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How Will Quantum Computers Affect Cryptography?

Quantum computers break public key cryptography through Shor’s algorithm and weaken symmetric keys modestly through Grover’s. The question is not whether, but when and what to do first.

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17 November 2026

How Will Quantum Computers Affect Cryptography?

How Will Quantum Computers Affect Cryptography?

A quantum computer manipulates qubits, which can exist in superposition and become entangled, allowing certain structured problems to be solved with far fewer operations than any classical machine would need. Two of those problems happen to be the ones modern public key cryptography is built on.

This does not mean quantum computers are faster at everything. They are useless for most workloads, and the machines that exist today cannot break anything. What matters is the small set of algorithms where the speed-up is dramatic, and the fact that one of them dismantles the public key layer entirely.

Shor’s Algorithm Is the Problem

Peter Shor showed in 1994 that a quantum computer could factor large integers and compute discrete logarithms in polynomial time. That single result covers:

Nothing survives by increasing the key size. Doubling an RSA modulus raises classical difficulty enormously and quantum difficulty only modestly, so the answer is replacement rather than reinforcement.

Grover’s Algorithm Is Manageable

Lov Grover’s 1996 algorithm searches an unstructured space in roughly the square root of the usual number of steps. Against a symmetric cipher that halves the effective key strength: AES-256 behaves like a 128-bit key, which remains far beyond reach, and AES-128 drops to 64 bits of quantum work — uncomfortable, though the real-world cost of running Grover for that long is itself prohibitive.

Hash functions are affected similarly, with collision-finding improving modestly. Moving to AES-256 and SHA-384 or SHA-512 where the choice exists is a cheap precaution, and that is the whole of the symmetric story.

How Close Is the Hardware?

Today’s machines are noisy. Qubits decohere in microseconds, gate operations have error rates around one in a thousand, and breaking RSA requires millions of operations in sequence. The bridge is quantum error correction, which combines many physical qubits into one reliable logical qubit.

Progress is real but early. IBM’s Condor processor reached 1,121 physical qubits in December 2023, and Google’s Willow chip demonstrated in December 2024 that increasing the size of an error-correcting code could reduce the logical error rate below the threshold — a milestone the field had sought for decades. Neither is close to the logical qubit counts required.

The resource estimates, however, keep falling. In 2019 Gidney and Ekerå calculated that factoring RSA-2048 would need around 20 million noisy qubits running for eight hours. A 2025 paper by Craig Gidney revised that to fewer than one million noisy qubits in under a week. The algorithms and error correction improve faster than most planning assumptions allow for, which argues for treating the date as uncertain rather than distant.

The Risk Is Already Present

Waiting for the hardware misses the point. An adversary can record encrypted traffic now and decrypt it when the capability exists, which means data with a long confidentiality life is exposed today. That is harvest now, decrypt later, and it is the reason the UK and US timetables are set for the early 2030s rather than for whenever a machine appears.

Michele Mosca’s framing is the useful planning tool: if the time your data must stay secret, plus the time your migration will take, exceeds the time until a capable quantum computer exists, you are already late. For a bank holding records for decades, or a government department with a statutory retention period, that inequality fails on almost any estimate.

What Changes and What Does Not

TechnologyQuantum impactAction
RSA, ECC, Diffie-HellmanBroken by ShorReplace with ML-KEM and ML-DSA
AES-128Weakened to about 64-bit workMove to AES-256 where practical
AES-256, SHA-256 and aboveAcceptable margin retainedNo urgent change
Password hashing, HMACMinimal impactNo change
Bitcoin and blockchain signaturesECDSA keys exposed once publishedProtocol-level migration required

The practical response is not to wait for certainty about the date. It is to build the cryptographic inventory, deploy hybrid key exchange where it already exists, and set the programme in motion. We scope that discovery work within our cyber risk analysis services, because the organisations that struggle in 2031 will be the ones that have not started looking.

FAQ – Frequently Asked Questions

Will Quantum Computers Break All Encryption?

No. They break public key cryptography — RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic curves — through Shor’s algorithm. Symmetric encryption and hashing are only modestly weakened by Grover’s algorithm, and AES-256 retains a very comfortable margin. The migration effort concentrates on key exchange and digital signatures, not on bulk data encryption.

How Many Qubits Are Needed to Break RSA-2048?

Estimates have fallen sharply. A 2019 analysis suggested around 20 million noisy physical qubits for an eight-hour run; a 2025 analysis brought that below one million qubits over roughly a week. Current machines have around a thousand physical qubits with error rates far too high, so the gap remains large but is narrowing on both sides.

Should I Worry About Quantum Computing Today?

You should plan today, because data recorded now can be decrypted later and large migrations take years. If your data loses value in weeks, the risk is low. If you hold health, legal, financial, defence, or intellectual property records that matter into the 2040s, that data is already exposed and should move first.

What About Bitcoin and Other Blockchains?

Addresses whose public key has been revealed on chain, which includes any address that has spent funds, would be vulnerable to a quantum attacker deriving the private key from ECDSA. Several projects are researching post-quantum signature schemes, but migrating a decentralised network requires consensus and is considerably harder than changing a server configuration.

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