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What Happened in the Equifax Data Breach?

Equifax lost the personal data of 147 million people in 2017 because a known Apache Struts flaw went unpatched for months and an expired certificate blinded the monitoring that should have caught it.

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17 November 2026

What Happened in the Equifax Data Breach?

What Happened in the Equifax Data Breach?

Equifax is a credit reference agency, which means it holds detailed financial histories on people who never chose to be its customers. On 7 September 2017 it announced that attackers had been inside its network since mid-May and had taken records on approximately 147 million individuals, including names, dates of birth, national identifiers, addresses, and in some cases driving licence and payment card numbers. The breach is studied not because the techniques were advanced — they were not — but because almost every control that should have stopped it failed for an ordinary, recognisable reason.

The Vulnerability

The entry point was CVE-2017-5638, a remote code execution flaw in the Jakarta Multipart parser of Apache Struts. It was disclosed on 6 March 2017 with a patch available the same day, and exploitation began within 48 hours. Equifax circulated an internal instruction to patch affected systems on 9 March. The instruction reached the wrong distribution list, a vulnerability scan run six days later did not cover the affected subnet, and an internet-facing dispute portal running Struts stayed unpatched. Attackers exploited it on 13 May 2017.

Seventy-Six Days Inside

Once in, the attackers found an unencrypted file containing credentials for other databases, and used them to query 51 systems, running roughly 9,000 queries and extracting data in small compressed batches that did not look anomalous in volume terms.

The reason nobody noticed is the detail most worth remembering. A network inspection device decrypted and examined outbound traffic, but its certificate had expired ten months earlier, so inspection had silently stopped. When Equifax renewed the certificate on 29 July 2017, the exfiltration became visible immediately and the intrusion was discovered the same day. A certificate lifecycle failure, not an advanced technique, delivered seventy-six days of undetected access.

Subsequent reviews, including a 2018 report by the US Government Accountability Office, also found flat network architecture that let the attackers pivot freely from a public-facing application into databases holding unrelated data.

The Consequences

Equifax agreed a settlement with the US Federal Trade Commission and state regulators in July 2019 worth at least $575 million and potentially $700 million. In the UK, the Information Commissioner’s Office fined Equifax Ltd £500,000 in September 2018 — the maximum available under the Data Protection Act 1998, because the breach predated GDPR. The ICO found that the UK arm had failed to take appropriate steps to ensure its US parent protected the data of up to 15 million UK consumers that it had transferred there. Under UK GDPR the same findings would attract a materially larger penalty.

What to Take From It

Most of these are findable before an attacker finds them. Regular vulnerability management, external testing of internet-facing applications, and a periodic check that your detection stack is genuinely seeing traffic cost a fraction of the aftermath. Our penetration test services exist partly to find the unpatched edge case that the inventory missed.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

What Vulnerability Was Exploited at Equifax?

CVE-2017-5638, a remote code execution flaw in the Jakarta Multipart parser used by Apache Struts 2. It was published on 6 March 2017 with a patch available immediately, and attacks began within days. Equifax issued an internal patching instruction but failed to identify an internet-facing dispute portal running the affected component, which was exploited on 13 May 2017.

Why Did Detection Take 76 Days?

A network inspection device that decrypted and examined outbound traffic had been running with an expired certificate for about ten months, so inspection had silently stopped. Exfiltration became visible within a day of the certificate being renewed in late July 2017. The lesson is to monitor whether controls are producing data, not just what the data says.

Was Equifax Fined in the UK?

Yes. The Information Commissioner’s Office fined Equifax Ltd 500,000 pounds in September 2018, the maximum available under the Data Protection Act 1998 because the incident predated GDPR. The ICO held the UK entity responsible for failing to ensure that data on up to 15 million UK consumers, transferred to its US parent for processing, was adequately protected.

What Is the Main Lesson for Mid-Sized Organisations?

That the failure chain was entirely ordinary: an incomplete asset inventory, a patch instruction that missed a system, a scan that did not cover the right subnet, a flat network, plaintext credentials, and a monitoring control that had quietly stopped working. None of those requires a large budget to address, and each one on its own would have shortened the incident considerably.

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