Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
A bootkit runs before the operating system does. Whatever loads afterwards, including every security product on the machine, inherits an environment the attacker has already edited.

What Is a Bootkit?
A bootkit is malware that takes control of the start-up sequence before the operating system kernel is running. Order of execution decides who wins: code that loads first can modify everything that loads after it, including the drivers, integrity checks, and security agents that would otherwise detect the compromise. A bootkit therefore does not need to hide from the operating system. It defines the operating system’s view of the machine.
It is the earliest form of rootkit, and the hardest to remove, because nothing it touches lives in the places a reinstall normally cleans.
On a modern PC, firmware initialises the hardware, verifies and runs a boot loader from the EFI system partition, and that loader starts the kernel. Each link is meant to validate the next. A bootkit inserts itself into one of those links:
Secure Boot requires each stage to carry a signature the previous stage trusts, which closed the simple cases. Attackers moved to signed components with exploitable bugs. BootHole (CVE-2020-10713), disclosed in July 2020, was a buffer overflow in the GRUB2 configuration parser that allowed arbitrary code to run inside a trusted loader. Revoking the affected binaries took years, because an over-eager revocation list bricks machines that have not been updated.
BlackLotus, analysed by ESET in March 2023, was the first UEFI bootkit confirmed to defeat Secure Boot on a fully patched Windows 11 system. It exploited CVE-2022-21894, a flaw known as Baton Drop, by bringing its own vulnerable but still-trusted boot binary with it. Once resident it disabled BitLocker integrity checks, hypervisor-protected code integrity, and Microsoft Defender. Microsoft’s remediation arrived through KB5025885 in May 2023 as a staged revocation process, deliberately slow because the alternative was unbootable fleets. Bootkitty, reported in late 2024, showed the same approach being tried against Linux.
A tool running on a compromised machine is the wrong instrument, because it asks questions of the layer that was subverted. Three approaches work better:
Unexpected BitLocker recovery prompts, Secure Boot silently switching off, and security agents that stop reporting without an uninstall event are all worth investigating as boot chain events rather than endpoint faults.
Keep Secure Boot enabled and apply the DBX revocation updates rather than deferring them; most organisations that remain exposed to known bootkits are exposed because a revocation was postponed. Set a firmware administrator password and disable booting from external media, since several infection routes need only a few minutes of physical access. Enable BitLocker bound to TPM platform registers so that boot tampering forces a recovery prompt instead of booting silently. Apply vendor firmware updates through the same process used for operating system patches, and keep the Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist current to limit bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver escalation, which is how attackers usually reach the privilege level a bootkit install requires.
If a bootkit is confirmed, the machine cannot report truthfully on itself. Image the disk and memory for evidence, then reflash the firmware or retire the hardware, rebuild from trusted media, and treat every credential used on the device as compromised. At Privia Security, our digital forensic incident response services include boot chain and firmware analysis for exactly these cases.
Sometimes. A clean installation that repartitions the disk removes MBR bootkits and most that live in the EFI system partition, provided you boot from trusted media and not from a recovery partition the malware could have modified. It does nothing about firmware implants in SPI flash, which survive disk replacement entirely and require reflashing or replacing the board.
A rootkit hides malicious activity from the operating system, usually by running in the kernel or in user mode once the system is already up. A bootkit executes earlier, during firmware and boot loader stages, so it can tamper with the kernel before any protection is active. Every bootkit is a rootkit; the reverse is not true.
Almost always with administrative or kernel privileges already in hand, obtained through an ordinary compromise followed by privilege escalation, frequently via a vulnerable signed driver. Physical access is the other route, which is why laptops left unattended at conferences and in hotel rooms remain a real concern for travelling executives. A bootkit is a persistence mechanism, not an entry point.
It does not prevent them, it reveals them. Measured boot records a hash of each component into the TPM as it loads, producing a value that changes if the chain is altered. Used with remote attestation and conditional access, a device whose measurements no longer match a known-good baseline can be refused access to corporate resources until it is investigated.
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