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Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Process doppelganging abuses NTFS transactions to create a process from a file that is rolled back before it runs, leaving security products with nothing on disk to inspect.

What Is Process Doppelganging?
Process doppelganging is a Windows code execution technique that exploits NTFS transactions to run a payload from a file that, by the time the process starts, no longer exists in its malicious form. Tal Liberman and Eugene Kogan of enSilo presented it at Black Hat Europe in December 2017, and demonstrated that it defeated essentially every major endpoint security product of the day. MITRE ATT&CK lists it as T1055.013.
Windows Vista introduced Transactional NTFS, a feature that lets a program group file operations into a transaction that can be committed or rolled back atomically. The intended use was installers and database-like applications that must not leave half-written files behind after a crash.
Within a transaction, changes are visible to the transacted handle but not to other processes. Roll the transaction back and the file system behaves as though nothing happened. Microsoft has discouraged the API for years and recommends alternatives, but it remains present for compatibility, which is the usual reason a deprecated feature is still an attack surface.
CreateTransaction opens a new NTFS transaction.CreateFileTransacted opens a file—often an existing, innocuous one—inside that transaction.NtCreateSection creates a memory section backed by the transacted file. The section now holds the malicious image.RollbackTransaction discards the file changes. The file on disk reverts, and from the file system’s perspective the malicious version never existed. The section, however, persists in memory.NtCreateProcessEx creates a process from that section, and the process environment and thread are constructed manually before execution begins.The result is a running process whose backing image cannot be retrieved from disk, because there is nothing to retrieve.
Most endpoint protection of the period hooked process creation and then examined the file the process was created from. Here that file either does not exist or contains different, harmless content. Scanning on file write also failed, because the write happened inside a transaction that was never committed.
The technique bypasses process creation callbacks less completely than it bypasses file inspection, which is why the fix came from the security industry rather than from Microsoft: vendors updated their kernel callbacks to examine the section object rather than trusting the file path, and to treat transacted file operations as suspicious in their own right.
In the wild, SynAck ransomware adopted doppelganging in 2018—the first confirmed criminal use—and the Osiris banking trojan followed. It has stayed a niche technique, partly because the API is awkward and partly because simpler variants achieve a similar effect.
Three closely related techniques appeared after it, each attacking the same assumption from a different angle:
The common thread is that a file path is not a reliable description of what is executing. Any detection logic that reads the file after the process has been created is making an assumption an attacker controls.
CreateTransaction and CreateFileTransacted are vanishingly rare in modern software. Endpoint products that instrument them can alert on the combination of a transaction and a section creation.At Privia Security, we test these evasion paths against a client’s deployed tooling during Red Team Services, because the honest answer to “would our EDR catch this?” depends on its configuration rather than its brand.
Much less so than in 2017. Endpoint vendors updated their kernel callbacks to inspect the section object rather than the file path, and several now flag use of the NTFS transaction APIs directly. It remains a useful demonstration of why file-based inspection is insufficient, and variants such as process ghosting continue to appear when products regress to path-based checks.
Not through a supported setting. Microsoft has deprecated the API and advises developers against it, but the feature remains in the file system for compatibility and cannot simply be switched off. Detection is therefore the practical control: instrument the transaction APIs, treat their use as anomalous, and rely on memory-based verification of running processes.
Hollowing starts a real process from a real file and then overwrites its memory, so the file on disk still exists and still matches a legitimate program. Doppelganging never produces a persistent malicious file at all, because the writes happen inside a transaction that is rolled back before the process is created. Doppelganging defeats file retrieval; hollowing defeats name-based attribution.
Verify running processes against their backing files in memory rather than trusting the recorded path, and alert on private executable memory regions with no valid image mapping. Add telemetry for the NTFS transaction APIs if your tooling exposes it. Finally, make sure post-execution behavioural detections are strong, since those fire regardless of how the code was loaded.
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