Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
DLL side-loading places a malicious library beside a legitimate signed executable so that Windows loads the attacker’s code into a trusted process, inheriting its signature and reputation.

What Is DLL Side-Loading?
DLL side-loading is a technique in which an attacker places a malicious dynamic link library next to a legitimate, signed Windows executable that loads a library of that name. When the executable runs, Windows resolves the dependency from the application’s own directory first and loads the attacker’s code into the process. MITRE ATT&CK records it as T1574.002.
The appeal is that the running process is genuine. It is signed by a known vendor, it appears in process listings under a familiar name, and its outbound network connections look like a product doing its job. Application control allow lists built on publisher rules let it through. The malicious code never has to be signed, because it is loaded by something that is.
Windows resolves a library name through an ordered list of locations. With safe DLL search mode enabled, which has been the default since Windows XP SP2, the order begins with the directory from which the application was loaded, then the system directory, then the Windows directory, then the current directory, then the directories in PATH.
Two distinct abuses follow from that list:
Well-built implants proxy the original library: they export the same function names, forward each call to the real DLL loaded from elsewhere, and run their own code alongside. The host application works exactly as expected, so nobody raises a ticket.
PlugX, the espionage toolkit associated with several Chinese intrusion sets, has used the same three-file pattern for more than a decade: a signed executable, a malicious DLL, and an encrypted payload file. The signed component has at various times been taken from antivirus vendors, from office software, and from hardware utilities.
The 3CX supply chain attack of March 2023 used side-loading inside the trojanised client, with ffmpeg.dll loading shellcode from an appended blob in d3dcompiler_47.dll. Qakbot, Lazarus tooling, and a long list of commodity loaders use the technique because it is cheap, reliable, and defeats a surprising amount of tooling.
The signal is in the relationship between the process and the library, not in either one alone.
%TEMP%, %PROGRAMDATA%, or a removable drive is a strong indicator.CWDIllegalInDllSearch where legacy applications allow.SetDefaultDllDirectories, and apply a signature requirement on loaded modules.Side-loading is a routine part of how we test endpoint controls during our Red Team services, and the gap between executable-level and library-level application control is one of the most common findings.
Side-loading gets malicious code into a process at start-up, by having the process load a library from a location the attacker controls. Injection forces code into a process that is already running, using techniques such as remote thread creation or APC queuing. Side-loading is generally quieter, because no process manipulation APIs are involved and the load looks ordinary.
Only if it is configured to enforce rules on libraries as well as executables. Many deployments of AppLocker and Windows Defender Application Control cover executables and scripts but leave DLL rules disabled, because enabling them requires more testing and has a performance cost. With DLL enforcement on, an unsigned library that fails policy will not load at all.
Because it gives them complete control of the pairing. They choose a program known to load a particular library name, place both files in a directory they can write to, and avoid depending on whatever software happens to be installed. The signed binary provides reputation and a plausible process name without the attacker needing a code signing certificate.
Signed executables loading unsigned libraries from user-writable paths, known utilities running from temporary or profile directories, and trusted applications making unusual network connections or spawning command interpreters. Sysmon event 7 provides the module load data, and tuning it against a baseline of your own software estate keeps the volume manageable.
You May Be Interested In These
Cybersecurity Terms
17 November 2026
What Is the Difference Between Threat, Vulnerability and Risk?
Read MoreWe use a few cookies that are needed to make this website work, and they are always on. We would also like to set analytics cookies, to see which pages are useful; functional cookies, so that our live chat works; and advertising cookies, to measure our campaigns. We will not set any of those until you say yes, and you can change your mind at any time from the Cookie Settings link in the footer.
Choose the cookies you are happy for us to use. Strictly necessary cookies are always on; everything else is off until you turn it on.
These cookies keep the website working: they hold your security checks, your form submissions and the choice you make here. The site cannot run without them, so they are always on.
These let our live chat open and remember your conversation, and let the newsletter sign-up work. Switch them off and the chat window will not appear.
These tell us which pages are read and how people find us, so that we can improve the site. The reports are about groups of visitors, never about you personally.
These let us measure our advertising and show you our adverts on other websites, such as LinkedIn, Google and Meta. Switch them off and you will still see adverts, but they will be less relevant.