Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
ESC1 to ESC16 are catalogued misconfigurations in Active Directory Certificate Services that let an ordinary domain user obtain a certificate for a privileged account and authenticate as them.

What Are ADCS ESC Attacks?
ADCS ESC attacks are a numbered catalogue of ways to abuse Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) for privilege escalation and persistence. The numbering comes from “Certified Pre-Owned”, the whitepaper Will Schroeder and Lee Christensen of SpecterOps released in June 2021, which defined ESC1 to ESC8. Researchers have since added further classes, and the list now runs into the mid teens.
The common thread is simple. In an Active Directory forest, a certificate issued by an enterprise CA can be used to authenticate over Kerberos or Schannel. If a low-privileged user can persuade the CA to issue them a certificate that names someone else, they can log in as that person. Most domains have had AD CS installed for years, often by someone who has since left, and almost nobody audits the templates.
| Class | Weakness |
|---|---|
| ESC1 | A template allows the requester to supply the subject alternative name, permits client authentication, and does not require manager approval. Request a certificate as the domain administrator. |
| ESC2 | A template grants the Any Purpose EKU, or no EKU at all, so the certificate can be used for anything. |
| ESC3 | A template grants the Certificate Request Agent EKU, letting the holder enrol on behalf of other users. |
| ESC4 | Weak access control on the template object itself, so an attacker can rewrite it into an ESC1 template and then request. |
| ESC5 | Weak access control on wider PKI objects, such as the CA computer account or the NTAuthCertificates container. |
| ESC6 | The CA has the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag set, which lets any requester add an arbitrary SAN to any template. |
| ESC7 | Weak permissions on the CA, specifically ManageCA or ManageCertificates, allowing flag changes or approval of pending requests. |
| ESC8 | The AD CS web enrolment endpoint accepts NTLM over HTTP, so a coerced domain controller authentication can be relayed into a certificate request. |
Later additions cover certificate renewal weaknesses, the certificate mapping behaviour reintroduced by misconfigured strong mapping settings, and abuse of the msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag in other combinations.
A forged or improperly issued certificate is not a password. It cannot be revoked by resetting an account, it typically remains valid for a year or more, and it keeps working after the victim changes their credentials. That makes AD CS abuse a persistence mechanism as much as a privilege escalation technique. ESC8 is also attractive because it chains neatly with NTLM coercion techniques: coerce a domain controller to authenticate to you, relay it to the web enrolment page, and receive a certificate for the DC machine account, which is enough to perform DCSync.
Attack tooling is mature. Certify and Certipy enumerate templates and CAs and request certificates in one step; PSPKIAudit and the certutil built-ins cover the defensive side; BloodHound ingests AD CS objects and draws the escalation path for you. A tester running certipy find -vulnerable against a typical enterprise forest will usually have something to report within a few minutes.
EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 and clear it.Enable auditing on the CA and forward the Certification Services event log. Event 4886 records a request and 4887 records issuance, including the requester and the subject. A certificate issued to one account that names a completely different, privileged principal is a high-fidelity alert. On the client side, watch for Kerberos authentication using a certificate (event 4768 with a certificate issuer) for accounts that never use smart cards.
AD CS review is a standard component of our Red Team services, because it is still one of the shortest paths from a standard user to the whole forest.
No, and that is the point. Most of the escalation classes begin with the rights of an ordinary authenticated domain user, or even an unauthenticated position in the case of relay chains. ESC1 in particular needs only enrolment rights on one badly configured template. The result is often a certificate for a Domain Admin or a domain controller machine account.
Only partially, and only if revocation checking is enforced. Kerberos authentication with certificates does not always consult a certificate revocation list, so a revoked certificate can still work. Proper remediation means fixing the template or CA weakness, revoking issued certificates, and in serious cases rotating the CA key and reissuing. Treat a confirmed AD CS compromise as a forest recovery question.
Run Certipy or Certify in enumeration mode from a domain-joined context, or use PSPKIAudit if you prefer Microsoft-signed tooling. Both list published templates, their enrolment rights, extended key usages, and whether requesters may supply a subject alternative name. Review the output with the template owners, because some findings are intentional and need a compensating control rather than removal.
Yes, wherever an on-premises forest remains. Hybrid environments usually keep AD CS for device certificates, VPN, or Wi-Fi, and the escalation paths continue to work against the on-premises domain. Compromise there frequently reaches the cloud through synchronisation accounts or federation. Decommission AD CS deliberately if you no longer need it, rather than leaving it installed and unmonitored.
You May Be Interested In These
We use a few cookies that are needed to make this website work, and they are always on. We would also like to set analytics cookies, to see which pages are useful; functional cookies, so that our live chat works; and advertising cookies, to measure our campaigns. We will not set any of those until you say yes, and you can change your mind at any time from the Cookie Settings link in the footer.
Choose the cookies you are happy for us to use. Strictly necessary cookies are always on; everything else is off until you turn it on.
These cookies keep the website working: they hold your security checks, your form submissions and the choice you make here. The site cannot run without them, so they are always on.
These let our live chat open and remember your conversation, and let the newsletter sign-up work. Switch them off and the chat window will not appear.
These tell us which pages are read and how people find us, so that we can improve the site. The reports are about groups of visitors, never about you personally.
These let us measure our advertising and show you our adverts on other websites, such as LinkedIn, Google and Meta. Switch them off and you will still see adverts, but they will be less relevant.