Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
A pass-the-hash attack lets an attacker authenticate to Windows systems with a stolen password hash instead of the password itself, enabling rapid lateral movement across a network.

What Is a Pass-the-Hash Attack?
A pass-the-hash (PtH) attack is a technique in which an attacker uses a stolen password hash, rather than the plain-text password, to authenticate to other systems. It works against the Windows NTLM authentication protocol, which accepts the hash itself as proof of identity. If an attacker can lift the hash from one machine, they can log in as that user anywhere the account is valid, without ever cracking it.
That makes PtH one of the most common ways attackers move laterally inside Windows environments. A single compromised workstation where an administrator has recently logged in can become the key to the entire domain.
Windows stores credential material in memory so that users do not have to retype their password every time they access a network resource. The Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) holds NTLM hashes for logged-on users, and the local Security Account Manager (SAM) database stores hashes for local accounts.
A typical attack follows four steps:
Because the hash is never cracked, password complexity offers no protection. A 30-character password produces a hash that is just as reusable as a weak one.
PtH thrives on a few very common weaknesses. Shared local administrator passwords across many machines mean one hash unlocks them all. Help desk and server administrators often log in to ordinary workstations with privileged accounts, leaving their hashes behind in memory. And NTLM is still enabled in most networks for compatibility with older systems.
Related techniques extend the same idea. Overpass-the-hash uses an NTLM hash to request Kerberos tickets, and pass-the-ticket reuses stolen Kerberos tickets directly. Attacks such as Kerberoasting target service account credentials from a different angle.
Detection is challenging because the logins look technically valid, but several signals help:
Identity threat detection products, successors to Microsoft ATA such as Microsoft Defender for Identity, specialise in spotting these patterns from domain controller traffic.
No single setting eliminates PtH, but layered controls make it far harder:
PtH is a staple of internal penetration tests and Red Team engagements because it reveals how quickly one compromised endpoint can lead to domain compromise. Mapping the attack paths with tools such as BloodHound often shows surprising routes created by forgotten group memberships and old administrator sessions.
At Privia Security, our Penetration Test Services include internal Active Directory testing that shows exactly how far an attacker could get with credential reuse, and how to close those paths.
No. In a pass-the-hash attack, the hash is reused directly and never needs to be cracked, so the length and complexity of the original password make no difference. Strong passwords still matter against other attacks, but PtH has to be addressed through credential hygiene, unique local passwords, Credential Guard, and restrictions on where privileged accounts log in.
Classic pass-the-hash targets NTLM authentication. However, a related technique called overpass-the-hash uses the NTLM hash to request Kerberos tickets, and pass-the-ticket reuses stolen Kerberos tickets directly. Disabling NTLM therefore reduces risk, but it does not remove the need to protect credentials stored in memory on Windows systems.
Windows Local Administrator Password Solution automatically sets a unique, random password for the local administrator account on each domain-joined or Entra-joined device and rotates it regularly. The password is stored securely in Active Directory or Microsoft Entra ID. This stops attackers from reusing a single local administrator hash to move between machines.
Look for NTLM logons between workstations, logon type 9 events with the seclogo process, unusual access to LSASS memory, and single accounts authenticating to many hosts in a short time. Identity threat detection tools and a well-tuned SIEM can correlate these signals, and a forensic investigation can confirm suspected activity.
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