Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
EternalBlue is an NSA exploit for an SMBv1 flaw, leaked in April 2017 and used weeks later by WannaCry and NotPetya to cause the most damaging cyberattacks on record.

What Is EternalBlue?
EternalBlue is an exploit for a remote code execution vulnerability in Microsoft’s Server Message Block version 1 protocol, addressed by security bulletin MS17-010 and tracked principally as CVE-2017-0144. It was developed by the US National Security Agency, leaked publicly by the group calling itself the Shadow Brokers on 14 April 2017, and used six weeks later in the two most destructive cyberattacks ever recorded.
Microsoft had already patched the flaw on 14 March 2017, a month before the leak, having evidently been given warning. The gap between patch and catastrophe was therefore two months — and the damage still ran to billions.
The flaw sat in how the SMBv1 server converted file extended attribute lists between OS/2 and NT formats. A size calculation in srv.sys used the wrong integer width, so a specially constructed request caused a buffer overflow in a kernel non-paged pool allocation. Exploitation gives SYSTEM-level code execution with no authentication, over TCP port 445.
EternalBlue was usually paired with DoublePulsar, a kernel-mode backdoor from the same leak that provided a quiet channel for loading further payloads. Several other exploits in the leak — EternalRomance, EternalChampion, EternalSynergy — targeted related SMB weaknesses.
On 12 May 2017 the WannaCry ransomware worm spread worldwide in hours, encrypting files and demanding payment in Bitcoin. In the UK it hit the NHS hardest: 80 of 236 trusts were disrupted, together with nearly 600 GP practices, and around 19,000 appointments and operations were cancelled. The National Audit Office later put the cost to the NHS at approximately £92 million and noted that the disruption was entirely preventable, since the patch had been available for two months and NHS Digital had issued warnings.
The spread was stopped, largely by accident, when Marcus Hutchins registered a domain the malware queried and found it acted as a kill switch.
On 27 June 2017 a second outbreak began, seeded through a compromised update to M.E.Doc, Ukrainian tax accounting software. NotPetya looked like ransomware but had no functioning recovery mechanism; it was a destructive attack dressed as extortion, later attributed by the UK and allied governments to the Russian military. It used EternalBlue alongside credential theft and legitimate administration tools such as PsExec and WMI, which meant that patched machines could still be reached through stolen credentials.
The global cost is usually estimated at around 10 billion US dollars. Maersk rebuilt 4,000 servers and 45,000 workstations in ten days, reportedly recovering its Active Directory only because one domain controller in Ghana had been offline during a power cut.
EternalBlue remains in commodity toolkits and still works, because unpatched Windows systems persist in industrial environments, medical equipment, and forgotten virtual machines. Cryptomining botnets such as Adylkuzz and WannaMine used it for years afterwards, and it turns up in internal penetration tests with some regularity.
Check for SMBv1 explicitly rather than assuming it is gone. On modern Windows, Get-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName SMB1Protocol answers the question for a host; a network scan for port 445 answers it for the estate. Then block SMB at the perimeter, segment internally, and monitor for SMB connections that cross segment boundaries.
Our infrastructure security testing services include legacy protocol discovery, which is usually where the uncomfortable findings live.
Only against systems that have not received Windows updates since March 2017 and still have SMBv1 enabled. Those systems do exist, typically embedded Windows builds in industrial or medical equipment, and forgotten virtual machines. Commodity cryptomining and ransomware tooling still includes the exploit, so an unpatched host on a reachable network remains a genuine risk.
No. WannaCry spread indiscriminately across the internet and internal networks, and the NHS was affected because many systems were unpatched and networks were insufficiently segmented. The National Audit Office concluded the disruption was preventable, since the patch had been available since March 2017 and warnings had been issued. The impact reflected exposure rather than selection.
On a Windows host, query the optional feature state with Get-WindowsOptionalFeature for SMB1Protocol, or check the SMB server configuration with Get-SmbServerConfiguration. Across an estate, scan for TCP port 445 and use a tool that reports the negotiated dialect. Pay particular attention to appliances, scanners, storage devices, and anything supplied with an embedded Windows build.
It would have stopped one of its propagation methods, but not all of them. NotPetya also harvested credentials from memory and spread using legitimate administration tools, so fully patched machines were still reached where an administrator credential was valid on them. Defending against it required credential isolation and network segmentation alongside patching.
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