Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.

View the Glossary View the Glossary
PRIVIA

Cybersecurity Terms Glossary

What Is AS-REP Roasting?

AS-REP roasting extracts crackable password material from Active Directory accounts that have Kerberos pre-authentication disabled, without the attacker needing any domain credentials at all.

Illustration for the cybersecurity term AS-REP Roasting
Home / Blog / Cybersecurity Terms / What Is AS-REP Roasting?
17 November 2026

What Is AS-REP Roasting?

What Is AS-REP Roasting?

AS-REP roasting is an Active Directory attack against accounts configured without Kerberos pre-authentication. For those accounts, a domain controller will hand out an authentication service reply containing data encrypted with a key derived from the account’s password — to anyone who asks. The attacker takes that reply away and cracks it offline. MITRE ATT&CK records the technique as T1558.004.

Its distinguishing feature is the entry requirement: unlike Kerberoasting, which needs a valid domain account first, AS-REP roasting can be performed by an unauthenticated attacker who only knows the domain name, a domain controller address, and a list of candidate user names. A foothold on a guest Wi-Fi network with line of sight to a DC is enough.

What Pre-Authentication Does

In a normal Kerberos exchange, the client sends an AS-REQ containing a timestamp encrypted with the key derived from the user’s password. The Key Distribution Centre decrypts it, confirms the timestamp is recent, and only then issues a ticket-granting ticket. This step exists specifically to stop anyone requesting encrypted material for an arbitrary user.

When the DONT_REQ_PREAUTH flag is set in an account’s userAccountControl attribute, the KDC skips that check. It answers any AS-REQ for that account with an AS-REP whose encrypted part is protected by the account’s own key. The attacker never has to guess online, never triggers a lockout, and never generates a failed logon.

Running the Attack

With no credentials, the attacker supplies a user list, often compiled from LinkedIn, email address formats, or an earlier enumeration:

GetNPUsers.py corp.example/ -usersfile users.txt -format hashcat -no-pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.10

With a low-privileged domain account, the list can instead be queried from LDAP directly, filtering on the pre-authentication flag, which is what Rubeus does with Rubeus.exe asreproast. The output is fed to Hashcat in mode 18200 or to John the Ripper. Cracking speed depends entirely on password quality: a passphrase of four random words will not fall, while a service account named after a project and a year will.

Why the Flag Is Set at All

Nobody enables this deliberately as a security decision. In practice it shows up because:

Because the flag persists quietly in the directory, the affected accounts are frequently old service or integration identities with passwords that have not changed in years — the worst possible combination.

Finding Affected Accounts

A single PowerShell query returns the full list:

Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $true} -Properties DoesNotRequirePreAuth,PasswordLastSet

Run it as a scheduled check, not once. BloodHound also surfaces these accounts, and most penetration tests report them in the first hour.

Remediation and Detection

For detection, watch Windows event ID 4768 on domain controllers. The attack produces a ticket-granting ticket request with pre-authentication type 0 — the field is empty rather than showing type 2 or 15. A burst of 4768 events with pre-authentication type 0 from one source address, especially covering several accounts, is a precise indicator with very few false positives. Pair it with event 4625 patterns to catch enumeration against accounts that do not exist.

Our penetration test services include a full Kerberos configuration review, so these accounts are found before someone else finds them.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Can AS-REP Roasting Be Done Without Any Credentials?

Yes, provided the attacker can reach a domain controller on the network and has a list of candidate user names. The domain controller answers the request for any account with pre-authentication disabled, regardless of who asked. Supplying a user list is the only real obstacle, and name formats are usually easy to derive from public sources or from email addresses.

How Is It Different From Kerberoasting?

Kerberoasting requests service tickets for accounts that have a service principal name, and requires an authenticated domain user to do so. AS-REP roasting targets accounts with pre-authentication disabled and needs no credentials. The cracking step is similar in both cases, but the preconditions, the Hashcat modes, and the directory attributes you audit are different.

Does a Strong Password Make the Account Safe?

It makes offline cracking impractical, which removes most of the risk, but the weakness remains visible and exploitable in other ways. An attacker can still confirm that the account exists and is reachable. The correct fix is to clear the pre-authentication flag; a strong password is a compensating control for the rare legacy system that genuinely cannot work without it.

What Should My SOC Alert On?

Alert on Windows security event 4768 with a pre-authentication type of 0, particularly several such events from one source address within a short window. Baseline first, because a small number of legitimate accounts may generate these routinely. Combine the alert with the directory list of accounts that have pre-authentication disabled, so analysts can triage quickly.

Related Terms

You May Be Interested In These

What Is Nikto?

Cybersecurity Terms

17 November 2026

What Is Nikto?

Read More
What Is LoRaWAN Security?

Cybersecurity Terms

17 November 2026

What Is LoRaWAN Security?

Read More