Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Kerberos constrained delegation lets a service act on a user’s behalf. Compromise that service account and the S4U extensions become a route to impersonating any user, including domain administrators.

What Are Constrained Delegation Attacks?
Kerberos delegation exists to solve a genuine problem. A web application that needs to query a database as the signed-in user has to obtain a ticket for that user to the database, without knowing their password. Constrained delegation, introduced in Windows Server 2003, allows this but restricts which services the intermediate account may reach, listed in its msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute.
The restriction is narrower than it looks. An attacker who compromises a service account configured for constrained delegation can usually impersonate arbitrary users to the listed services, and — because of how the protocol was specified — frequently to services that were never listed at all.
Two Kerberos extensions make delegation work:
TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION flag.Chain them and the sequence is: take the compromised service account’s key, call S4U2Self to mint a forwardable ticket for the domain administrator, then call S4U2Proxy to obtain a ticket for the target service as that administrator. No password for the administrator is ever needed.
The important subtlety, demonstrated publicly by Alberto Solino in Impacket, is that the service principal name inside the resulting ticket is not integrity-protected in the way most administrators assume. The service class portion — the CIFS, HTTP, LDAP, or TIME prefix — can be rewritten by the attacker after the ticket is issued, because the Key Distribution Centre only validates the host portion.
Practically, this means delegation to TIME/dc01.corp.example, which looks harmless, is equivalent to delegation to CIFS/dc01.corp.example and LDAP/dc01.corp.example. Any constrained delegation entry pointing at a domain controller is a path to full domain compromise, regardless of how innocuous the named service appears.
Two queries cover most of it. List accounts with a populated delegation attribute, and list accounts carrying the protocol transition flag:
Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -like "*"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo,userAccountControl
BloodHound maps the same relationships graphically and will draw the path from a delegated service account to Domain Admins, which is usually the most persuasive way to present the finding.
ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota to zero to close the resource-based variant.Watch for Windows event 4769 with a transited services field populated, which indicates S4U2Proxy, especially where the account requesting the ticket is not a known delegated service. Changes to msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo or msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity should generate directory change alerts, since legitimate modifications are rare and planned.
Delegation review is a standard part of our penetration test services, and it is one of the few findings where a configuration change on a single account closes a path to the entire forest.
It is better, but the name promises more than it delivers. Unconstrained delegation caches full ticket-granting tickets and is indefensible on anything reachable by users. Constrained delegation limits the listed targets, yet the service class in a ticket can be rewritten, so delegation to any service on a host effectively means delegation to every service on it. Resource-based delegation is generally the safest of the three.
Protocol transition, set by the trusted to authenticate for delegation flag, allows the service to call S4U2Self and create a forwardable ticket for any user without that user authenticating by Kerberos. For an attacker holding the service account key, this removes the need to wait for a privileged user to connect, which turns a conditional attack into an immediate one.
Query Active Directory for objects with a populated msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute, for the user account control flags covering unconstrained delegation and protocol transition, and for populated msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attributes. Run BloodHound alongside, because it shows which of those paths actually reaches a privileged group. Review the results with application owners, then remove whatever cannot be justified.
It helps considerably for the accounts in it, because members cannot be delegated and are restricted to stronger Kerberos encryption. It does not fix the misconfiguration itself, and it can break legitimate workflows for accounts that rely on older authentication. Use it for privileged accounts, combined with the sensitive and cannot be delegated flag, while also removing unnecessary delegation.
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