Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Secure Boot is a UEFI mechanism that verifies the signature of each component in the boot path before executing it, preventing bootkits from loading code ahead of the operating system.

What Is Secure Boot?
Secure Boot answers a narrow question with considerable consequences: is the next thing about to execute signed by someone this machine trusts. Defined in the UEFI specification, it checks the signature of each boot component, firmware drivers, the bootloader, and the operating system loader, before handing control to it. If verification fails, the machine refuses to boot that component. The aim is to close the window before the operating system loads, which is precisely where a bootkit wants to live.
Four databases held in firmware non-volatile storage drive the decision.
Most x86 hardware ships with Microsoft certificates in db: one for Windows components and a third-party UEFI certificate used to sign other vendors’ bootloaders. Linux distributions rely on that third-party certificate through shim, a small signed loader that then verifies the distribution’s own bootloader against its embedded key, with Machine Owner Keys allowing locally built kernel modules to be trusted.
Secure Boot stops unsigned or revoked code executing in the boot path. It does not verify anything after the operating system kernel starts, so it has no bearing on malware that runs in userland, and it does not by itself detect a change to firmware that executes before the verification begins. For that you need the measured boot chain, where each stage records a hash into a trusted platform module so a remote service can attest to what ran. Secure Boot enforces; measured boot reports. They are complementary and frequently confused.
Three cases define the operational reality. BootHole, CVE-2020-10713, was a buffer overflow in GRUB2 configuration parsing disclosed in July 2020 that allowed arbitrary code execution before the kernel on any machine trusting a shim-signed GRUB. Revoking the affected binaries meant adding many hashes to dbx, and a botched rollout could leave machines unbootable, which made the remediation nearly as disruptive as the vulnerability.
BlackLotus, analysed publicly in March 2023, was a UEFI bootkit sold on criminal forums that exploited CVE-2022-21894, known as baton drop, to bypass Secure Boot on fully patched Windows 11. The underlying flaw had been patched in January 2022, but the vulnerable signed binaries were still trusted, so attackers simply supplied an older copy. Microsoft’s revocation of those binaries was rolled out cautiously over many months from May 2023 precisely because an incorrect revocation bricks devices.
PKfail, published by Binarly in July 2024, found that hundreds of device models from multiple vendors shipped with test platform keys taken from reference code, some labelled explicitly as not for production use, with the private keys publicly available. On those devices, anyone could sign boot components the firmware would trust.
A further operational issue is approaching rather than historical: the Microsoft certificates issued in 2011 begin expiring from June 2026, and devices need firmware updates carrying the 2023 certificates to continue receiving signed boot components. Organisations with long hardware refresh cycles should be checking vendor guidance now rather than discovering the problem later.
Enable Secure Boot on every device that supports it, and confirm it rather than assume it: Confirm-SecureBootUEFI on Windows and mokutil --sb-state on Linux report the real state, and many estates contain machines where it was disabled during a troubleshooting session years ago and never re-enabled. Apply dbx revocation updates as part of normal patch management, testing on a pilot group first because a revocation that removes a bootloader still in use will prevent boot.
Set a firmware administrator password so Secure Boot cannot be turned off at the keyboard, enrol a custom PK where your hardware and tooling support it, and check for the PKfail test keys on models you have deployed. Pair the control with BitLocker, since BitLocker uses the boot measurements to decide whether to release the volume key, which makes an attempt to disable Secure Boot visible as a recovery prompt.
Our Infrastructure and Architecture Review Services audit boot chain configuration across laptop and server builds, including the revocation state that most inventory tools never report.
Only malware that tries to execute in the boot path. It verifies firmware drivers, bootloaders, and the operating system loader before each runs, which blocks bootkits and unsigned kernel drivers. It has no visibility of anything after the kernel starts, so ransomware, credential theft, and ordinary application-level malware are unaffected. It is one layer of a boot chain, not an anti-malware control.
Yes. Mainstream distributions use shim, a small loader signed with the Microsoft third-party UEFI certificate, which then verifies the distribution bootloader and kernel against its own embedded key. Locally compiled kernel modules, including some hardware drivers, require enrolling a Machine Owner Key, which is a one-time step performed at the console during the next boot.
The dbx is the forbidden signature database held in firmware: a list of certificates and binary hashes that must not be trusted even though they were validly signed. It is how vulnerable bootloaders such as those affected by BootHole and baton drop are blocked after disclosure. Revocation updates need piloting, because removing trust from a bootloader still in use prevents the device booting.
On Windows, run Confirm-SecureBootUEFI in PowerShell or check the System Information summary. On Linux, use mokutil –sb-state. Report the result centrally through your endpoint management platform, because disabled Secure Boot is almost always the result of a past troubleshooting step on an individual machine rather than a deliberate policy decision.
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