Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
The handshake is where two parties agree on cryptography, prove identity, and derive session keys. TLS 1.3 made it one round trip and removed most of what went wrong before.

What Is the TLS Handshake?
Everything TLS provides — confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of the server — is established in the handshake. Once it completes, bulk encryption is comparatively simple. Almost every historical TLS vulnerability, from BEAST to POODLE to FREAK to Logjam, attacked the negotiation rather than the cryptography itself, which is why TLS 1.3 made the handshake so much narrower.
The older handshake takes two round trips. The client sends ClientHello with its supported versions, cipher suites, and extensions, including Server Name Indication so a server hosting several sites knows which certificate to present. The server replies with ServerHello choosing a cipher suite, then its certificate chain, then key exchange parameters, then ServerHelloDone. The client verifies the chain, sends its key exchange contribution, and both sides send ChangeCipherSpec and Finished.
The weaknesses were structural. The cipher suite list included RSA key transport, which provides no forward secrecy, and export-grade and anonymous suites that should never have survived. The certificate travelled in plaintext. And version negotiation could be downgraded by an active attacker, which is what POODLE exploited in 2014 by forcing a fallback to SSL 3.0.
RFC 8446, published in August 2018, is more a removal than an addition.
ClientHello, so the server can complete key agreement in its first reply.Full handshakes are expensive, so TLS supports resumption using a pre-shared key established in a previous session. TLS 1.3 also allows 0-RTT, where the client sends application data in its very first flight.
That saves a round trip and carries a specific risk: there is nothing in 0-RTT data proving freshness, so an attacker who captures it can replay it. Use it only for idempotent requests. A GET that reads a cached page is fine; a POST that moves money is not. Many servers disable 0-RTT entirely, which is a defensible default.
Configuration, almost always.
Certificate chain problems are the most common cause of failures in production. A server that sends its leaf certificate without the intermediate works in browsers that cache intermediates and fails in command-line clients, mobile applications, and anything doing machine-to-machine calls. Test with a client that has no cache rather than with a browser.
Expiry. Still the leading cause of self-inflicted outages. Automate issuance and renewal through ACME, and monitor expiry independently of the automation so that a broken renewal job surfaces before the certificate does.
Protocol version policy. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 were deprecated by RFC 8996 in March 2021 and must be disabled; PCI DSS has required their removal for years and NCSC guidance says the same. Offer TLS 1.2 with forward-secret AEAD suites only, plus TLS 1.3.
Validation shortcuts in clients. Code that disables certificate verification to get past a development problem, and then ships, remains one of the most frequent findings in application testing. It converts an encrypted connection into one any on-path attacker can read.
Encrypted Client Hello conceals the Server Name Indication field, closing the last plaintext leak of the destination hostname and complicating inspection for network defenders. Post-quantum key exchange is arriving through hybrid groups such as X25519MLKEM768, already enabled by default in current Chrome and Firefox builds and supported by major CDNs, which addresses harvest now, decrypt later collection.
Our Web Application Security Services review TLS configuration alongside the application, since a correct handshake is a precondition for everything above it.
TLS 1.3 completes in one round trip instead of two, mandates forward secrecy by removing RSA key transport, cuts the cipher suite list to five AEAD options, encrypts most of the handshake including the certificate, and builds in downgrade protection. It is faster and substantially simpler, and the simplification removed entire categories of historical attack.
Only with care. Data sent in the first flight of a resumed connection has no round trip proving it is fresh, so a captured message can be replayed. Restrict it to idempotent requests that only read data, and never allow it for operations that change state. Disabling it entirely is a reasonable default for most applications.
Usually an incomplete certificate chain. Browsers cache intermediate certificates from previous sites and can fill the gap, while command-line tools, mobile applications, and server-to-server clients cannot. Configure the server to send the full chain excluding the root, and test with a tool that has no cached intermediates rather than relying on a browser.
TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 with forward-secret AEAD cipher suites only. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 were formally deprecated in RFC 8996 in March 2021, are prohibited under PCI DSS, and should be disabled everywhere. SSL 2.0 and 3.0 have been broken for years. Review the configuration periodically, because defaults change when software is upgraded.
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