Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Turkey’s Ministry of Health issues binding information security directives for every public and private healthcare provider, backed by a separate regulation governing personal health data.

What Is Turkey’s Health Ministry Security Policy?
Healthcare information security in Turkey is directed centrally. The Ministry of Health issues an information security policies directive that applies to its own organisations and, through the licensing relationship, to private providers that connect to national health systems. Alongside it sits a dedicated regulation on personal health data, published in the Resmi Gazete in June 2019, which governs how health information is processed, who may access it, and how the national personal health record system operates.
The arrangement is unfamiliar to a UK reader, because in Britain no government department writes the hospital security policy. NHS England sets an assurance framework and organisations write their own policies against it. In Turkey the policy itself comes from the centre, in considerable detail, and hospitals implement it.
Turkey operates a national personal health record system known as e-Nabiz, which aggregates records from providers across the country and gives citizens access to their own history, prescriptions, test results, and imaging. The central appointment system, MHRS, sits alongside it. The 2019 regulation on personal health data governs how this data is processed, establishes a committee overseeing it, and sets rules on access, sharing, anonymisation, and the rights of patients over their records.
A national aggregated record is a different proposition from the federated English model, where records sit with providers and shared care records are regional. It produces better continuity of care and concentrates both the value and the risk, which is why access controls and audit over the central system matter disproportionately.
| Turkey | UK | |
|---|---|---|
| Source of policy | Ministry of Health directive, binding and detailed | Organisation’s own policy, against an assurance framework |
| Assurance mechanism | Ministry oversight and ISO/IEC 27001 alignment | Data Security and Protection Toolkit, aligning to the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework |
| Patient record architecture | National aggregated record through e-Nabiz | Provider-held records with regional shared care records |
| Data protection law | KVKK, with health data as a special category | UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 |
| Professional overlay | Ministry directives and professional rules | Common law confidentiality and the Caldicott Principles |
Three situations bring this to a British desk. A UK group operating hospitals or clinics in Turkey inherits the directive directly. A UK software supplier selling to Turkish providers will be asked to demonstrate compliance with it as a condition of integration. And a UK research or insurance organisation receiving health data from Turkey faces both the directive’s sharing rules and the KVKK cross-border transfer rules, which are strict for special category personal data.
In each case the practical advice is the same. Do not assume the UK control set maps across; read the directive and map against it explicitly, because items such as removable media restrictions and the designated security officer role are specific obligations rather than general good practice. Expect ISO/IEC 27001 certification to be requested as evidence. And remember that Turkish incident reporting runs to two places, the ministry and the Personal Data Protection Board, on different timescales.
The clinical and technical risks themselves are the same everywhere: ransomware against hospital systems, imaging archives exposed to the internet, and staff browsing records they have no reason to open. The governance wrapper differs; the attacks do not.
Our regulation and compliance services map a group’s existing health security controls against local healthcare obligations and evidence the gaps technically rather than on paper.
In practice, yes, for those connected to national health systems and operating under Ministry of Health licensing. The ministry’s information security requirements reach providers that exchange data with central systems such as the national personal health record, and compliance is a condition of that integration. Private providers also remain subject to KVKK independently of the ministry’s rules.
Turkey’s national personal health record system, which aggregates records from healthcare providers across the country and lets citizens view their own history, prescriptions, test results, and imaging. It is governed by the 2019 regulation on personal health data. The centralised architecture differs substantially from the provider-held model used in England, which concentrates both clinical benefit and security risk.
Not in the same form. NHS England sets an assurance framework through the Data Security and Protection Toolkit, which is being aligned with the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework, and the National Data Guardian maintains the Caldicott Principles. Individual organisations write their own policies against that framework rather than implementing a centrally issued policy document.
Both the Ministry of Health, under the incident reporting expectations in its directives, and the Personal Data Protection Board, under KVKK, which requires notification within 72 hours of becoming aware. Affected individuals must also be informed as soon as reasonably practicable. UK organisations used to a single route to the Information Commissioner’s Office should plan for the parallel reporting path.
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