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What Is Rubeus?

Rubeus is a C# toolset for interacting with Kerberos directly, used in Active Directory assessments to request, forge, harvest, and abuse tickets from a Windows host.

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17 November 2026

What Is Rubeus?

What Is Rubeus?

Rubeus is a toolset for talking to Kerberos without going through the Windows APIs that normally mediate it. Written in C# and released as part of the GhostPack collection by Will Schroeder, it lets an operator request tickets, extract them from memory, inject them into a session, forge them outright, and watch for new ones as users log on. Almost every modern Active Directory attack path involves it at some point.

It builds on earlier work, notably the Kekeo tool, but the choice of C# mattered: a .NET assembly can be loaded straight into memory by a post-exploitation framework, so nothing needs to be written to disk.

What It Automates

TechniqueWhat it abuses
KerberoastingAny user can request a service ticket for an account with a service principal name; the ticket is encrypted with that account’s password hash and can be cracked offline
AS-REP roastingAccounts configured without Kerberos pre-authentication hand out an encrypted blob to anyone who asks
Pass the ticketA ticket stolen from one host is injected into a session on another
Ticket harvestingMonitoring for tickets as users and computers authenticate, including the renewal of ticket-granting tickets
Delegation abuseRequesting tickets on behalf of other users where constrained or resource-based delegation is misconfigured
Golden and silver ticketsForging tickets using a stolen krbtgt or service account key

The first two are the ones encountered most often on real engagements, because they need no special privilege at all. Any authenticated domain user can perform Kerberoasting, and if a service account has a weak password set in 2014 and never changed, the result is a credential with whatever rights that account holds.

Why Service Accounts Are the Weak Point

Kerberoasting works because of a design decision rather than a bug. Service tickets are encrypted with the key of the target service account, and the domain controller issues them to any authenticated requester without checking whether the requester should be talking to that service. Where the account uses RC4 encryption, the ticket is cracked at high speed on a consumer graphics card.

Service accounts are frequently the worst-managed credentials in a domain: long-lived passwords, membership of privileged groups because it was easier than working out the minimum rights, and documented in a spreadsheet somewhere. That combination is why a single roasted account so often leads to domain compromise, as the attack path graph produced by SharpHound will usually show.

Delegation and Ticket Forgery

Kerberos delegation lets a service act on behalf of a user, which is legitimate in multi-tier applications and dangerous when configured loosely. Unconstrained delegation stores the user’s ticket-granting ticket on the service host, so compromising that host yields tickets for everyone who has connected to it. Constrained and resource-based constrained delegation are tighter but still abusable when write permissions over a computer object are available. Rubeus provides the ticket requests these paths need.

Forgery sits at the end of the chain. With the krbtgt account’s key, an attacker mints a golden ticket granting any identity and any group membership; with a service account key, a silver ticket for that one service. Both are post-compromise techniques, but they are also the reason recovery from a domain breach requires resetting krbtgt twice.

Detection

Kerberos activity is logged, and the useful events are specific:

Honeypot service accounts are the highest-value detection here. Create an account with a service principal name, no real purpose, and a long random password, then alert on any ticket request for it. Nothing legitimate will ever ask.

Hardening

Use group managed service accounts wherever the application supports them, so passwords rotate automatically and are 120 characters long. Where that is impossible, set passphrases of at least 25 characters and rotate them. Disable RC4 and require AES. Audit every account with pre-authentication disabled and fix the reason it was turned off. Remove unconstrained delegation entirely, and add sensitive accounts to the Protected Users group so their tickets cannot be delegated. Review which accounts hold service principal names and strip the privileges they do not need.

Our Infrastructure Security Testing Services include Active Directory assessments that exercise these paths and show which of your detections fire.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Does Rubeus Need Administrator Rights?

Not for the techniques that matter most. Kerberoasting and AS-REP roasting work with any authenticated domain account, which is why they appear so early in internal engagements. Extracting tickets from the memory of other sessions, injecting tickets, and forging golden tickets do require elevated privileges on the host or control of the relevant account key.

How Is Rubeus Different from Mimikatz?

Mimikatz is a broad credential tool covering LSASS memory, DPAPI, certificates, and Kerberos among other things. Rubeus focuses entirely on Kerberos and implements the protocol directly in C#, which gives finer control over ticket requests and makes in-memory execution straightforward. Operators commonly use both, picking whichever handles the specific step more cleanly.

Which Event ID Detects Kerberoasting?

Event 4769 on domain controllers records every service ticket request. Look for encryption type 0x17, which indicates RC4 in an environment that should be using AES, and for a single account requesting tickets for many distinct services in a short period. Pair this with a honeypot service account that alerts on any request at all.

Do Managed Service Accounts Stop These Attacks?

They remove the password problem, which is the heart of roasting. Group managed service accounts use automatically rotated passwords of around 120 characters, so a captured ticket cannot realistically be cracked. They do not address delegation misconfiguration or ticket theft from memory, so they are one part of Kerberos hardening rather than a complete answer.

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