Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Process hollowing starts a legitimate Windows program in a suspended state, replaces its memory with malicious code, and resumes it, so the running process wears a trusted name.

What Is Process Hollowing?
Process hollowing, sometimes called RunPE, is a code injection technique in which malware launches a legitimate Windows executable in a suspended state, removes the original program image from its memory, writes its own payload in place of it, and then lets the process run. Everything a defender looks at afterwards—the process name, the path on disk, the digital signature of the file, the parent-child relationship—belongs to the legitimate program. The code executing does not. MITRE ATT&CK catalogues it as T1055.012.
The classic implementation is consistent enough that it can be described step by step:
CreateProcess is called with the CREATE_SUSPENDED flag against a benign target such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or RegAsm.exe. The process is created, the primary thread exists, but no instruction has executed.NtUnmapViewOfSection unmaps the original executable image from the new process’s address space, leaving the allocation empty—hollowed out.VirtualAllocEx reserves memory at the payload’s preferred base address, usually with read, write, and execute permissions.WriteProcessMemory copies the malicious PE headers and sections into that space, applying relocations if the preferred address was unavailable.SetThreadContext points the suspended thread’s instruction pointer, or the PEB’s image base, at the new entry point.ResumeThread starts execution.From this moment the process list shows a signed Microsoft binary running from C:\Windows\System32, and whatever the malware does—network connections, file encryption, credential access—is attributed to it.
Three benefits stack. Application allow-listing is defeated, because the program that started is genuinely on the allow list. Firewall rules keyed to a process name are inherited. And analysts triaging a host see a familiar name in Task Manager and move on.
It also helps with unpacking. Much commodity malware arrives as a small loader carrying an encrypted payload; hollowing gives that payload a clean, correctly initialised process to run in without ever writing the decrypted executable to disk, which keeps it away from file-based scanning.
The technique is old and extremely widely used. Dridex, TrickBot, Agent Tesla, FormBook, Remcos, and countless commodity stealers have all shipped with it, and it appeared in Duqu as early as 2011. Any malware-as-a-service builder sold on a criminal forum will offer it as a checkbox.
All of them exist to break the link between what is on disk and what is in memory, which is the assumption most file-based detection rests on.
Hollowing leaves distinctive traces for anyone looking at memory rather than files:
malfind and hollowfind plugins check exactly this on a memory image.WriteProcessMemory and SetThreadContext against it is the signature pattern. Endpoint detection products hook these calls, and Sysmon event IDs 1, 8, and 10 provide partial coverage.svchost.exe with the wrong parent process, started without the expected service command line, or making outbound connections to an unfamiliar address.The practical conclusion is that a process name is not evidence of anything. Detection engineering for this class of technique has to work from parent-child relationships, command lines, memory region attributes, and network behaviour together—the sort of correlation our Managed Security Services (MDR) build and tune against a client’s own baseline.
No. DLL injection loads additional code into a process that continues running its own program, so both the legitimate and the injected code execute. Process hollowing replaces the process image entirely before any of the original code runs, so nothing of the legitimate program executes at all. The process keeps its name and file path but is, from the first instruction, something else.
File-based scanning will not, because the executable on disk is a genuine signed binary and the payload never lands there in decrypted form. Behavioural detection does far better, since the API sequence of creating a suspended process and then writing to its memory is unusual. Memory scanning for private executable regions that do not match a mapped image is the most reliable method.
Signed Microsoft binaries that are expected to be running and have plausible network behaviour: svchost.exe, explorer.exe, RegAsm.exe, InstallUtil.exe, and MSBuild.exe are all frequent choices. The .NET utilities are especially popular because they are legitimately present on developer and server systems and are often excluded from monitoring as development tooling.
Not on its own, because the process that starts is a legitimately allowed program. Allow-listing remains valuable for blocking the initial loader, which is usually an unsigned executable or script, so it prevents the chain from starting. Once a loader is running, preventing hollowing requires memory-aware controls such as endpoint detection with behavioural rules and exploit protection settings.
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