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What Is the ISA-95 Model?

ISA-95 is the international model for integrating enterprise systems with manufacturing operations, describing the levels from the physical process up to business planning and the information that crosses between them.

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17 November 2026

What Is the ISA-95 Model?

What Is the ISA-95 Model?

ISA-95, published internationally as IEC 62264, exists to answer a dull but consequential question: what information does a business system need from a factory, and what does the factory need back? It defines a layered model of manufacturing, an object model for the things that cross between layers, and the activities that belong at each level. Security teams have adopted it as shorthand for where things sit, which is a useful borrowing provided its limits are understood.

The Levels

The standard is published in several parts: models and terminology, object model attributes, the activity models of manufacturing operations management, the objects exchanged for integration, and the transaction model. The XML representation known as B2MML gives the object model a concrete serialisation, which is what integrators actually implement.

ISA-95 and Purdue Are Not the Same Thing

Security practitioners routinely say ISA-95 when they mean the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture, a 1990s reference model from which the level numbering derives. The difference matters in one specific place. The industrial demilitarised zone, almost always called Level 3.5, is a security construction added to the Purdue layering by practitioners and standards such as the converged plant-wide Ethernet design guidance. It is not part of ISA-95, which concerns itself with information exchange rather than with network boundaries.

The practical consequence is that ISA-95 will tell you which systems legitimately need to talk to which, and that is genuinely useful input to a zoning exercise, but it will not tell you where to put a firewall. That decision comes from IEC 62443, and specifically from the zone and conduit method in 62443-3-2.

How Security Teams Use It

  1. As a vocabulary. Saying that a server sits at Level 3 tells an engineer and a security architect the same thing about its function, its change control regime, and its tolerance for downtime.
  2. As an input to zoning. The standard’s activity models describe which information genuinely crosses between manufacturing operations and business planning. A conduit that carries only what ISA-95 says should cross is a defensible conduit.
  3. To place the crossing points. Historians, manufacturing execution systems, jump hosts, patch distribution, and antivirus update servers belong in the demilitarised zone between Levels 3 and 4, not on either side of it.
  4. To argue against convenience. When a business application asks for a direct connection to a Level 2 controller, the model is a clear statement that the request is architecturally wrong, independent of anybody’s opinion.

Where the Model Is Under Strain

Three developments have made the strict hierarchy harder to hold. Cloud-hosted manufacturing execution and analytics platforms place Level 3 functions outside the plant entirely. Industrial internet of things sensors publish from Level 1 straight to a cloud service, skipping every layer in between. And the unified namespace pattern, built around a central message broker, deliberately replaces the hierarchy with a publish-subscribe fabric that any system may read from.

These are not necessarily bad, but they relocate the security problem rather than removing it. The useful response is to insist that data paths bypassing the hierarchy are one-way and read-only, which is the principle behind the NAMUR Open Architecture concept: a second, parallel path for monitoring and optimisation data that can never write back into the control function. Where a cloud analytics platform needs plant data, replication outward through the demilitarised zone, or through a data diode where consequence justifies it, preserves the property that matters.

The model also says nothing about safety systems, which sit outside it and should be treated as a separate zone with their own requirements, or about the building services and physical security systems that increasingly share plant infrastructure.

Used as a vocabulary and a sanity check rather than as a network design, ISA-95 remains one of the more useful things an OT security team can have on the wall. Used as a claim that a five-layer architecture is in place when the reality is three flat networks and a wireless router, it is actively misleading, which is why the zoning exercise has to start from the network as it is rather than as the diagram says.

At Privia Security, we map real industrial architectures against this model as part of our Infrastructure and Architecture Review Services.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

What Is Level 3.5 and Why Is It Not in ISA-95?

Level 3.5 is the industrial demilitarised zone, the buffer network between manufacturing operations and the business estate where historians, jump hosts, patch servers, and brokered connections live. It is a security pattern added by practitioners to the Purdue layering. ISA-95 describes information exchange between functional levels and does not specify network boundaries, so the term does not appear in it.

Is the Purdue Model Obsolete?

It is strained rather than obsolete. Cloud manufacturing platforms, industrial internet of things sensors publishing directly outward, and unified namespace architectures all cross the hierarchy. The durable principle is not the five boxes but the direction of trust: data may flow outward freely, control must not flow inward without passing a designed and monitored boundary.

How Does ISA-95 Help With IEC 62443 Zoning?

It supplies the functional map. The activity models say which information legitimately crosses between manufacturing operations and business planning, which lets you define a conduit with a justified purpose and protocol set rather than one that carries whatever happens to be configured. IEC 62443-3-2 then provides the risk assessment method and the target security levels.

What Is a Unified Namespace and Does It Break the Model?

It is an architecture in which every system publishes its current state to a central message broker and any authorised system subscribes, replacing point-to-point hierarchical integration. It does break the strict layering. It can still be secure if the broker is treated as a zone boundary with authentication, authorisation per topic, and a hard rule that control writes never originate from outside the control zone.

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