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Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
PetitPotam forces a Windows domain controller to authenticate to an attacker through the encrypting file system RPC interface, opening the fastest known route to full domain compromise.

What Is PetitPotam?
PetitPotam is a coercion technique published by the French researcher Gilles Lionel, known as Topotam, on 18 July 2021. It abuses the Microsoft Encrypting File System Remote Protocol, MS-EFSRPC, to make a Windows server—usually a domain controller—connect to an address of the attacker’s choosing and authenticate there with its machine account. The tool is small and the call is legitimate; the consequences are not.
MS-EFSRPC exists to manage data stored on encrypted file systems, and several of its methods take a file path as a parameter. EfsRpcOpenFileRaw was the original target: send it a UNC path such as \\\\attacker\\share\\file over the \pipe\lsarpc named pipe, and the server attempts to open that file. Opening a remote file means authenticating to the remote host, and Windows does so automatically using the machine account.
When Lionel published, the call could be made in some configurations without any credentials at all. Microsoft’s response, advisory ADV210003 and later the patch for CVE-2021-36942, required authentication for EfsRpcOpenFileRaw. Researchers promptly demonstrated that other methods in the same interface produced the same result, and a standard domain user account is enough to invoke them. The technique therefore survives, now as an authenticated attack.
Coercion by itself achieves nothing—the attacker simply receives an NTLM authentication they cannot use. The value comes from relaying it, and the destination that matters is Active Directory Certificate Services.
The AD CS web enrolment interface, if installed, accepts NTLM authentication over HTTP and issues certificates. Relaying the domain controller’s coerced authentication to it produces a certificate issued to the domain controller’s own machine account, using the DomainController or Machine template. The attacker then uses that certificate to request a Kerberos ticket-granting ticket through PKINIT, and from there performs DCSync to extract every password hash in the directory, including KRBTGT.
The full chain, usually written as PetitPotam plus ESC8, runs from a standard domain user to Domain Admin equivalent in a few minutes with Impacket and a coercion tool. It is frequently the single finding that most changes a client’s view of their Active Directory security.
Because the coercion call is considered working as intended, the effective controls sit on the relay side.
certsrv application, require HTTPS, and disable NTLM for that site. If web enrolment is not used—and in many organisations it is not—remove the role service entirely. This single change breaks the chain whichever coercion method is used.The clearest signal is a certificate issued to a domain controller machine account by a requester that is not that domain controller. AD CS logs the requester, and this combination has essentially no legitimate cause, which makes it an excellent alert. Supporting signals include machine account authentications to hosts that are not file servers, and network detection rules matching the EFSRPC operation numbers—open rule sets for Suricata and Zeek cover them.
Microsoft Defender for Identity flags both the coercion attempt and suspicious certificate activity, and the same logic is straightforward to build in a SIEM given certificate authority log collection, which many organisations have never configured.
PetitPotam is the best-known member of a family that also includes PrinterBug, DFSCoerce, and ShadowCoerce; the general problem is covered under NTLM coercion techniques. Treating them individually leads to an endless cycle of disabling one service after another. Treating the relay destinations as the real exposure fixes the class.
At Privia Security, our Penetration Test Services include an Active Directory Certificate Services review, because AD CS misconfiguration is still the most common critical finding we report in mature Windows estates.
Partially. Microsoft restricted the specific unauthenticated call used in the original release through CVE-2021-36942, but other methods in the same interface achieve the same coercion for any authenticated domain user. Treating PetitPotam as a closed issue because the patch is installed is a common and serious mistake. The durable fix is hardening the relay targets, particularly AD CS web enrolment.
You are much less exposed, because the most damaging relay destination is absent. Coercion can still be relayed to LDAP on a domain controller, which enables resource-based constrained delegation and shadow credential attacks, and to SMB where signing is not enforced. Confirm AD CS is genuinely absent rather than installed and forgotten, which happens more often than teams expect.
RPC filters can restrict it, and several researchers publish ready-made filter sets. This is worth doing, but treat it as one layer. The same coercion is achievable through the DFS namespace service, the print spooler, and the file server VSS agent, so blocking a single interface moves the attacker to the next one rather than stopping the technique.
With authorisation, run a coercion tool from a standard domain user account against a domain controller while listening for the inbound authentication, then audit your certificate services configuration with Certipy or PSPKIAudit for the ESC8 condition. A successful coercion combined with an unprotected web enrolment endpoint means the full domain compromise path is available today.
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