Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Responder answers broadcast name resolution requests on a local network and impersonates the service the victim was looking for, capturing authentication material in the process.

What Is Responder?
Responder is a small Python tool that exploits an old convenience in Windows networking. When a client cannot resolve a name through DNS, it shouts the question to the whole local subnet using LLMNR, NBT-NS, or mDNS, and accepts an answer from whoever replies first. Responder always replies first, claims to be the host the victim wanted, and then presents a fake SMB, HTTP, LDAP, or SQL service to collect the authentication the client offers.
What comes back is a NetNTLM challenge-response. It is not a password, but it can be cracked offline or, more dangerously, relayed in real time to a service that will accept it. On an internal penetration test, Responder is typically the first thing started and frequently produces domain credentials within minutes.
Nothing needs to be exploited. The failed lookups that trigger this happen constantly on real networks, for mundane reasons: a mistyped share name, a mapped drive pointing at a decommissioned server, a printer reference in a logon script, a browser looking for a proxy configuration. Windows resolves the name, fails in DNS, falls back to broadcast, and sends credentials to whatever answers.
The web proxy case is the most productive. If a machine is configured to detect proxy settings automatically and no wpad record exists in DNS, the client broadcasts for it. Responder supplies a rogue proxy configuration, and from that point the browser authenticates to the attacker for ordinary web requests.
| Path | Requirement | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Offline cracking | A weak or reused password | The plaintext password, usable anywhere |
| SMB relay | SMB signing not enforced on the target | Code execution or file access as the captured user |
| LDAP relay | LDAP signing or channel binding not enforced | Directory modification, including adding computer accounts |
The relay path is the one that turns a captured hash into immediate compromise, and it is covered in more detail under NTLM relay attacks. Responder is usually paired with a relay tool for this, with its own SMB and HTTP servers disabled so they do not compete for the connection.
Captured NetNTLMv2 hashes are cracked with Hashcat in mode 5600. A fifteen-character passphrase will survive; a seasonal password with a number on the end will not survive the lunch break.
This is one of the few internal findings with a clean, complete fix. The attack depends on fallback protocols that almost no modern environment needs.
wpad that points somewhere harmless, so the broadcast never happens, and disable automatic proxy detection where it is not required.Password strength is the backstop rather than the control. Long passphrases and multi-factor authentication limit what a cracked hash achieves, but they do not stop relaying, because a relayed authentication never needs the password at all.
Poisoning is noisy if anyone is listening. A host answering LLMNR or NBT-NS queries for names it has no relationship with is anomalous by definition, and network monitoring with Zeek or an IDS rule set will show one source responding to many different queries. Sudden SMB or HTTP authentication attempts from workstations to a machine that is not a server deserve the same scrutiny.
Honey credentials are the cheapest high-confidence detection available. Plant a non-existent hostname in a logon script or a mapped drive and alert whenever anything resolves it, because only a poisoner will ever answer. An account that exists solely to be captured, with alerting on any use, works the same way.
Responder appears in almost every internal infrastructure assessment and assumed-breach exercise, because it tests network hygiene, password policy, and detection in one go. A clean result, meaning no responses captured over several hours on a busy subnet, is a genuine sign that the basics have been done. Our Infrastructure Security Testing Services include this assessment alongside wider Active Directory security review.
Not directly. It captures NetNTLM challenge-response material, which is derived from the password but is not the password itself. That material can be cracked offline if the password is weak, or relayed to another service to authenticate as the user without ever recovering the plaintext. Strong passphrases defeat cracking but do nothing against relaying.
Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS name resolution through Group Policy and DHCP options, create a DNS entry for wpad so proxy detection never broadcasts, and enforce SMB signing and LDAP channel binding so captured authentication cannot be relayed. These changes rarely break anything in an environment with healthy DNS, but test them with a pilot group first.
In most organisations, no. LLMNR and NBT-NS are fallback mechanisms for when DNS fails, and correctly configured networks do not depend on them. Problems appear where legacy applications or small workgroup devices resolve names by broadcast. Roll the change out in stages, monitor for failures, and fix the underlying DNS records that the fallback was hiding.
Only with authorisation. Responder intercepts other people’s authentication traffic on a network, which in the UK engages the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and interception provisions. Authorised testers operate under written rules of engagement that name the networks in scope, and they handle captured material as confidential evidence that is destroyed when the engagement ends.
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