Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Kerberoasting lets any authenticated domain user request Kerberos service tickets and crack them offline to recover service account passwords, turning a single foothold into privileged access across Active Directory.

What Is Kerberoasting?
Kerberoasting is an attack on Active Directory in which an ordinary domain user requests Kerberos service tickets for accounts that have a service principal name (SPN), then cracks those tickets offline to recover the service account password. No software flaw is exploited and no privilege beyond a valid domain account is required: the attack uses Kerberos exactly as it was designed to behave.
Tim Medin presented the technique at DerbyCon in 2014. MITRE ATT&CK records it as T1558.003, and it appears in incident reports from ransomware crews and state-linked groups alike, because it converts a foothold on one workstation into the credentials of a service that usually has far more access than the user who was phished.
When a user wants to reach a service in a domain, the Key Distribution Centre issues a service ticket encrypted with the password-derived key of the account that the service runs under. The client cannot read the encrypted portion, which is why the design was considered safe: only the service and the Key Distribution Centre share that key.
Two consequences follow. A domain controller issues service tickets to any authenticated user who asks, without checking whether that user could reach the service at all. And the encrypted portion is a verifiable ciphertext derived from a password, so whoever holds it can test password guesses against it offline, at the speed of their own hardware, with no account to lock and no further events written to your logs.
| Ticket encryption | Key derived from | Practical effect |
|---|---|---|
| RC4-HMAC (etype 23) | the account NTLM hash | Fast to crack; attackers request it deliberately |
| AES128 and AES256 (etype 17 and 18) | an iterated key derivation over the password | Far slower to crack, though not immune to a weak password |
Because a client states which encryption types it supports, an attacker will ask for RC4 even in a domain that otherwise prefers AES. Removing RC4 from Kerberos takes that choice away, and it needs testing first, since older applications and some trusts still depend on it.
The pattern repeats across almost every estate we assess. A password is set once during installation, chosen by whoever installed the application, reused across environments, and then excluded from the password policy because rotating it would interrupt the service. The same reasoning grants the account more rights than it needs. An eight-character password set in 2016 on an account that administers forty servers is the vulnerability; Kerberoasting is only the means of retrieving it.
Event 4769 is generated in enormous volume, so filtering and a baseline matter more than the rule itself. Microsoft ATA and its successor, Microsoft Defender for Identity, ship a dedicated suspected Kerberoasting detection, and the same logic is straightforward to express in a SIEM.
NCSC password guidance favours length, uniqueness, and machine generation over complexity rules and routine expiry, which suits service accounts precisely: a long secret managed by the operating system beats a memorable one changed each quarter. Cyber Essentials expects administrative activity to use separate accounts and weak or default passwords to be dealt with, and stale service account passwords fail both tests.
Kerberoasting is one of the first checks we run during an internal penetration test, because the answer tells you a great deal about how an intrusion in your domain would end.
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