System

Legal Considerations in the UK

Owning a Proxmark3 is lawful. Using it on credentials you do not own is not: copying another person’s access card to enter premises engages the Fraud Act 2006 and the law of trespass, and if the card is used to reach a computer system, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 applies as well. Professional engagements carry written authorisation naming the sites, the credential types in scope, and a client contact reachable at any time.

Our Hardware Penetration Test Services cover card and reader technology alongside the rest of your physical security estate.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Can a Proxmark3 Clone Any Access Card?

No. Legacy 125 kHz proximity cards and MIFARE Classic badges are copied easily, because they either have no cryptography or use a cipher that was broken over a decade ago. Modern credentials such as MIFARE DESFire EV2 and EV3 or HID SEOS use AES with mutual authentication and diversified keys, and cannot be duplicated by reading them.

How Close Does an Attacker Need to Be?

With a standard Proxmark3 antenna, a few centimetres, which usually means brushing past or standing close in a lift. Purpose-built long-range readers hidden in a bag or a folder extend that to tens of centimetres for low-frequency cards. That is enough to capture a badge from a pocket or a lanyard without the holder being aware of it.

Is It Legal to Own a Proxmark3 in the UK?

Yes. It is openly sold research equipment used by security teams, access control integrators, and academics. The legal risk attaches to use: reading or copying a credential that is not yours, or entering premises with a duplicate, engages the Fraud Act 2006, trespass, and potentially the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Authorised testing requires written permission from the site owner.

What Should We Replace Old Badges With?

Credentials that authenticate mutually with the reader using AES and site-specific diversified keys, such as MIFARE DESFire EV3 or HID SEOS. Insist that the installer generates keys unique to your site rather than using defaults, upgrade readers to OSDP with secure channel so the wiring cannot be tapped, and require a second factor on doors protecting critical areas.

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