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What Is the Internet of Medical Things?

The Internet of Medical Things covers connected clinical devices, from infusion pumps to implanted cardiac monitors, and the security problem of defending equipment that cannot be patched on an IT schedule.

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Home / Blog / Cybersecurity Terms / What Is the Internet of Medical Things?
17 November 2026

What Is the Internet of Medical Things?

What Is the Internet of Medical Things?

The Internet of Medical Things, usually shortened to IoMT, is the population of networked clinical devices that a modern hospital runs alongside its ordinary IT estate: infusion pumps, patient monitors, ventilators, anaesthesia machines, imaging modalities, dialysis units, surgical robots, smart beds, and the wearable and implanted devices that send readings back from outside the building. What makes it a distinct security problem is not the networking, which is unremarkable, but the fact that each device is a regulated product whose software cannot be changed on a whim.

A ward network therefore holds equipment that a security team can neither patch, scan aggressively, nor take offline at will, and that may remain in clinical use for fifteen years after the manufacturer stopped issuing updates.

What Sits in the Estate

The Flaws That Shaped the Field

Several disclosures made the risk concrete rather than theoretical. URGENT/11, published in July 2019, affected the VxWorks TCP/IP stack used in patient monitors and imaging equipment and allowed remote code execution without authentication. Ripple20, disclosed in June 2020, found nineteen flaws in the Treck embedded IP stack that reached hundreds of millions of devices including infusion pumps. Access:7, announced in March 2022, affected the PTC Axeda remote support agent embedded in laboratory and imaging products from multiple manufacturers. On the clinical side, Abbott issued a firmware update in August 2017 for roughly 465,000 implanted pacemakers originally sold under the St Jude Medical brand, after regulators accepted that radio frequency commands could be sent without adequate authentication.

The pattern is consistent. The vulnerable code is usually a third-party component buried several layers down the supply chain, and the fix depends on the device manufacturer revalidating and reissuing firmware rather than on the hospital.

Controls That Work in a Hospital

  1. Discover passively. Build the inventory from network traffic and switch data rather than active scanning, which has been known to crash older clinical devices.
  2. Segment by clinical function. Put device classes into their own VLANs with explicit allow rules to the clinical systems they need, so a compromised administrative workstation cannot reach a pump.
  3. Demand evidence at procurement. Ask for a manufacturer disclosure statement, a software bill of materials, the patching commitment, and the end-of-support date before purchase, not after installation.
  4. Control remote support. Vendor access for diagnostics should be brokered, time-limited, and recorded, in the same way as any other third-party connection.
  5. Apply compensating controls where firmware cannot be updated: strict network policy, protocol-aware monitoring, and physical restrictions on ports.
  6. Plan for degraded operation. Clinical teams should know how to run the ward if monitoring or infusion management is unavailable.

How the UK Handles It

A connected medical device sold in Great Britain is regulated by the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency under the Medical Devices Regulations 2002, and the MHRA has treated cybersecurity as part of the safety and performance requirements through its software and artificial intelligence change programme. The manufacturer owns the device’s security; the NHS organisation owns the environment it sits in.

On the provider side, two obligations matter. Clinical risk management for health IT follows the standards DCB0129 for manufacturers and DCB0160 for deploying organisations, which require a clinical safety officer and a hazard log. Information governance follows the Data Security and Protection Toolkit, which NHS England has been realigning to the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework, with health data treated as special category data under the UK GDPR. Larger NHS bodies also fall within the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, with the Department of Health and Social Care as competent authority.

Where an organisation needs to understand what an attacker could actually reach across a clinical network, our IoT penetration testing work is scoped around patient safety first and coverage second.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Can We Run a Vulnerability Scan Across Clinical Devices?

Not as a routine sweep. Several classes of medical device respond badly to active scanning, and incidents where monitors or pumps have rebooted during a scan are well documented. Use passive discovery and traffic analysis for the clinical VLANs, reserve authenticated scanning for the general-purpose servers and workstations, and agree any active testing with clinical engineering in advance.

Who Is Responsible When a Device Cannot Be Patched?

Responsibility is shared. The manufacturer must assess the vulnerability, decide whether a firmware update is required, and revalidate it for safety. The healthcare organisation must assess clinical risk in its own environment and apply compensating controls in the meantime. Contracts should state the expected response time and the support end date, because an unsupported device is a procurement decision, not an accident.

What Is an MDS2 Form?

The Manufacturer Disclosure Statement for Medical Device Security is a standard questionnaire in which a manufacturer records how a device handles patient data, authentication, encryption, logging, remote support, and operating system patching. Asking for a completed form at tender stage lets a hospital compare products on security as well as clinical capability, and gives the security team a documented baseline.

Does the Internet of Medical Things Include Patient-Owned Devices?

Yes, when the readings feed a clinical pathway. Continuous glucose monitors, cardiac monitors, and remote monitoring hubs sit in the patient’s home, on their broadband, and often on their phone, and the hospital has little control over any of it. The defensible boundary is the receiving service: authenticate the device, validate the data, and limit what the ingestion platform can reach.

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