Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Mimikatz extracts passwords, hashes, Kerberos tickets, and certificates from Windows memory, and the research behind it reshaped how Microsoft protects credentials.

What Is Mimikatz?
Mimikatz is a Windows security tool written by Benjamin Delpy, published in 2011 as a demonstration that the operating system kept credential material in memory in a recoverable form. It is probably the single most consequential piece of security research of the last fifteen years, measured by how much of Windows was redesigned in response.
The original demonstration was blunt. On a Windows 7 machine, one command printed the plaintext passwords of everyone currently logged on, because the WDigest authentication provider cached them in reversible form inside the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service. That was not a vulnerability in the usual sense; it was a design decision from an era when single sign-on convenience outweighed the threat model. Mimikatz made the consequence impossible to ignore.
The specific binary is caught by every endpoint product on the market and has been for a decade. The techniques it implements are not. They have been reimplemented in PowerShell, in C#, in Impacket scripts, in command and control frameworks as beacon object files, and in custom loaders written for individual operations. Detecting the file named mimikatz.exe is a check that has not been useful since roughly 2013.
What persists is the underlying problem: an attacker with administrative rights on a machine can read the memory of the process that holds credentials on that machine. Every mitigation Microsoft has shipped addresses that sentence from a different direction.
The highest-fidelity signal is process access. Sysmon event 10 records handle opens against lsass.exe, and the set of processes with a legitimate reason to request read access is small and known. Alert on anything outside it, with particular attention to the access mask requesting memory read.
Beyond that: look for LSASS memory being written to disk, including through legitimate tools such as Task Manager’s dump feature, comsvcs.dll invoked through rundll32, and procdump. Watch for event 4662 on domain controllers showing directory replication rights used by a non-controller, which is DCSync and close to conclusive. Monitor for vulnerable driver loads that would disable LSA protection. And deploy honeytoken accounts whose credentials appear attractive and whose use is always malicious.
At Privia Security, our Infrastructure Security Testing Services test credential theft paths in your domain and report which of your controls stopped them and which did not.
Yes, because the file is not the threat. The techniques have been reimplemented in PowerShell, C#, Impacket scripts, beacon object files, and custom loaders written for single operations. Detecting the original binary has been of little value since around 2013. Defend against the behaviour, principally handle access to the LSASS process, and against the architecture with Credential Guard.
It uses virtualisation-based security to store credential secrets in an isolated environment that the normal operating system kernel cannot read, so dumping LSASS memory no longer produces usable hashes or tickets. It is the most structural defence available and is enabled by default on qualifying Windows 11 Enterprise installations. It requires modern hardware and does not cover every credential type.
For reading LSASS memory, yes: local administrator or SYSTEM privileges are required. That is why privilege escalation and credential theft are consecutive steps in almost every intrusion. Some capabilities need more than that, such as DCSync, which requires directory replication rights, normally held only by domain controllers and a small number of specifically justified accounts.
Tiered administration, because it removes the credential from the machine rather than protecting it there. If privileged accounts never authenticate on workstations, there is nothing valuable in workstation memory. Then enable Credential Guard and LSA protection, deploy LAPS for unique local administrator passwords, verify WDigest is disabled, and alert on handle access to the LSASS process.
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