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What Is Post-Quantum Migration Planning?

Post-quantum migration planning is the programme of discovering where your organisation uses vulnerable cryptography, ranking it by risk, and replacing it before the published deadlines.

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Home / Blog / Cybersecurity Terms / What Is Post-Quantum Migration Planning?
17 November 2026

What Is Post-Quantum Migration Planning?

What Is Post-Quantum Migration Planning?

Replacing RSA and elliptic curve cryptography across a large organisation is not a patching exercise. It touches TLS termination, VPNs, internal PKI, code signing, device identity, payment hardware, database encryption, and every supplier product in between. The SHA-1 transition took the industry roughly a decade and affected only hashing. This one is bigger, and it has published deadlines.

Migration planning is the programme management around that work: finding the cryptography, deciding what moves first, securing budget and supplier commitments, and sequencing changes so that nothing breaks in the middle.

The Timetable You Are Planning Against

NCSC guidance issued in 2025 sets out three milestones for UK organisations:

NIST’s draft IR 8547 aligns with this, indicating deprecation of 112-bit classical public key cryptography around 2030 and disallowance by 2035. Regulated sectors are adding their own expectations, and the financial sector in particular is being asked by supervisors how post-quantum risk features in ICT risk management under DORA.

Phase One: Discovery

Discovery is the longest phase and the one organisations consistently underestimate. The output is a cryptographic bill of materials recording, for each system: which algorithms and key lengths are in use, where keys live, who owns them, which protocols and certificates are involved, whether the component can be upgraded, and how long the data it protects must remain confidential.

Draw from several sources, because no single one is complete:

  1. Network scanning of external and internal TLS, SSH, and VPN endpoints to capture negotiated algorithms.
  2. Static analysis of source code and dependency manifests for cryptographic API calls.
  3. Certificate inventories from public Certificate Transparency logs and internal certificate authorities.
  4. Key management service and HSM inventories, including key purposes and owners.
  5. Supplier questionnaires covering embedded cryptography and product roadmaps.
  6. Architecture documentation and data flow records, to connect algorithms to the data they protect.

Phase Two: Prioritisation

Rank by two variables: how long the data must stay confidential, and how hard the system is to change. The first drives urgency, because of harvest now, decrypt later collection; the second drives lead time.

PriorityTypical systemsWhy
HighestLong-lived confidential traffic: replication links, backup transfer, site-to-site VPNs, health and legal records in transitRecorded today, readable later; few endpoints to change
HighRoots of trust: internal CA hierarchies, code signing, firmware verification keysLong validity periods and hard to replace once deployed
MediumExternal-facing TLS, API gateways, identity providersHybrid key exchange is available now, so change is cheap
Longest leadSmart cards, TPMs, payment HSMs, OT and IoT devicesAlgorithms in silicon; requires a hardware refresh cycle

Phase Three: Execution

Start with the changes that are already available and low risk. Enabling hybrid key exchange on web servers, CDNs, and SSH is a configuration task today, and it immediately protects recorded traffic. Moving symmetric encryption to AES-256 is similarly cheap.

Then address the structural work. Build crypto agility into the systems you are touching anyway: version ciphertext, centralise cryptographic calls, separate key references from key material. Put algorithm requirements into procurement and renewal terms. Align hardware replacement with existing refresh cycles rather than funding a separate programme. And test through every intermediary, because larger handshakes and certificates break middleboxes in ways that unit tests will not reveal.

Governance and Common Mistakes

Give the programme a named owner, a board-level reporting line, and a budget separate from business-as-usual patching, because without those it will be deferred every quarter in favour of something with a nearer deadline.

Three mistakes recur. Treating 2035 as the start date, when discovery alone takes years in a large estate. Deploying non-standardised algorithms from earlier competition rounds, which creates a second migration. And assuming suppliers will handle it silently, when in reality their roadmaps are the long pole and only contractual pressure moves them. We scope and run discovery exercises as part of our cyber risk analysis services, which is usually what turns a stated intention into a dated plan.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Where Should a Migration Programme Start?

With discovery, not with technology selection. Scan your endpoints, search your code, pull certificate and key inventories, and question suppliers. Until you know where vulnerable cryptography lives and what data it protects, any prioritisation is guesswork. Most organisations find the inventory itself takes longer than the first wave of changes.

What Is a Cryptographic Bill of Materials?

A structured inventory of the cryptography in your estate: algorithms, key lengths, key locations and owners, protocols, certificates, the systems involved, and the confidentiality lifetime of the data concerned. It is the post-quantum equivalent of a software bill of materials, and it is the artefact auditors and regulators will increasingly ask to see.

Can I Wait Until the Standards Settle?

The main standards settled in August 2024, so the waiting argument has largely expired. Hybrid key exchange is deployed by Chrome, OpenSSH, Apple, and the major CDNs. What remains unsettled is post-quantum certificates, which is a reason to sequence signatures later, not a reason to delay discovery or confidentiality work.

How Do I Handle Suppliers and Embedded Hardware?

Ask now, in writing, what each product supports and when post-quantum algorithms will arrive, and add the requirement to contracts and renewals. For hardware with algorithms fixed in silicon, map the devices against your refresh cycle and bring replacements forward where the data warrants it. These are the longest lead times in the programme.

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