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What Is Lateral Movement?

Lateral movement is the set of techniques attackers use after an initial compromise to move from one system to another inside a network, gathering credentials and access on the way.

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17 November 2026

What Is Lateral Movement?

What Is Lateral Movement?

Lateral movement is what an attacker does after getting a foothold: moving from the first compromised machine to other systems in the network until they reach something worth stealing, encrypting, or controlling. It sits between initial access and the final objective, and it is where most of an intrusion’s time is spent.

MITRE ATT&CK groups these techniques under the Lateral Movement tactic (TA0008). In a typical ransomware case, the first phishing victim is an ordinary workstation; the domain controllers, file servers, and backup systems are reached only through a chain of lateral moves.

How Attackers Move

Lateral movement usually combines two ingredients: credentials and a remote execution method. Attackers harvest passwords, NTLM hashes, or Kerberos tickets from memory on one host, then use built-in administrative protocols to log in to the next.

TechniqueATT&CK IDWhat it looks like
Remote Desktop ProtocolT1021.001Interactive RDP sessions using stolen credentials
SMB and admin sharesT1021.002Copying tools to C$ or ADMIN$ and running them with PsExec-style services
Windows Remote ManagementT1021.006PowerShell remoting to run commands on remote hosts
Pass the HashT1550.002Authenticating with an NTLM hash without knowing the password
Pass the TicketT1550.003Reusing stolen Kerberos tickets, up to forged golden tickets
Exploitation of remote servicesT1210Using vulnerabilities such as EternalBlue to compromise hosts directly
Lateral tool transferT1570Moving payloads between internal hosts

Tooling is widely available. Mimikatz extracts credentials, Impacket provides Python implementations of Windows protocols, BloodHound maps the shortest attack paths through Active Directory permissions, and frameworks such as Cobalt Strike and Sliver wrap everything together. Increasingly, attackers prefer built-in tools—an approach known as living off the land—because they blend in with administrator activity.

A Case That Showed the Scale

NotPetya, released in June 2017 through a poisoned update to Ukrainian accounting software, is the textbook example. Once inside a network, it harvested credentials from memory and spread with PsExec and WMI, alongside the EternalBlue exploit against unpatched hosts. Within hours it had moved through global networks at companies such as Maersk and Merck, causing billions of dollars in damage. The UK government attributed the attack to the Russian military in 2018.

How Fast It Happens

Speed has become the defining problem. CrowdStrike’s 2025 Global Threat Report put the average eCrime “breakout time”—from initial access to the first lateral move—at 48 minutes, with the fastest observed case under one minute. A SOC that reviews alerts only during office hours will usually be too late.

Detecting Lateral Movement

Because attackers use legitimate protocols, detection depends on spotting unusual combinations rather than single events:

EDR telemetry, Sysmon, and a SIEM with identity context make these patterns visible. Deception helps too: a fake admin credential planted in memory or a honeypot file server generates high-confidence alerts the moment someone uses it.

Making Movement Harder

  1. Tier administrative accounts so domain admins never log on to workstations where their credentials could be harvested.
  2. Deploy Windows LAPS to give every machine a unique local administrator password.
  3. Enable Credential Guard and add privileged users to the Protected Users group.
  4. Block workstation-to-workstation SMB and RDP with host firewalls, and segment servers by function.
  5. Restrict NTLM where possible and require MFA for remote administration.
  6. Apply least privilege to service accounts, which often hold far more rights than they need.

Testing Your Exposure

An assumed-breach exercise starts from a compromised workstation and measures how far a tester can get and how quickly your team notices. It is one of the most revealing tests an organisation can run, because it exercises both prevention and detection along real attack paths. Our Red Team services simulate exactly this kind of movement against your live environment.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

What Is the Difference Between Lateral Movement and Privilege Escalation?

Privilege escalation is gaining higher rights, for example moving from a standard user to local administrator or domain admin. Lateral movement is moving from one system to another. In real attacks the two alternate: an attacker escalates on one host to dump credentials, uses those credentials to move to another host, escalates again, and repeats until they reach the target.

Can Network Segmentation Stop Lateral Movement?

Segmentation will not stop it completely, but it greatly limits where an attacker can go and forces them through monitored chokepoints. Blocking workstation-to-workstation traffic is one of the most effective single measures, because ordinary user devices rarely need to talk to each other. Combined with credential hygiene and administrative tiering, segmentation turns a flat network into a series of barriers.

Which Logs Do I Need to Detect Lateral Movement?

At minimum, collect Windows security logs from domain controllers and servers, including logon events, Kerberos ticket requests, and service creation. Add EDR or Sysmon telemetry from endpoints for process and network activity, and firewall or NetFlow data for internal traffic. Centralise everything in a SIEM with enough retention to reconstruct activity that may have started weeks before detection.

Is Lateral Movement Tested in a Normal Penetration Test?

Internal infrastructure penetration tests often include lateral movement, especially Active Directory assessments. However, a time-limited test usually focuses on finding as many weaknesses as possible. An assumed-breach or Red Team engagement goes further, following realistic attack paths quietly over a longer period and measuring whether your SOC detects and responds to the activity.

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