Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
EPDK, Turkey’s energy market regulator, requires licensed energy companies to run an information security management system for their industrial control systems and to prove it through audit.

What Are EPDK Information Security Obligations?
EPDK is the Energy Market Regulatory Authority of Turkey, the body that licenses and supervises electricity, natural gas, petroleum, and LPG markets. Its information security obligations matter to a UK audience in one specific situation: when a British company owns, supplies, or audits an energy business operating under a Turkish licence.
The central instrument is the Regulation on Information Security in Industrial Control Systems Used in the Energy Sector, published in the Official Gazette on 13 July 2017. It was one of the earlier national attempts anywhere to place binding security requirements on energy operational technology, arriving before the EU NIS Directive had been transposed across member states.
The regulation applies to licence holders whose activities depend on industrial control systems, with scope defined by criticality rather than by company size. In practice it reaches electricity generation plants above a defined capacity, transmission and distribution operators, natural gas transmission, storage and distribution companies, and refining and pipeline operators.
Each in-scope organisation must determine which of its systems are critical, and the obligations then attach to those systems rather than to the whole corporate IT estate. That distinction is important for UK parent companies: the Turkish entity’s obligation centres on the plant, the SCADA network, and the engineering workstations, not primarily on the office environment.
The duties are recognisable to anyone who has implemented ISO 27001, with an operational technology slant.
Several of these obligations overlap with the broader Turkish framework. The Presidential Circular of 6 July 2019 and the resulting Information and Communication Security Guide apply to critical infrastructure sectors including energy, adding asset-group measures and a separate compliance and audit cycle. Personal data handled by the business falls under KVKK, which is a distinct regime with its own regulator.
A UK energy operator meets similar objectives through different machinery. The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 designate operators of essential services in the energy sector, with Ofgem and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero acting as competent authorities. Compliance is assessed against the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework, which is outcome-based: it states what good looks like and leaves the implementation to the operator, with an indicative profile setting the expected level.
Three differences stand out. The Turkish regulation prescribes control requirements directly, whereas the Cyber Assessment Framework describes outcomes. Turkish compliance evidence runs through a defined audit and reporting cycle to EPDK, while UK assessment is conducted by or on behalf of the competent authority on a risk-led basis. And incident reporting routes differ: UK operators report to their competent authority under the NIS Regulations, with the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill announced in 2024 expected to broaden those duties.
For a group operating in both countries, the practical approach is a single operational technology control framework mapped to ISO/IEC 27019 and the Cyber Assessment Framework, with a Turkish annex recording the prescribed items: documented ICS inventory, named officer, audit cycle, and reporting lines.
Three problems recur in energy environments regardless of jurisdiction. Legacy controllers cannot be patched without an outage window that production will not grant, so compensating controls and segmentation carry the risk. Vendor remote access, often arranged years earlier for maintenance, provides a path into the control network that nobody currently owns. And asset inventories built from engineering drawings rather than from the live network miss devices added during maintenance.
Testing an operational technology environment safely requires a different method from corporate penetration testing, with passive techniques, lab replication, and carefully bounded active testing. Our OT-SCADA penetration test service is built around those constraints.
Only through a Turkish licensed entity. The regulation binds holders of EPDK licences in Turkey. A UK group with a Turkish generation, distribution, or pipeline business must meet it for that entity. UK suppliers to those companies are affected through contracts and through the operator’s own audit of its supply chain and remote access arrangements.
The framework is built on TS ISO/IEC 27001 for the management system, with industrial control system specifics drawn from ISO/IEC 27019, the energy utility extension of ISO/IEC 27002. An organisation already certified to ISO 27001 holds most of the governance structure, but the scope must be extended to the control environment and evidenced there.
The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, under which energy operators of essential services are supervised by Ofgem and the responsible government department, with compliance assessed against the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework. The UK regime is outcome-based rather than prescriptive, and the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill announced in 2024 is expected to extend its reach.
Not in the way you would test a corporate network. Active scanning can crash legacy controllers, and availability is the dominant priority. Competent testing uses passive traffic analysis, configuration and architecture review, testing against a laboratory replica or during a planned outage, and tightly bounded active work on segments agreed with plant engineering.
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