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What Is DMARC?

DMARC ties SPF and DKIM to the visible From address and tells receivers what to do when neither aligns. It is the control that actually stops domain spoofing.

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17 November 2026

What Is DMARC?

What Is DMARC?

SPF authorises sending servers. DKIM signs messages. Neither looks at the address the recipient actually sees. A message can pass both checks while displaying a From address belonging to someone else entirely, which is the gap that made domain spoofing trivial for two decades. Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance, published as RFC 7489 in March 2015, closes it by requiring one of the two underlying checks to align with the visible domain, and by giving the domain owner a way to state what should happen when neither does.

Alignment Is the Whole Idea

SPF alignment compares the domain in the SMTP envelope sender with the domain in the From header. DKIM alignment compares the d= tag of a valid signature with the same From domain. DMARC passes if either aligns and the corresponding check passed. It fails only when both fail.

The aspf and adkim tags set how strict the comparison is. In relaxed mode, the default, mail.example.co.uk aligns with example.co.uk because the organisational domain matches. In strict mode the names must be identical, which breaks most third-party sending arrangements and is rarely the right starting point.

The Policy Record

The record is published at _dmarc.example.co.uk:

_dmarc.example.co.uk. IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]; fo=1; adkim=s"

The p tag takes three values. none asks receivers to do nothing beyond reporting. quarantine asks them to treat failures as suspicious, usually meaning the junk folder. reject asks them to refuse the message at SMTP time. A sp tag sets a separate policy for subdomains, and a pct tag applies the policy to a sampled percentage during rollout.

Do not overlook subdomains and parked domains. An organisation that protects its main domain while leaving twenty unused brand domains without records has simply moved the attacker’s target. Every domain you own that never sends mail should carry v=DMARC1; p=reject; together with an SPF record of v=spf1 -all and a null MX record.

Reading the Reports

The rua address receives daily aggregate reports as compressed XML from every major receiver. These are the most useful part of DMARC and the part most often ignored. Each report lists source addresses, message volumes, and the SPF and DKIM results per source, which gives you a complete inventory of everything sending as your domain — including the payroll system nobody mentioned and the marketing platform a department bought on a card.

The ruf tag requests forensic reports containing message samples. Few receivers send them, and those that do may include personal data, so UK organisations should weigh whether to request them at all under UK GDPR, and keep retention short if they do.

Getting to Enforcement Without Breaking Mail

The sequence that works is the same in every organisation.

Pressure to finish this work increased in February 2024, when Google and Yahoo began requiring DMARC for bulk senders. In the UK public sector, the NCSC’s Mail Check service has provided free DMARC reporting and assessment for years, and the Minimum Cyber Security Standard expects central government domains to reach enforcement.

What DMARC Does Not Do

It stops mail that forges your exact domain. It does nothing about lookalike domains such as examp1e.co.uk, nothing about display-name spoofing where the address is a free webmail account and only the friendly name is yours, and nothing about business email compromise sent from a genuinely compromised mailbox. Those need lookalike domain monitoring, inbound gateway rules, and user training. DMARC removes one large category cleanly, which is worth doing, and leaves the rest. Our Email Security Solutions take a domain estate from first report to full enforcement.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Is p=none Enough?

No. A policy of none provides reporting only and gives receivers no instruction, so spoofed mail is still delivered. It is the correct starting point because it reveals your sending estate without risk, but leaving a domain there indefinitely means you have the monitoring overhead and none of the protection. Treat it as a stage, not a destination.

Will DMARC Break My Marketing Email?

Only if those platforms are not authenticated. Most providers support custom DKIM signing with your own domain and will give you SPF entries or a CNAME to publish. Set this up for every sending platform while your policy is still none, confirm alignment in the aggregate reports, and enforcement will have no effect on legitimate campaigns.

Do I Need DMARC on Domains That Never Send Email?

Yes, and they are often the easier win. A parked or brand-protection domain with no records can be spoofed freely. Publish v=DMARC1; p=reject; on each one, together with an SPF record of v=spf1 -all and a null MX record. There is nothing to break, because no legitimate mail originates from those domains.

How Do I Read DMARC Aggregate Reports?

They arrive as compressed XML, which is painful to read by hand beyond a handful of sources. Use a reporting service or an open-source parser that groups results by sending source and shows SPF and DKIM alignment over time. The goal is a list of every system sending as your domain, split into authenticated, fixable, and unrecognised.

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