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Turkish law requires a controller to notify the Personal Data Protection Board within 72 hours of becoming aware of a personal data breach, and to notify affected individuals as well.

What Is KVKK Data Breach Notification?
Article 12(5) of Turkish Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698 states that when processed personal data is obtained by others through unlawful means, the controller must notify the affected person and the Personal Data Protection Board as soon as possible. Board decision 2019/10 of 24 January 2019 put numbers on “as soon as possible”: notification to the Board without delay and in any case within 72 hours of the controller becoming aware.
For a UK organisation managing a Turkish entity, the 72-hour figure looks reassuringly familiar. The details underneath it are not, and assuming the UK process transfers is the mistake that causes late filings.
| Point | KVKK | UK GDPR |
|---|---|---|
| Threshold for notifying the regulator | Unlawful acquisition of personal data; no risk-based filter in the statutory wording | Notify unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to rights and freedoms |
| Notifying individuals | Required for affected data subjects, in the shortest time reasonably possible | Required only where there is a high risk to rights and freedoms |
| Form | Prescribed Personal Data Breach Notification Form published by the Authority | ICO online reporting form or telephone |
| Processors | Must inform the controller without delay; the controller’s 72 hours start on becoming aware | Processor informs controller without undue delay |
| Publication | The Board may publish breach notices on its website, naming the controller | The ICO publishes enforcement action, not routine breach reports |
The publication point changes incident handling materially. A Turkish breach notification can become a public announcement bearing the organisation’s name, so communications planning has to run in parallel with the filing rather than after it.
The prescribed form asks for the identity of the controller, when the breach occurred and when it was detected, how it was detected, the categories of personal data affected, the approximate number of affected data subjects and records, the likely consequences, the measures taken or proposed, how affected individuals will be informed, and contact details for the person responsible.
Where the full picture is not available within 72 hours, partial notification with supplementary information afterwards is the expected approach, as it is in the UK. What is not acceptable is waiting until the investigation is complete.
Individuals must be informed directly where their contact details are available, or by a method such as publication on the controller’s website where they are not. The notice should describe the breach, the data involved, the likely consequences, and the measures taken, in plain language.
Because Turkish law does not apply the UK’s high-risk filter to individual notification in the same way, organisations frequently find themselves notifying people they would not have notified in the UK for an equivalent incident. Build that into the assessment rather than discovering it during the event.
A multinational group with a breach affecting both UK and Turkish data subjects is running two clocks against different thresholds. A workable approach:
Published Board decisions concentrate on a small number of recurring failures: notification made outside 72 hours without a defensible justification, failure to notify data subjects at all, inadequate technical and organisational measures preceding the breach, and incomplete notification forms. Credential-based intrusions, misconfigured systems, and third-party compromises dominate the fact patterns, as they do in breach reporting everywhere.
The practical consequence is that the measures in place before the incident matter as much as the filing after it. Organisations that can show documented access controls, logging, patching, and testing are in a materially better position when the Board examines the breach.
Preparation is what shortens the 72 hours. Rehearsing the sequence through a tabletop exercise that includes both the ICO and Board filings is the cheapest way to find the gaps, and our investigation and incident response services support organisations through the real thing.
Board decision 2019/10 requires notification to the Personal Data Protection Board without delay and in any case within 72 hours of the controller becoming aware of the breach. Affected individuals must be informed in the shortest reasonable time once the controller has determined who is affected. Partial notification followed by supplementary detail is accepted where facts are still emerging.
The UK applies a risk filter: you notify the ICO only where a risk to rights and freedoms is likely, and individuals only where the risk is high. Turkish practice applies no equivalent filter in the same way, so more incidents are reported and more individuals notified. The Board may also publish breach notices naming the controller, which the ICO does not do routinely.
The controller notifies the Board. A processor that becomes aware of a breach must inform the controller without delay, and the controller’s 72-hour period runs from becoming aware. Contracts with Turkish processors should therefore specify a short internal notification window, commonly 24 hours, so the controller retains usable time.
If the incident affects personal data under both regimes, yes, and the assessments are separate. Facts are gathered once, but the notification decision, threshold, form, and content are determined under each law independently. Document the reasoning for each decision, and align public communications so the Turkish and UK accounts of the incident do not diverge.
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