Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Black start is the ability to restore an electricity network after a total shutdown without any external supply. Grid resilience is the wider capacity to absorb, withstand, and recover from such events.

What Are Black Start and Grid Resilience?
Almost every generator on a modern grid needs electricity to start. Pumps, fans, control systems, and excitation equipment all draw power before the unit can produce any, and in a total shutdown that power is not there. Black start capability is the ability to break that circle: a small number of units able to start from their own on-site resources, then energise a path to larger plant, which in turn picks up more demand until the system is whole again. Grid resilience is the broader property that black start sits inside, covering how a network absorbs a shock, keeps serving what it can, and recovers.
Restoration is a sequence, not a switch. An anchor generator, typically hydro or a gas turbine with on-site diesel starting plant, comes up and energises a defined cranking path across the transmission network to a larger station. Operators then build islands: small, separately controlled sections of network with generation and demand balanced inside them. Frequency and voltage control in an island is delicate, because there is very little inertia and a modest block of demand switched on at the wrong moment will collapse it. Islands are then synchronised to each other until the system is reconnected.
Every step depends on things that are not electricity: telephony and radio to coordinate, SCADA telemetry to see what is energised, telemetry backhaul that may itself be on mains power, and people who can reach substations on roads without traffic signals. A restoration plan that assumes working corporate email is not a restoration plan.
Great Britain has an unusually explicit target. The Electricity System Restoration Standard, set by government in 2021, requires that the electricity system be capable of restoring 60 per cent of regional demand within 24 hours of a total or partial shutdown, and 100 per cent within five days. NESO, the National Energy System Operator, procures the restoration services that make this possible and tests them. Having a measurable standard changes the conversation with suppliers, because capability becomes contractible.
Real events keep the subject concrete. The GB power cut of 9 August 2019, triggered by a lightning strike and the near-simultaneous loss of two large generators, cut supply to around a million customers for under an hour and still produced a substantial regulatory inquiry. The Iberian Peninsula blackout of 28 April 2025 required a large-scale restoration across Spain and Portugal. Turkey experienced a nationwide blackout on 31 March 2015 that left most provinces without supply and required a staged restoration across the TEIAS transmission system, which remains the reference event in the Turkish sector.
None of the events above was caused by a cyberattack, but two Ukrainian incidents show what changes when one is. On 23 December 2015, attackers using BlackEnergy opened breakers at several regional distribution companies, cutting supply to around 225,000 customers, and then bricked serial-to-Ethernet converters so that operators could not reclose remotely. Crews restored supply manually, substation by substation. In December 2016 the Industroyer malware targeted a transmission substation in Kyiv using native grid protocols rather than operator workstations.
The lesson for restoration planning is specific. After a natural or technical failure, your control systems are trustworthy and the problem is physical. After a cyber incident, you cannot assume the control system telemetry is accurate, you cannot assume remote control is available, and you may need to prove that the environment is clean before reconnecting it, all while a restoration clock is running. That is why incident response in the energy sector builds in manual fallback, pre-authorised isolation decisions, and out-of-band communications.
Three habits separate credible plans from documents.
In the UK, operators of essential services in the electricity subsector are regulated under the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, assessed against NCSC’s Cyber Assessment Framework, with Ofgem as competent authority and resilience duties under the licence regime alongside. In Turkey the equivalent duties sit with EPDK and the critical infrastructure rules applying to the energy sector. At Privia Security, we run grid restoration and cyber-physical scenarios with control room teams through our cyber exercise services.
Units that can reach operating condition using only on-site resources: hydroelectric plant, pumped storage, and gas turbines fitted with diesel starting plant and independent auxiliaries. Increasingly, battery storage and some grid-forming inverter installations are being qualified to provide restoration services. Most large thermal stations cannot start unaided, which is why they sit later in the restoration sequence.
The specific route across the transmission network used to carry power from a black start generator to the next station that needs an external supply to begin operating. Cranking paths are identified and tested in advance, because energising lines and transformers in an unloaded network produces voltage and switching behaviour that has to be planned rather than discovered during a restoration.
The Great Britain standard requires 60 per cent of regional demand restored within 24 hours and all demand within five days. Actual timings depend on the cause, the extent of the shutdown, and whether control and communications systems are available. Restoration after a cyber incident can run considerably longer because operators have to verify system integrity before reconnecting.
Yes. On 23 December 2015, attackers opened breakers at Ukrainian regional distribution companies and cut supply to roughly 225,000 customers, then disabled remote control equipment so that restoration had to be performed manually at substations. A second attack on a Kyiv transmission substation followed in December 2016 using malware that spoke grid protocols directly rather than driving operator workstations.
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