Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
In December 2015 attackers opened circuit breakers by hand through hijacked operator consoles; a year later purpose-built malware did it automatically. Both remain the reference cases for grid security.

What Happened in the Ukraine Power Grid Attacks?
On 23 December 2015, around 225,000 customers in western Ukraine lost electricity because someone in another country moved a mouse. It was the first confirmed cyberattack to cause a power outage anywhere in the world, and it remains the clearest demonstration that an intrusion into an office network can end with the lights going out.
Three regional distribution companies were affected. The intrusion began months earlier with spear-phishing emails carrying macro-enabled Office attachments that installed BlackEnergy 3. The attackers spent roughly six months on the corporate networks, learning the environment, harvesting credentials, and identifying the connections into the operational technology side.
The attack itself was manual. Using stolen virtual private network credentials, the operators took control of the human machine interface workstations and opened breakers at around thirty substations exactly as an engineer would, while watching the effect on screen. They then made recovery as difficult as they could:
Power was restored within one to six hours because Ukrainian utilities retained manual switching capability and sent engineers to the substations. A heavily automated grid without that fallback would have taken considerably longer.
On 17 December 2016, a transmission substation north of Kyiv was attacked, cutting power to roughly a fifth of the city for about an hour. This time the breaker operations were performed by the malware itself. Industroyer, also called CrashOverride, contained modules implementing the industrial protocols directly: IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 60870-5-104, IEC 61850, and OPC Data Access.
That is the significant change. The 2015 attack required an operator with knowledge of the specific environment; the 2016 attack encoded that knowledge into software that could be pointed at other grids. Industroyer also carried a module exploiting a denial of service vulnerability in Siemens SIPROTEC protection relays, intended to disable the safety equipment that would otherwise respond to the fault.
In April 2022, CERT-UA and ESET disclosed Industroyer2, deployed against a Ukrainian energy provider alongside CaddyWiper and other destructive tooling, and timed for a specific hour. It was detected and blocked before it operated. The relevant lesson is that the capability persists and is maintained, and that detection inside the operational network is what prevented the outage.
All three operations are attributed to Sandworm, a unit of Russian military intelligence, the same actor behind NotPetya.
Electricity, gas, water, transport, health, and digital infrastructure operators in the UK fall within the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, with Ofgem acting as competent authority for the GB energy sector. Compliance is assessed against the NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework, and these incidents map directly onto its objectives.
The practical controls they point to are specific:
At Privia Security, we assess these boundaries and the detection behind them through OT-SCADA Penetration Test engagements, which examine the path from the corporate network to the controller rather than the controller alone. The wider discipline is covered in our entries on SCADA security and OT security.
Through the corporate network. Spear-phishing emails with malicious Office attachments gave access to office systems, where the attackers spent months harvesting credentials and mapping connections into the operational environment. They then used stolen virtual private network credentials to reach the operator workstations. Neither attack required a direct internet connection to the control systems themselves.
Industroyer, also known as CrashOverride, was malware used in the December 2016 Kyiv attack that implemented industrial control protocols directly, including IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850. Unlike the 2015 attack, which required a human operating a hijacked console, Industroyer could issue breaker commands autonomously, making the capability portable to other grids using the same standard protocols.
The techniques are generic because the protocols are international standards, so the question is whether the specific controls are in place rather than whether the method translates. UK operators of essential services are regulated under the NIS Regulations 2018, assessed against the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework, with Ofgem as competent authority for the GB energy sector.
Because Ukrainian distribution companies retained the ability to operate substations manually. Engineers travelled to the affected sites and closed the breakers by hand, restoring supply within one to six hours even though the remote control systems had been disabled and the serial converters bricked. Grids that have removed manual fallback would face a substantially longer outage.
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