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Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) was a cryptographic flaw in the Netlogon protocol that let an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a domain controller take over an entire Active Directory domain.

What Is Zerologon?
Zerologon is CVE-2020-1472, a flaw in the Netlogon Remote Protocol that received the maximum CVSS score of 10.0. An attacker with network access to a domain controller, and no credentials of any kind, could impersonate that domain controller’s machine account, blank its password, and from there extract every credential in Active Directory. The whole sequence took a couple of minutes.
Tom Tervoort of the Dutch security firm Secura found it. Microsoft patched it quietly on 11 August 2020, and when Secura published the technical write-up on 14 September 2020 the exploitation began almost immediately.
Netlogon establishes a secure channel between a domain-joined machine and a domain controller. Part of that handshake involves ComputeNetlogonCredential, which encrypts a client challenge using a session key.
The implementation used AES in CFB8 mode with an initialisation vector fixed at all zeroes. CFB8 processes one byte at a time, feeding ciphertext back into the next block. With an all-zero IV and an all-zero plaintext, there is a one in 256 chance for any given key that the output is also all zeroes.
That probability is the vulnerability. An attacker sends an authentication attempt with a challenge of eight zero bytes and a credential of eight zero bytes. On average one in every 256 attempts succeeds, and the attempts can be made as fast as the network allows, so the loop finishes in seconds. The attacker is then authenticated as the domain controller’s own computer account.
Protocol choices made it worse. Signing and sealing of Netlogon traffic were optional and could simply be turned off by the client, and the NetrServerPasswordSet2 call allowed the attacker to set the machine account password to an empty value.
NetrServerPasswordSet2 to set the domain controller’s machine account password in Active Directory to empty.There is an important operational trap in step two. The password is changed in Active Directory but not in the local registry of the domain controller, so the machine loses its own secure channel and replication breaks. Attackers who did not restore it caused obvious damage; the careful ones restored the original password afterwards and left far less evidence.
CISA issued Emergency Directive 20-04 on 18 September 2020, four days after the write-up, giving US federal agencies until the following Monday to patch. Ryuk ransomware operators adopted it within weeks, and an incident documented that October showed Zerologon used roughly two hours after initial phishing access, with domain-wide ransomware deployment five hours later. Iranian state-linked groups, including the actor tracked as MERCURY, were observed using it against targets in several countries.
Exploit code was trivially available, including Secura’s own safe tester, which checks for the flaw without changing any password.
Microsoft could not simply require secure Netlogon overnight, because non-Windows devices, network appliances, and old Samba installations did not support it. The rollout therefore came in two stages:
DomainControllerAllowedNtlmV1AndVulnerableSecureChannel group policy.Any environment that added exemptions in 2020 as a stopgap should check whether those exemptions still exist. They are a quiet way for a long-patched vulnerability to remain exploitable.
Look for event 4742 showing a domain controller computer account password change not performed by the system itself, a burst of Netlogon authentication failures from a single source followed by a success, event 5829 indicating a vulnerable secure channel connection, and DCSync replication requests from hosts that are not domain controllers.
The broader lesson is about exposure rather than this single CVE. Netlogon is reachable from any host that can talk to a domain controller over SMB and RPC, which in a flat network means every workstation on the estate. Network segmentation that restricts which systems may reach domain controller management protocols limits the blast radius of the next protocol flaw as well as this one.
Our Penetration Test Services include Active Directory assessments that check for lingering Netlogon exemptions and the segmentation gaps that make flaws like this reachable in the first place.
Not on a domain controller that has received updates since February 2021, when Microsoft made enforcement mode mandatory. Two situations still deserve a check: domain controllers that have fallen outside patching, and environments where administrators added explicit exemptions through group policy in 2020 to accommodate legacy devices and never removed them.
None at all. Zerologon required only network access to a domain controller over SMB and RPC. Any device on the internal network, including an unmanaged laptop, a compromised printer, or a guest machine on a flat network, could run the exploit. That absence of any authentication requirement is why it scored the maximum 10.0 on CVSS.
Requiring secure Netlogon immediately would have broken non-Windows domain members, network appliances, and older Samba installations that did not implement it. The August 2020 update enforced secure RPC for Windows accounts while logging which others were still vulnerable, giving administrators six months to fix or replace them before enforcement became mandatory in February 2021.
Confirm that all domain controllers have cumulative updates from February 2021 or later, then review the registry and group policy for any accounts added to the vulnerable secure channel allow list. Reviewing event IDs 5827 to 5831 in the System log shows whether anything is still attempting a vulnerable connection. Secura also published a non-destructive tester.
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