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What Is a Silver Ticket Attack?

A Silver Ticket attack forges a Kerberos service ticket using a stolen service account key, granting access to one service without the domain controller ever seeing the request.

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17 November 2026

What Is a Silver Ticket Attack?

What Is a Silver Ticket Attack?

A Silver Ticket attack is a Kerberos ticket forgery in which an attacker who already holds the password hash of a service account or computer account mints their own service ticket for that one service. The ticket is never issued by a domain controller: the service decrypts it with its own key, reads the Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) inside, and grants whatever access the PAC claims.

MITRE ATT&CK catalogues the technique as T1558.002. Compared with its louder relative, the Golden Ticket attack, a Silver Ticket is narrow in scope but far harder to spot, because the domain controller logs nothing at all.

Ingredients of a Forged Service Ticket

To build one, an attacker needs five things:

Everything except the key is public information. The key is the only secret, and there are several ways to obtain it: Kerberoasting a service account with a weak password, dumping the local SAM or LSASS memory on a compromised server, or reading a machine account hash from the registry of a host the attacker already owns. Impacket’s ticketer.py and Mimikatz both automate the forgery itself.

Why the Domain Controller Never Finds Out

In normal Kerberos authentication, a client asks the Key Distribution Centre for a service ticket and receives one encrypted with the service account’s key. The service cannot verify the PAC on its own; it trusts that only the KDC could have produced a ticket that decrypts correctly. PAC validation, in which the service calls back to a domain controller to check the signature, is skipped for services running as SYSTEM or with SeTcbPrivilege, which covers most of them.

That assumption is what the attack breaks. Because the request never reaches a KDC, there is no event 4768 or 4769 on any domain controller, and the only trace is a successful logon on the target server itself.

What a Single Service Buys an Attacker

A Silver Ticket unlocks one SPN, but some services are worth far more than others:

Because a computer account owns HOST, CIFS, and RPCSS on its own machine, stealing a single machine account hash effectively hands the attacker SYSTEM on that server and a convenient foothold for further lateral movement.

Detection Without KDC Logs

Hunting for Silver Tickets means comparing two sources that should always agree:

Enabling Kerberos PAC validation through the ValidateKdcPacSignature setting closes much of the gap at a small performance cost. More significant is Microsoft’s PAC signature hardening (KB5020805), enforced from November 2023, which adds a signature only the KRBTGT key can produce, so a classic Silver Ticket forged with a service key alone is rejected by patched services.

Practical Defences

Move service accounts to group managed service accounts, which rotate long random passwords automatically and make Kerberoasting pointless. Leave automatic machine account password rotation enabled; the 30-day default limits how long a stolen computer hash stays useful. Disable RC4 across the domain so that AES keys, which are much harder to recover offline, are the only option. Keep domain controllers and member servers current with Kerberos hardening updates, and treat any server where a service hash can be dumped as a tier-0 asset.

At Privia Security, our Red Team Services forge Silver Tickets during Active Directory engagements to show which servers would fall silently, and which of your detections would actually fire.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

What Is the Difference Between a Golden Ticket and a Silver Ticket?

A Golden Ticket is forged with the KRBTGT account key and produces a ticket-granting ticket that works across the whole domain. A Silver Ticket is forged with one service or computer account key and produces a service ticket for that single service. The Golden Ticket is far more powerful, but the Silver Ticket is quieter because it never contacts a domain controller.

Can a Silver Ticket Attack Be Detected on the Domain Controller?

Not directly, because no ticket request reaches the KDC. Detection has to come from the target service itself: a successful logon on a member server with no corresponding 4769 event on any domain controller is the classic signal. Correlating member server logs with domain controller Kerberos logs in a SIEM is the only reliable way to surface that gap.

Does Changing a Service Account Password Invalidate a Silver Ticket?

Yes. The forged ticket is encrypted with the key derived from the service account password, so resetting that password makes every existing Silver Ticket undecryptable by the service. For computer accounts, the automatic 30-day rotation does the same job. After a confirmed compromise, reset the affected service and machine account passwords as part of containment.

Do Group Managed Service Accounts Stop Silver Tickets?

They remove the most common route to the key. A gMSA password is a long random value rotated automatically, so it cannot be cracked offline after Kerberoasting. An attacker who gains SYSTEM on a host allowed to retrieve the gMSA password can still read it, so gMSAs reduce the attack surface rather than eliminating the technique.

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