Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
NTLM coercion forces a Windows server or domain controller to authenticate to a machine of the attacker’s choosing, supplying the authentication that a relay attack needs.

What Are NTLM Coercion Techniques?
NTLM coercion is the art of making a Windows machine authenticate to you on demand. On its own it reveals nothing useful, but it supplies the missing ingredient for an NTLM relay attack: a victim that connects at the moment of your choosing, rather than whenever a user happens to mistype a share name. Pair coercion with relay, and an attacker with a single low-privileged domain account can often reach domain controller compromise in minutes.
Several Microsoft RPC interfaces accept a UNC path as a parameter and instruct the server to go and look at it. When the server reaches out to \\\\attacker\\share, it authenticates using its own machine account over SMB or HTTP, because that is how Windows accesses network resources. The call is behaving exactly as documented. The problem is that the path is attacker-supplied and the authentication is automatic.
A domain controller’s machine account is a particularly valuable thing to coerce, because it is a member of Domain Controllers and in some configurations can be used to request a certificate or modify directory objects.
| Name | Interface abused | Note |
|---|---|---|
| PrinterBug / SpoolSample | MS-RPRN, RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx | Published by Lee Christensen in 2018; requires the Print Spooler service to be running |
| PetitPotam | MS-EFSRPC, EfsRpcOpenFileRaw and related calls | Released by Gilles Lionel in July 2021; originally worked unauthenticated against some systems |
| DFSCoerce | MS-DFSNM, NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot | Targets the DFS Namespace service, which cannot simply be disabled on a domain controller |
| ShadowCoerce | MS-FSRVP, the shadow copy service | Requires the File Server VSS Agent role |
| WebDAV coercion | Any of the above, with a WebDAV-style path | Forces HTTP authentication instead of SMB, which bypasses SMB signing |
The tool Coercer automates the whole set, trying every known method against a target until one responds. Expect new entries: this is a pattern in the protocol family rather than a finite list of bugs, and researchers have found fresh variants every year since 2018.
SMB signing, when enforced, prevents SMB relay. Coercion over WebDAV sidesteps that entirely by producing an HTTP authentication, and HTTP relay targets are plentiful. The most damaging is the Active Directory Certificate Services web enrolment interface. Relaying a domain controller’s coerced authentication to AD CS—the technique known as ESC8—yields a certificate for the domain controller’s machine account, which is then used to obtain a Kerberos ticket and perform DCSync. That chain, usually demonstrated as PetitPotam plus ESC8, remains one of the fastest paths from zero to domain compromise in an unhardened Active Directory.
The WebClient service that enables WebDAV is not running by default on servers, but it is on many workstations, and an attacker can often start it remotely through a searchConnector file dropped on a writable share.
Microsoft’s position has been that coercion is largely by design, so the defence focuses on making the resulting authentication useless rather than preventing the call.
Coercion is quiet but not invisible. Watch for machine account authentications arriving at hosts that are not file servers, especially from domain controllers. Certificate issuance to a machine account from an unusual requester is a high-fidelity signal for the ESC8 chain, and AD CS logs the requester identity. Network detection rules for the specific RPC operation numbers are also available in open Suricata and Zeek rule sets.
At Privia Security, we test this chain as standard during internal Penetration Test Services, because the gap between “patched” and “hardened” is where it lives.
Mostly a feature being used against its intent. The affected RPC calls are documented interfaces that legitimately instruct a server to access a path, and Microsoft has declined to treat several of them as vulnerabilities. Individual implementations have been patched where authentication was not required, but the broader behaviour persists, which is why defence focuses on making the coerced authentication unusable.
It stops PrinterBug only. PetitPotam uses the encrypting file system RPC interface, DFSCoerce uses the DFS namespace service, and others exist. Disabling the spooler on domain controllers is still worthwhile for other reasons, including PrintNightmare, but it should be treated as closing one door in a corridor rather than as a solution to coercion.
Enabling Extended Protection for Authentication and requiring HTTPS on Active Directory Certificate Services web enrolment, or removing that role if unused. Coercion only becomes critical when the authentication can be relayed somewhere valuable, and AD CS web enrolment is by far the most valuable target. Combine it with SMB signing and LDAP channel binding to close the remaining relay paths.
Run the public coercion tools from a standard domain-joined machine with an ordinary user account against your own servers, with authorisation, and see which respond. Then audit your AD CS configuration with Certipy or PSPKIAudit for ESC8 and related misconfigurations. The combination of a responding coercion method and an unprotected relay target is what turns theory into a domain compromise.
You May Be Interested In These
We use a few cookies that are needed to make this website work, and they are always on. We would also like to set analytics cookies, to see which pages are useful; functional cookies, so that our live chat works; and advertising cookies, to measure our campaigns. We will not set any of those until you say yes, and you can change your mind at any time from the Cookie Settings link in the footer.
Choose the cookies you are happy for us to use. Strictly necessary cookies are always on; everything else is off until you turn it on.
These cookies keep the website working: they hold your security checks, your form submissions and the choice you make here. The site cannot run without them, so they are always on.
These let our live chat open and remember your conversation, and let the newsletter sign-up work. Switch them off and the chat window will not appear.
These tell us which pages are read and how people find us, so that we can improve the site. The reports are about groups of visitors, never about you personally.
These let us measure our advertising and show you our adverts on other websites, such as LinkedIn, Google and Meta. Switch them off and you will still see adverts, but they will be less relevant.