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What Is Quantum Key Distribution?

Quantum key distribution uses the physics of single photons to share a secret key, with eavesdropping detectable by the disturbance it causes. It needs dedicated hardware and solves a narrow problem.

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17 November 2026

What Is Quantum Key Distribution?

What Is Quantum Key Distribution?

Quantum key distribution shares a secret key between two parties using the properties of individual photons rather than mathematical hardness. Its security argument is physical: measuring a quantum state disturbs it, and quantum states cannot be copied, so an eavesdropper on the link necessarily introduces errors that the two endpoints can detect by comparing a sample of their results.

The best known protocol, BB84, was described by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984. The sender transmits photons polarised in randomly chosen bases, the receiver measures in randomly chosen bases, and afterwards the two compare which bases matched over a normal channel, keeping only those results. If the error rate in the retained bits exceeds a threshold, they assume interception and discard the key.

What It Does and Does Not Replace

QKD distributes key material. It does not encrypt data, and the encryption that follows is ordinary AES. It is therefore an alternative to Diffie-Hellman key agreement on a single link, and not to cryptography in general.

Crucially, it cannot authenticate anyone. Without authentication, an attacker can run separate quantum exchanges with each endpoint and sit in the middle, exactly as with unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman. QKD deployments therefore require a classical authentication mechanism — pre-shared keys or digital signatures — which means the system still depends on conventional cryptography at the point where it matters most.

The Practical Constraints

ConstraintDetail
Dedicated linkNeeds dark fibre or free-space optics; cannot traverse routers or the public internet
DistancePhoton loss limits fibre links to a few hundred kilometres; no quantum repeaters are commercially available
Trusted nodesLonger routes are built from relays that decrypt and re-encrypt, so each node must be trusted — undermining the physical guarantee
Key rateThroughput falls sharply with distance, so QKD supplies keys for symmetric encryption rather than streaming data
CostSpecialist transmitters, receivers, and single-photon detectors at every endpoint
ImplementationSecurity proofs assume ideal devices; real hardware has side channels

That last row has a research record behind it. Detector blinding attacks demonstrated by Lydersen and colleagues in 2010 used bright illumination to control a receiver’s avalanche photodiodes, allowing full key recovery against commercial systems without raising the error rate. The physics was sound; the equipment was not. Certification schemes for QKD hardware remain immature compared with those for HSMs.

Where It Has Been Deployed

China’s Micius satellite demonstrated entanglement-based key distribution over 1,200 km in 2017, and a national backbone links Beijing and Shanghai through trusted nodes. In the UK, BT and Toshiba launched a commercial quantum-secured metropolitan network in London in April 2022, with EY as the first customer, and Toshiba’s Cambridge research laboratory remains one of the main hardware developers. Banks, defence organisations, and national research networks across Europe have run comparable pilots.

These are genuine engineering achievements. They are also point-to-point links between a handful of sites, which is the shape of the problem QKD can address.

Why the NCSC Advises Against Relying on It

The NCSC’s published position is unambiguous: it does not endorse QKD for any government or critical national infrastructure application, and recommends post-quantum cryptography instead. The US National Security Agency has reached the same conclusion. The reasoning is consistent across both:

  1. QKD addresses only key distribution on a dedicated link, leaving authentication, integrity, and software security untouched.
  2. The special hardware requirement makes it unsuitable for general networks, mobile devices, and the internet.
  3. Trusted nodes reintroduce exactly the trust assumptions the technology claims to remove.
  4. Implementation attacks are a live concern, and assurance regimes are not yet mature.
  5. Post-quantum algorithms solve the same threat in software, everywhere, at a fraction of the cost.

None of this means the research is misguided. Quantum networking has real long-term potential, and organisations with a single ultra-high-value link between two fixed sites may reasonably evaluate it as defence in depth alongside conventional cryptography.

What it should not do is displace migration work. If a supplier presents QKD as an alternative to post-quantum migration planning, that is a procurement question worth examining closely, and it is one we are asked about regularly during our cyber risk analysis services.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Is QKD Unbreakable?

The protocol’s security proof holds under idealised assumptions about the equipment. Real deployments depend on detectors, light sources, and random number generators that can be attacked, as detector blinding research demonstrated against commercial systems. QKD also needs classical authentication, so it is not self-sufficient and is not unconditionally secure in practice.

Should My Organisation Invest in QKD?

For almost all organisations, no. The NCSC and NSA both recommend post-quantum cryptography instead, because it protects every connection in software rather than one dedicated fibre link. QKD may be worth evaluating where you have an extremely high-value point-to-point link between fixed sites and budget for defence in depth.

What Is the Difference Between QKD and Post-Quantum Cryptography?

QKD uses quantum physics over specialist optical hardware to distribute keys on a dedicated link. Post-quantum cryptography is classical software using mathematics believed hard for quantum computers, deployable on existing networks and devices. They address the same threat, and only one of them scales to the internet.

Why Does QKD Still Need Classical Cryptography?

Because it cannot tell who is at the other end. Without authentication, an attacker can establish separate quantum channels with each party and relay between them. Deployments therefore authenticate the classical comparison channel with pre-shared keys or signatures, which means conventional cryptography remains part of the security argument.

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