Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Secure remote access in OT gives engineers and vendors a single brokered, authenticated, and recorded route into industrial systems, instead of the direct tunnels that cause most industrial incidents.

What Is Secure Remote Access in OT?
Remote access is how most attackers get into industrial environments, and it is also how most plants are kept running. A turbine vendor in Denmark adjusts a control parameter. An integrator in Manchester debugs a batch sequence at three in the morning. An on-call engineer checks an alarm from home. Removing remote access is not an option; making it a single, controlled, observed path is.
Two incidents frame the problem. The ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline in May 2021 began with a password for a legacy virtual private network account that was still active and not protected by multi-factor authentication. In February 2021, an operator at a water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida watched the sodium hydroxide setpoint change on screen during a session established through a shared remote desktop tool; the city later indicated the change may have been an employee action rather than an intruder, but the shared, unmonitored access path was real either way.
The common pattern is a jump host, or a commercial secure remote access product, sitting in the DMZ. The external user authenticates to the gateway and never obtains an IP route into the control network; the gateway establishes the onward connection and proxies the protocol. That design means a compromised vendor laptop cannot reach a controller even with valid credentials, because there is no path, only a brokered application session.
Where the risk justifies it, add a second hop: a hardened workstation inside the control network that holds the engineering tools, accessed only by screen transfer from the DMZ jump host. Files move through a scanned, logged transfer service rather than by drag and drop. The conduit carrying this traffic is inspected by an OT firewall and watched by passive monitoring, so that a legitimate session doing something illegitimate is still visible.
IEC 62443-3-3 addresses this directly: SR 1.13 covers access via untrusted networks, SR 2.6 requires session termination, and SR 6.1 requires auditable records. For UK operators of essential services, the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework asks under Principle B2 how remote and third-party access is controlled, and an assessor will want the register, the multi-factor evidence, and the session logs rather than a policy statement. The NCSC’s guidance on remote access and on supply chain security maps onto the same controls.
Where financial entities operate industrial estates, DORA adds its own third-party access expectations; where personal data is involved in session recordings, the UK GDPR requires the monitoring to be proportionate and disclosed to the people recorded.
At Privia Security, our OT-SCADA Penetration Test routinely starts where attackers do, by examining how remote access into your plant is actually configured rather than how it is documented.
No. A VPN grants network-level reachability, so a compromised endpoint gains a route into your control network. Brokered access terminates the session at a gateway and proxies the application, meaning the remote machine never gets an IP path inwards. Use a VPN as transport if you wish, but put a broker behind it.
On high-consequence systems, yes. A physical enable switch or an operator approval step in the access workflow gives the control room an unambiguous say over who is connected to the plant they are responsible for. It also creates a human record of why a session happened, which logs alone rarely capture.
Long enough to support investigation, typically six to twelve months, and defined in a retention schedule rather than left to disk capacity. Where recordings capture identifiable individuals, the UK GDPR requires a lawful basis, proportionality, and transparency with those being recorded, so set the period deliberately and tell vendors it applies to them.
Treat it as an unmanaged route into your plant until proven otherwise. Ask the supplier to disable it, or terminate it on a segment you control with no path to the control network. If neither is possible, document it as an accepted risk with compensating monitoring and raise it at the next contract review.
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