Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Ticket lifetimes decide how long a Kerberos credential keeps working after it is issued—and therefore how long a stolen ticket remains useful to an attacker.

What Are Kerberos Ticket Lifetimes?
Every Kerberos ticket carries its own expiry, and in Active Directory those values come from four settings in the Default Domain Policy that most organisations have never changed. They are worth understanding, because they determine the window in which a stolen credential still works.
| Setting | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Maximum lifetime for user ticket | 10 hours | How long a ticket-granting ticket is valid |
| Maximum lifetime for user ticket renewal | 7 days | How long a TGT may be renewed without re-entering a password |
| Maximum lifetime for service ticket | 600 minutes | Validity of a ticket for one service |
| Maximum tolerance for clock synchronisation | 5 minutes | Permitted skew before tickets are rejected |
The ten-hour default is a working day plus a margin. It means a user authenticates in the morning and does not see another password prompt until the next day, while the ticket itself stops working overnight. The seven-day renewal window then lets a laptop that sleeps and wakes refresh its TGT without a full re-authentication, which is why people who come back from a week’s leave are asked to sign in again and people who were away for two days are not.
Service tickets inherit the same ten-hour figure by default, but the practical lifetime of a session is usually shorter because the service only needs the ticket at connection time.
Kerberos tickets are bearer credentials once issued. An attacker who extracts tickets from a compromised host’s memory—with Mimikatz, Rubeus, or any of their successors—can inject them into their own session and act as that user for as long as the ticket remains valid. This is pass-the-ticket, and no password is involved at any point.
Shortening the TGT lifetime narrows that window directly. The trade-off is authentication load on domain controllers and, in some configurations, visible prompts to users. Four hours is a defensible figure for a general population; for administrative accounts, shorter still. The Protected Users security group in Windows Server 2012 R2 and later enforces a four-hour TGT lifetime with no renewal for its members, alongside blocking NTLM, DES, and RC4—which makes it the simplest way to apply tighter lifetimes exactly where they matter without touching domain-wide policy.
Here is the detail that makes lifetimes useful for detection as well as prevention. A golden ticket is constructed by the attacker, not issued by the KDC, so its lifetime is whatever the attacker put in it. Mimikatz historically defaulted to ten years, and plenty of forged tickets in real intrusions have carried exactly that.
That is a gift to defenders. A ticket presenting a lifetime that does not correspond to any domain policy is not an oddity, it is evidence. Build detection on it: compare the start and end times in ticket events against the configured policy, and alert on any ticket whose validity exceeds the maximum your domain would ever issue. Attackers who know this now set realistic lifetimes, so it is not a complete control, but it still catches a meaningful proportion of commodity tooling.
Other lifetime-related signals worth collecting are service tickets requested with RC4 encryption when the domain is AES-capable, tickets presented from an address unrelated to where they were issued, and TGT renewals continuing long after the account was disabled—because disabling an account does not invalidate tickets already issued.
Lifetimes live in Group Policy under Computer Configuration, Policies, Windows Settings, Security Settings, Account Policies, Kerberos Policy, and they apply at domain level only. You cannot vary them per organisational unit, which is precisely why Protected Users exists.
Before changing anything, consider what depends on long-lived tickets. Scheduled tasks and batch jobs that run unattended for many hours, applications using delegation to reach back-end services, and long-running database sessions can all break when a ticket expires mid-operation. Test in a representative environment and watch for authentication failures that appear hours into a job rather than at its start.
Also remember what lifetimes do not address. They do not stop Kerberoasting, which happens within a normal ticket’s life. They do not prevent credential theft from memory; they only limit its usefulness afterwards. And they do nothing about a compromised KRBTGT key, which lets an attacker mint fresh tickets indefinitely until the key is rotated twice. Shorter lifetimes are a containment measure that makes an intruder work harder and generate more noise, which is a reasonable thing to buy for the cost of a policy change.
At Privia Security, we examine credential lifetime and containment design as part of our cyber risk analysis services.
For privileged accounts, yes, and the Protected Users group does it without changing domain-wide policy by enforcing a four-hour non-renewable ticket. For the general population the gain is smaller and the operational risk higher, since long-running jobs and delegated applications can fail mid-operation. Measure what depends on long tickets before changing the domain default.
Not immediately. Tickets already issued remain cryptographically valid until they expire, and a service that accepts one does not contact the KDC to check the account status. That is why leaver processes should include explicit session revocation, and why the ticket lifetime effectively sets the worst-case delay between disabling an account and access genuinely stopping.
A forged ticket carries whatever lifetime the attacker chose, and common tooling has historically defaulted to values like ten years. Comparing the validity period in ticket events against what your domain policy could actually issue turns that into a high-confidence alert. Skilled attackers now set realistic values, so treat it as one signal among several rather than a complete control.
It lets a client refresh a ticket-granting ticket that is nearing expiry without the user re-entering credentials, which is what keeps a laptop working across several days of sleeping and waking. The default allows renewal for seven days. After that window closes, full re-authentication is required, which is why returning from a long absence prompts a sign-in.
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