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What Are ADCS ESC Attacks?

ESC1 to ESC16 are catalogued misconfigurations in Active Directory Certificate Services that let an ordinary domain user obtain a certificate for a privileged account and authenticate as them.

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17 November 2026

What Are ADCS ESC Attacks?

What Are ADCS ESC Attacks?

ADCS ESC attacks are a numbered catalogue of ways to abuse Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) for privilege escalation and persistence. The numbering comes from “Certified Pre-Owned”, the whitepaper Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen of SpecterOps released in June 2021, which defined ESC1 to ESC8. Researchers have since added further classes, and the list now runs into the mid teens.

The common thread is simple. In an Active Directory forest, a certificate issued by an enterprise CA can be used to authenticate over Kerberos or Schannel. If a low-privileged user can persuade the CA to issue them a certificate that names someone else, they can log in as that person. Most domains have had AD CS installed for years, often by someone who has since left, and almost nobody audits the templates.

The Core Escalation Classes

ClassWeakness
ESC1A template allows the requester to supply the subject alternative name, permits client authentication, and does not require manager approval. Request a certificate as the domain administrator.
ESC2A template grants the Any Purpose EKU, or no EKU at all, so the certificate can be used for anything.
ESC3A template grants the Certificate Request Agent EKU, letting the holder enrol on behalf of other users.
ESC4Weak access control on the template object itself, so an attacker can rewrite it into an ESC1 template and then request.
ESC5Weak access control on wider PKI objects, such as the CA computer account or the NTAuthCertificates container.
ESC6The CA has the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag set, which lets any requester add an arbitrary SAN to any template.
ESC7Weak permissions on the CA, specifically ManageCA or ManageCertificates, allowing flag changes or approval of pending requests.
ESC8The AD CS web enrolment endpoint accepts NTLM over HTTP, so a coerced domain controller authentication can be relayed into a certificate request.

Later additions cover certificate renewal weaknesses, the certificate mapping behaviour reintroduced by misconfigured strong mapping settings, and abuse of the msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag in other combinations.

Why Certificates Are Such a Useful Prize

A forged or improperly issued certificate is not a password. It cannot be revoked by resetting an account, it typically remains valid for a year or more, and it keeps working after the victim changes their credentials. That makes AD CS abuse a persistence mechanism as much as a privilege escalation technique. ESC8 is also attractive because it chains neatly with NTLM coercion techniques: coerce a domain controller to authenticate to you, relay it to the web enrolment page, and receive a certificate for the DC machine account, which is enough to perform DCSync.

Tooling

Attack tooling is mature. Certify and Certipy enumerate templates and CAs and request certificates in one step; PSPKIAudit and the certutil built-ins cover the defensive side; BloodHound ingests AD CS objects and draws the escalation path for you. A tester running certipy find -vulnerable against a typical enterprise forest will usually have something to report within a few minutes.

Fixing and Auditing

Detection

Enable auditing on the CA and forward the Certification Services event log. Event 4886 records a request and 4887 records issuance, including the requester and the subject. A certificate issued to one account that names a completely different, privileged principal is a high-fidelity alert. On the client side, watch for Kerberos authentication using a certificate (event 4768 with a certificate issuer) for accounts that never use smart cards.

AD CS review is a standard component of our Red Team services, because it is still one of the shortest paths from a standard user to the whole forest.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Do ESC Attacks Need Domain Admin to Start?

No, and that is the point. Most of the escalation classes begin with the rights of an ordinary authenticated domain user, or even an unauthenticated position in the case of relay chains. ESC1 in particular needs only enrolment rights on one badly configured template. The result is often a certificate for a Domain Admin or a domain controller machine account.

Does Revoking a Certificate Undo the Attack?

Only partially, and only if revocation checking is enforced. Kerberos authentication with certificates does not always consult a certificate revocation list, so a revoked certificate can still work. Proper remediation means fixing the template or CA weakness, revoking issued certificates, and in serious cases rotating the CA key and reissuing. Treat a confirmed AD CS compromise as a forest recovery question.

How Do I Find Vulnerable Templates Quickly?

Run Certipy or Certify in enumeration mode from a domain-joined context, or use PSPKIAudit if you prefer Microsoft-signed tooling. Both list published templates, their enrolment rights, extended key usages, and whether requesters may supply a subject alternative name. Review the output with the template owners, because some findings are intentional and need a compensating control rather than removal.

Is AD CS Still a Risk if We Use Entra ID?

Yes, wherever an on-premises forest remains. Hybrid environments usually keep AD CS for device certificates, VPN, or Wi-Fi, and the escalation paths continue to work against the on-premises domain. Compromise there frequently reaches the cloud through synchronisation accounts or federation. Decommission AD CS deliberately if you no longer need it, rather than leaving it installed and unmonitored.

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