Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
NFC and RFID security covers the cloning, eavesdropping, and relay risks affecting contactless cards, access badges, and tags, and the cryptographic controls that mitigate them.

What Is NFC and RFID Security?
Radio-frequency identification covers any system where a reader powers and interrogates a tag over radio. Near-field communication is a specific subset standardised around 13.56 MHz with a range of a few centimetres, used for payment cards, phone wallets, and transport ticketing. The security question for both is the same: what does the tag prove, and to whom?
A great many deployed systems answer that question with “it says a number out loud”, which is why badge cloning is one of the most reliable techniques in physical penetration testing.
mfoc. In 2024 a Quarkslab researcher documented an undocumented backdoor key in the FM11RF08S, a widely sold MIFARE Classic-compatible chip, allowing recovery of the sector keys on cards already in circulation.Cloning. Read a badge and write a duplicate. Against low-frequency credentials this needs nothing but proximity, which a long-range reader in a bag extends to roughly a metre. Against MIFARE Classic it takes an extra minute of key recovery.
Eavesdropping. Although NFC is described as a few centimetres, that figure applies to powering a passive tag. Passive interception of an active exchange works from considerably further with a suitable antenna.
Relay. Two devices forward the radio exchange between a genuine card and a genuine reader that are far apart. Cryptography does not help, because the real card produces every response — see relay attack.
Tag manipulation. NFC tags encoding URLs can be overwritten or replaced, sending a phone to an attacker-controlled page. The physical sticker on a poster or a restaurant table carries whatever someone last wrote to it.
Downgrade. Multi-technology readers deployed for migration will accept both the new credential and the old one. The estate’s security becomes that of the weakest card it still honours.
Contactless EMV is frequently cited as proof that the technology is safe, and the comparison is fair but specific. A payment card performs a cryptogram over transaction data using a key it never reveals, so a captured transaction cannot be replayed and the card cannot be cloned from a read. The residual risks are relay attacks and the limited offline floor amount. The lesson for access control is that the chip is capable of real cryptography; most building systems simply do not use it.
Badge cloning and reader tampering form part of the physical component of our Red Team Services, which is usually where an organisation discovers how old its credentials really are.
With a 125 kHz proximity card, yes: a concealed long-range reader can capture it from around a metre, which covers standing next to someone in a lift or a queue. Modern authenticated credentials such as DESFire EV3 or Seos cannot be cloned this way because the card never reveals a reusable secret, only a response to a challenge.
Not for anything that controls access or value. Crypto1 has been broken since 2008, key recovery takes under a minute with standard tools, and 2024 research disclosed a backdoor key in a widely used compatible chip. It remains acceptable only where the card is a convenience identifier and all authorisation happens elsewhere, such as a loyalty tag with no privileges attached.
It prevents a reader from powering the card, so it blocks skimming and casual relay while the card is in the wallet. It does nothing once you take the card out to use it, and it does not help with eavesdropping on a live transaction. For payment cards the practical risk is low; for old proximity badges, a shielded holder is a reasonable interim measure.
OSDP with Secure Channel, standardised by SIA. Wiegand sends the credential number in clear over two wires, so an attacker who reaches the cabling behind a reader can capture badge numbers or inject a valid one. OSDP encrypts and authenticates that link and supports supervision, so tampering with a reader generates an alert rather than passing unnoticed.
You May Be Interested In These
We use a few cookies that are needed to make this website work, and they are always on. We would also like to set analytics cookies, to see which pages are useful; functional cookies, so that our live chat works; and advertising cookies, to measure our campaigns. We will not set any of those until you say yes, and you can change your mind at any time from the Cookie Settings link in the footer.
Choose the cookies you are happy for us to use. Strictly necessary cookies are always on; everything else is off until you turn it on.
These cookies keep the website working: they hold your security checks, your form submissions and the choice you make here. The site cannot run without them, so they are always on.
These let our live chat open and remember your conversation, and let the newsletter sign-up work. Switch them off and the chat window will not appear.
These tell us which pages are read and how people find us, so that we can improve the site. The reports are about groups of visitors, never about you personally.
These let us measure our advertising and show you our adverts on other websites, such as LinkedIn, Google and Meta. Switch them off and you will still see adverts, but they will be less relevant.