Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Medical device cybersecurity is the set of obligations placed on manufacturers to design, document, and maintain secure devices, now enforced through regulatory approval rather than left to good practice.

What Is Medical Device Cybersecurity?
Medical device cybersecurity sits on the manufacturer’s side of a line. Hospitals own the problem of running connected clinical equipment on a network, which is a separate discipline covered under hospital device network security. Manufacturers own the problem of designing, documenting, supporting, and eventually retiring devices that are safe to run on that network. In the past decade regulators have moved that second obligation from guidance into the approval process itself, which changed the industry faster than any amount of advocacy had.
Three characteristics distinguish a medical device from other connected products. The consequence of failure may be clinical harm rather than data loss. The device is certified as a whole, so the hospital cannot patch it independently without potentially invalidating that certification. And the service life is long: an infusion pump fleet bought this year will still be in wards in the late 2030s, long after the components inside it stop receiving updates.
Vulnerabilities have arrived at component scale rather than one device at a time. URGENT/11 in 2019 affected a widely embedded real-time operating system network stack used in patient monitors, infusion pumps, and imaging systems. Ripple20 in 2020 did the same for another embedded TCP/IP implementation. A 2022 disclosure affected a remote support agent built into many manufacturers’ products. In each case one supplier’s code reached hundreds of device models, and remediation took years because every affected model required separate validation and release.
Individual devices have had their moments too. A 2017 safety communication led to a firmware update for several hundred thousand implanted cardiac devices, and 2019 advisories covered the proprietary telemetry protocol used by another manufacturer’s implants and programmers. These cases are instructive mainly because they showed that a recall mechanism designed for mechanical defects could be applied to software.
The most consequential change came through section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, added by legislation at the end of December 2022. For a cyber device, a premarket submission must include a plan for monitoring, identifying, and addressing postmarket vulnerabilities and exploits, including a coordinated disclosure process; processes and procedures providing reasonable assurance that the device and related systems are cybersecure, with updates and patches made available on a reasonable cadence and out of cycle for critical issues; and a software bill of materials covering commercial, open-source, and off-the-shelf components.
The decisive element is that the FDA may refuse to accept a submission that does not contain these things. Security stopped being a review comment and became an admissibility test, and final premarket guidance published in September 2023 set out expectations in detail.
In the European Union, the Medical Device Regulation requires that devices with software be developed in accordance with the state of the art, covering development lifecycle, risk management, verification, and validation, and that manufacturers set minimum requirements for the IT environment the device is used in. The coordination group guidance document on cybersecurity for medical devices fills in what that means in practice. Devices under the MDR are excluded from the EU Cyber Resilience Act precisely because the sectoral regime already covers them.
In the United Kingdom, devices are regulated under the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 as amended, with UKCA marking, and the MHRA has published guidance on software and artificial intelligence as a medical device alongside a reformed post-market surveillance regime. NHS procurement adds the Digital Technology Assessment Criteria, which asks suppliers direct questions about security. IEC 81001-5-1, the health software security lifecycle standard, is the technical backbone that most manufacturers now build against, and it is deliberately aligned with IEC 62443-4-1.
That last item is where the sector remains weakest. Legacy devices that cannot be patched and cannot be replaced on a security timetable are the enduring problem, and the honest answer for them is compensating control: segmentation, restricted communication, and monitoring rather than remediation.
At Privia Security, we support device manufacturers with threat modelling and security testing through our Hardware Penetration Test Services.
Under section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a premarket submission for a cyber device must include a postmarket vulnerability monitoring and disclosure plan, processes giving reasonable assurance of security with patches on a reasonable cadence and out of cycle for critical issues, and a software bill of materials. Submissions lacking these can be refused acceptance outright.
The MHRA, under the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 as amended, with UKCA marking and published guidance on software and artificial intelligence as a medical device. NHS procurement adds the Digital Technology Assessment Criteria, and NHS organisations themselves are assessed through the Data Security and Protection Toolkit, which is aligned to the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework.
Because the device is certified as a complete product and the manufacturer validates any change before release. Applying an update the manufacturer has not issued can invalidate certification and support. The realistic hospital-side controls are therefore network segmentation, restricting what each device class may communicate with, passive monitoring, and procurement pressure on support commitments.
The manufacturer disclosure statement for medical device security: a standard form in which a manufacturer answers detailed questions about a device’s security capabilities, such as authentication, encryption, audit logging, patching, and the operating system in use. Hospitals use it in procurement and in network design, and requesting it should be routine rather than exceptional.
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