Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
RPKI puts cryptographic proof behind the claim that a network is entitled to announce an address block, so routers can reject false announcements automatically.

What Is RPKI?
BGP has no built-in way to check whether a network is entitled to announce the addresses it claims. Resource Public Key Infrastructure, specified in RFC 6480, supplies that check. The holder of an address block signs a statement saying which autonomous system may originate it; routers that validate against those statements can reject announcements that contradict them. It is the deployed answer to BGP hijacking, and it finally reached meaningful coverage in the early 2020s after years of slow progress.
Signing. As an address holder you create a Route Origin Authorisation through your regional internet registry — RIPE NCC for the UK and Europe — stating the prefix, the maximum prefix length you will announce, and the autonomous system number permitted to originate it. The registry publishes the signed object in a repository, and the trust chain runs up to the registry’s own trust anchor.
The maxLength field causes most of the mistakes. Setting it longer than you actually announce creates room for a more-specific hijack that still validates. The current good practice, set out in RFC 9319, is to make maxLength equal to the prefix length you announce, and to create separate ROAs for the more specific prefixes you genuinely originate.
Validating. As a network operator you run relying party software — Routinator, rpki-client, FORT, or similar — which fetches and verifies the repositories and produces a validated payload set. Routers connect to it over the RPKI to Router protocol, RFC 8210, and mark each received announcement as valid, invalid, or not-found. Policy then drops invalids and accepts the rest.
Run at least two validators for resilience, and place them close to the routers that depend on them. Note the failure mode: if validation data becomes unavailable, everything becomes not-found and is accepted, so the system degrades to pre-RPKI behaviour rather than to an outage.
Route Origin Validation detects announcements originated by the wrong autonomous system. That covers the accidental fat-finger leaks that cause most real outages, and the straightforward origin hijacks used in attacks such as the April 2018 redirection of Amazon’s Route 53 prefixes.
It does not validate the AS path. An attacker who forges the path to make it appear that the legitimate origin is present can still produce an announcement that validates. Closing that gap requires AS Provider Authorisation, which is progressing through the IETF, or BGPsec, which has seen essentially no deployment because of its performance cost. Treat RPKI as removing the easy attacks and the common accidents, not as a complete solution.
Coverage passed half of the global routing table during 2024 and continues to rise. Most large transit providers and internet exchanges perform validation, including LINX in London, and the major cloud and content networks have published their invalid-drop policies. Public awareness campaigns by large content providers and the MANRS initiative both contributed, and several national regulators now expect it: the US FCC has consulted on requirements, and Dutch and Nordic government procurement standards list it.
For a UK organisation the practical position is straightforward. If you hold address space, sign it — the RIPE NCC portal makes creating ROAs a short task, and it costs nothing beyond membership you already have. If you operate a network, validate, and ask your transit providers whether they drop invalids, because your own signing only helps when somebody downstream is checking.
A wrong ROA takes your own prefixes off the internet for every validating network, which is a self-inflicted outage with a rapid blast radius. Three habits avoid it.
Routing hygiene sits alongside DNSSEC and CAA records as infrastructure controls that are cheap to deploy and awkward to retrofit during an incident. Our Network Security Services include a routing and DNS posture review.
No. Route Origin Validation checks which autonomous system originated a prefix, so it catches origin hijacks and the misconfigurations behind most route leaks. It does not validate the AS path, so an attacker who forges a path showing the correct origin can still produce a valid-looking announcement. Path validation requires ASPA or BGPsec, neither of which is widely deployed.
It is the longest prefix length your ROA permits that autonomous system to announce. Setting it longer than you actually announce leaves room for a more-specific hijack that still validates, which defeats the purpose. Set maxLength equal to the prefix you announce and create separate ROAs for any more specific prefixes you genuinely originate.
Routes become not-found rather than invalid, so they are accepted under normal policy and the network degrades to pre-RPKI behaviour. It is not an outage. Still, run at least two validators in different locations and monitor their freshness, because a stale validator silently removes the protection you believe you have.
Yes, they are different protections. Your provider filtering invalid announcements protects their customers from accepting hijacks. Your signing protects your prefixes from being hijacked and accepted elsewhere on the internet. Both are needed, and signing is the cheaper of the two: creating ROAs through the RIPE NCC portal takes minutes for most address holders.
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