Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Resource-based constrained delegation lets a resource decide who may impersonate users to it. Write access to a computer object is therefore enough to take it over completely.

What Is Resource-Based Constrained Delegation?
Resource-based constrained delegation is an Active Directory feature introduced with Windows Server 2012 that inverts how delegation is configured. In the older model, an administrator set on the front-end service which back-end services it could impersonate users to. RBCD instead lets the resource decide: each object carries an attribute, msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity, listing which accounts may act on a user’s behalf when connecting to it.
The design is sensible from an administrative point of view, since the owner of a resource is best placed to decide who may impersonate to it. From a security point of view it moves a highly sensitive decision from “requires Domain Admin” to “requires write access to this one object”, and that difference is what attackers exploit. Elad Shamir set out the attack in his 2019 paper “Wagging the Dog”, and it has been a staple of Active Directory testing ever since.
Suppose an attacker has write permission over a computer object—through a delegated help desk group, an inherited permission on an organisational unit, or an NTLM relay to LDAP. The sequence is:
MachineAccountQuota attribute lets any authenticated domain user create up to ten by default. Tools such as PowerMad or Impacket’s addcomputer.py do this in one command.msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity on the target computer so that it trusts the new account. Impacket’s rbcd.py handles the security descriptor encoding.secretsdump.py or psexec.py.Start to finish this takes a couple of minutes, and the default MachineAccountQuota of 10 is what makes step one trivial for any ordinary domain user.
Write permissions on computer objects accumulate invisibly. A help desk group granted GenericWrite on a workstation OU in 2016 so that staff could manage descriptions. An inherited permission from a deployment account. A service account for an imaging tool with more rights than it needs. None of these look like administrative access on an organisation chart, and graph analysis with BloodHound finds them in minutes.
The technique is also the standard follow-up to relayed LDAP authentication, which is why it appears alongside coercion findings so often. Its close relative, the shadow credentials attack, abuses a different attribute on the same objects to achieve a comparable result.
MachineAccountQuota to 0. Domain joins should be performed by delegated accounts with explicit rights, not by ordinary users. This single change removes the easiest path to a controllable account with a service principal name.GenericWrite, GenericAll, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, and write access to the delegation attribute itself, granted to non-administrative groups. BloodHound reports these directly.msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity value and confirm each one is intended; most environments find entries nobody recognises.The decisive signal is a change to the delegation attribute. Enable directory service change auditing and alert on event ID 5136 where the modified attribute is msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity—legitimate changes are rare and planned, so false positives are minimal. Supporting signals include event 4741 for computer account creation by a non-administrative user, and Kerberos event 4769 showing S4U activity for an account that has never performed delegation before.
At Privia Security, our internal Penetration Test Services include an Active Directory permission review that maps exactly which accounts hold write access to which objects, which is usually where this finding originates.
It is a domain-wide attribute controlling how many computer accounts an ordinary authenticated user may create, set to 10 by default since Windows 2000. Attackers rely on it to obtain a controllable account with a service principal name, which is the prerequisite for the delegation chain. Setting it to 0 and delegating domain join rights to specific accounts removes that convenience without affecting legitimate operations.
Classic constrained delegation is configured on the front-end service and requires the SeEnableDelegation privilege, which is effectively Domain Admin. Resource-based delegation is configured on the target object and requires only write access to that object. The security decision therefore moves from a tightly held privilege to a commonly delegated permission, which is what makes it exploitable.
Yes, if an attacker can write to the domain controller’s computer object, which usually means relaying a coerced authentication to LDAP or exploiting an excessive permission. That is why LDAP signing and channel binding matter so much, and why domain controller objects should be audited for write permissions held by anything other than the expected administrative groups.
Query Active Directory for objects with a populated msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute, and separately for accounts with msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo or unconstrained delegation enabled. PowerShell and BloodHound both report these. Review each entry against a documented reason, and remove anything nobody can account for, since unused delegation is a standing attack path.
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