Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
MTA-STS tells other mail servers that encryption to your domain is mandatory, closing the STARTTLS downgrade hole. TLS-RPT reports back when a sender could not comply.

What Are MTA-STS and TLS-RPT?
Encryption between mail servers has always been optional. A sending server issues STARTTLS, the receiving server offers it, and the session is encrypted — unless an attacker on the path strips the offer from the response, in which case both sides fall back to plaintext without complaint. There is also no check on the certificate presented, so any certificate will do. SMTP MTA Strict Transport Security, published as RFC 8461 in September 2018, fixes both problems by letting a domain publish a policy that says encryption is required and names the servers that are allowed to receive its mail.
MTA-STS has two parts, which is unusual for an email standard.
A TXT record in DNS announces that a policy exists and carries a version identifier:
_mta-sts.example.co.uk. IN TXT "v=STSv1;id=20261115000000Z"
The policy itself is served over HTTPS from a well-known path on a dedicated subdomain:
https://mta-sts.example.co.uk/.well-known/mta-sts.txt
version: STSv1
mode: enforce
mx: mail1.example.co.uk
mx: mail2.example.co.uk
max_age: 604800
Using HTTPS for the policy is the design’s cleverness and its awkwardness. Because the policy is fetched over a connection validated against the public certificate authority system, MTA-STS needs no DNSSEC — which is exactly why it deploys so much more widely than DANE. The cost is that you must run a web server for the policy, with a valid certificate, and keep it available.
The mode field takes three values. none withdraws the policy. testing means senders should report failures but still deliver. enforce means a sender that cannot establish a validated TLS connection to a listed server must not deliver the message.
A sending server that supports MTA-STS checks for the TXT record, fetches and caches the policy for max_age seconds, and then requires that the receiving server’s certificate is valid, publicly trusted, and matches a name in the mx list. Caching is what provides the protection: an attacker who can block the policy fetch cannot downgrade a sender that already holds a cached copy, which is the same trust-on-first-use model as HSTS on the web.
Change the id value whenever you change the policy, because senders use it to decide whether to re-fetch.
Enforcement without feedback is how mail disappears. SMTP TLS Reporting, RFC 8460, gives senders a place to report what happened:
_smtp._tls.example.co.uk. IN TXT "v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:[email protected]"
Participating senders deliver a daily JSON report listing successful and failed sessions, with failure types such as certificate-expired, certificate-host-mismatch, starttls-not-supported, and validation-failure. These reports cover DANE as well as MTA-STS, so they are worth publishing even if you deploy neither — they are the only practical way to learn that a correspondent’s gateway has been failing to encrypt mail to you for a month.
Work in this order.
testing mode with a short max_age, such as 86,400 seconds, and watch the reports.enforce and lengthen max_age to a week or more once failures are clean.Two cautions. Every hostname in your MX records must be in the mx list and must have a matching valid certificate, including any third-party filtering gateway in front of your mail platform. And a certificate expiry on a mail server now causes inbound mail from enforcing senders to queue rather than arrive, so monitor those certificates with the same seriousness as your website’s.
Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, and the major gateways support MTA-STS on both the sending and receiving sides. Combined with DMARC for authentication, it covers the two halves of mail security that SMTP left open. Our Email Security Solutions handle the rollout end to end.
No, and that is the main reason to choose it over DANE. MTA-STS anchors its trust in the HTTPS connection used to fetch the policy file and in the public certificate authority system, rather than in signed DNS. If your zone is already DNSSEC-signed, publishing both gives the widest coverage, since different sending servers support different mechanisms.
Senders that already hold a cached policy continue to enforce it until max_age expires, so short outages are harmless. Senders without a cached copy simply proceed as they would without MTA-STS, meaning delivery continues but without the guarantee. Host the policy somewhere resilient, because availability of that small text file now affects your mail security posture.
Yes. TLS-RPT costs one DNS record and reports on all transport encryption outcomes, including DANE and ordinary opportunistic STARTTLS. The reports reveal expired certificates, hostname mismatches, and correspondents whose gateways fail to encrypt. It is the cheapest visibility available into a part of your mail path that otherwise produces no signal at all.
Your published policy protects mail sent to you by others. Outbound protection depends on your own mail platform honouring other domains’ MTA-STS and DANE policies, which the major platforms do by default. Check that the setting is enabled on your gateway, and publish a TLS-RPT record so you receive reports about your own sending behaviour too.
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