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What Is Unconstrained Delegation Abuse?

A server configured for unconstrained Kerberos delegation caches the ticket-granting ticket of everyone who connects to it, so compromising one such host can hand an attacker the whole domain.

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Home / Blog / Cybersecurity Terms / What Is Unconstrained Delegation Abuse?
17 November 2026

What Is Unconstrained Delegation Abuse?

What Is Unconstrained Delegation Abuse?

Kerberos delegation exists so that a middle-tier service can act on behalf of the user who called it. A web application that needs to read a user’s files from a back-end file server has to present that user’s identity, not its own. Unconstrained delegation, the original mechanism shipped with Windows 2000, solves this in the bluntest way available: it hands the service a copy of the user’s ticket-granting ticket.

That TGT then sits in the service host’s LSASS memory, where it can be used to request a service ticket for anything, anywhere in the domain, as that user. Anyone who gains administrative control of such a host inherits every identity that has recently connected to it.

How the Flag Works

A computer or service account configured this way has TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION set in its userAccountControl attribute. When a client authenticates to it, the KDC includes a forwarded TGT inside the service ticket, provided the client’s account is not marked as sensitive. The receiving host caches it.

Domain controllers hold this flag by design, which is expected. The problem is the other machines: print servers, legacy intranet applications, SharePoint and SQL servers set up a decade ago, and whatever box an administrator ticked the box on while troubleshooting. Finding them takes one query:

Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $true} -Properties TrustedForDelegation

In most mature domains the result is longer than anyone expects, and at least one entry is a server nobody can account for.

Waiting Is Optional

An attacker who compromises an unconstrained delegation host could simply wait for a privileged user to connect and harvest the TGT from memory with Mimikatz (sekurlsa::tickets /export) or monitor continuously with Rubeus. Waiting is unnecessary, because authentication can be compelled.

The printer bug, discovered by Lee Christensen, abuses the MS-RPRN remote printing protocol: any authenticated user can ask a remote machine’s Print Spooler to send a printer change notification to a host of their choosing, and the target machine authenticates with its own computer account to do so. Point that at a domain controller and the DC authenticates to the attacker’s compromised host, depositing the domain controller’s TGT in its memory.

PetitPotam does the same through MS-EFSRPC, and further coercion vectors exist in MS-DFSNM and MS-FSRVP. These coercion techniques turn an opportunistic weakness into a reliable, on-demand attack.

The Full Chain

  1. Enumerate unconstrained delegation hosts with PowerView, BloodHound, or an LDAP query. This requires only a standard domain user.
  2. Compromise one of them. They are rarely treated as tier-0 assets, so they are often unpatched, over-shared, or running a vulnerable application.
  3. Start a listener, such as Rubeus in monitor mode, to capture incoming TGTs.
  4. Coerce a domain controller into authenticating, using SpoolSample or PetitPotam.
  5. Extract the domain controller’s TGT, inject it into the current session, and use it to perform DCSync, pulling the KRBTGT hash and every other credential in the directory.
  6. Forge a Golden Ticket for long-term access.

The entire sequence commonly takes under an hour from the first domain user account.

Constrained and Resource-Based Alternatives

Windows Server 2003 added constrained delegation, which limits a service to specific service principal names, and Windows Server 2012 added resource-based constrained delegation, where the resource rather than the front-end service decides who may delegate to it. Both are substantially safer, though resource-based constrained delegation has its own abuse paths when an attacker can write to a computer object. Protocol transition, the TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION flag, deserves similar scrutiny.

Removing the Exposure

For detection, alert on event 4769 showing a service ticket request for a domain controller’s computer account from an unexpected source, on Rubeus-style ticket monitoring behaviour, and on DCSync replication requests from hosts that are not domain controllers.

Mapping these paths is standard practice in our Red Team Services, where an overlooked delegation flag is one of the most common routes from a single workstation to the entire directory.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Why Do Domain Controllers Have Unconstrained Delegation?

It is set on domain controllers by design, because they must be able to act on behalf of users across the directory. That is expected and should not be changed. The risk lies with ordinary member servers carrying the same flag, since they rarely receive domain controller levels of patching, monitoring, and administrative isolation, yet cache the same tickets.

How Do I Find Unconstrained Delegation in My Domain?

Query Active Directory for computer and user accounts with the TrustedForDelegation attribute set, using Get-ADComputer with a filter, PowerView’s Get-DomainComputer with the -Unconstrained switch, or BloodHound, which highlights the relationship graphically. Review each result against a documented application requirement, and remove the flag wherever no current justification exists.

Does the Protected Users Group Fully Solve This?

It prevents members’ credentials from being delegated, which protects those specific accounts, and it is a strong control for administrators. It does not help accounts that cannot join the group, including most service accounts and computer accounts, and membership has side effects such as disabling NTLM and restricting ticket lifetimes. Use it alongside removing the delegation flag, not instead.

Is Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Safe?

It is a clear improvement, because the resource owner controls who may delegate to it and the scope is explicit. It introduces its own abuse path: an attacker who can write to a computer object’s msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute can configure delegation to themselves. Restrict who can modify computer objects and monitor changes to that attribute.

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