Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Email header analysis reads the routing and authentication metadata attached to a message to establish where it really came from, which servers handled it, and whether the sender was forged.

What Is Email Header Analysis?
Every email carries a block of metadata that the recipient never sees unless they ask for it. Those headers record which servers handled the message, in what order, what authentication checks were applied, and what the sending system claimed about itself. Reading them is the quickest way to distinguish a forged message from a compromised account, and it is the first technical step in almost every phishing and business email compromise investigation.
Each mail server that handles a message prepends a Received header, so the list reads in reverse chronological order. The bottom entry is the earliest, usually the submitting client or the originating mail server, and that is where the useful detail sits: the connecting IP address, the name the client offered in the SMTP greeting, and the timestamp.
Compare the claimed hostname with reverse DNS for the address, and check the geolocation and autonomous system against where the purported sender does business. A message supposedly from a Manchester supplier submitted through a residential broadband address in another hemisphere is a finding on its own. Watch for time gaps between hops, which can indicate queuing through an intermediate relay, and for headers that look fabricated — an attacker can insert fake Received lines, but they can only add them below the ones your own infrastructure writes, so trust the entries added by servers you control and treat everything beneath them as a claim.
Most receiving platforms summarise their checks in an Authentication-Results header:
pass says nothing about the From address the user sees.A DMARC pass does not make a message safe. It makes it authentic to its domain — and lookalike domains, newly registered domains, and compromised legitimate accounts all pass comfortably.
Direct spoofing of the From domain is now rare against organisations that publish a DMARC reject policy; headers show an SPF or DKIM failure and the message is usually quarantined. Lookalike domains are far more common: the authentication passes because the attacker owns the domain, and the deception is visual, so the finding comes from registration date and WHOIS rather than from the authentication block. Display name spoofing is the simplest of all, putting a trusted name in front of an unrelated address, and it works because most mobile clients hide the address entirely.
The fourth pattern is the serious one. When the account itself is compromised, the headers are perfect, because the message genuinely came from the real mailbox. Header analysis then shifts to the submitting IP address and client, which is exactly what you compare against the tenant sign-in logs in a business email compromise case.
Ask users to forward the suspect message as an attachment rather than inline, which preserves the original headers; a standard forward rewrites them. In Microsoft 365, message trace and the unified audit log supply server-side records that survive a user deleting the message, and in Google Workspace the equivalent is the email log search. Export both early, because retention is limited and an attacker who still has mailbox access will often delete the evidence along with the rules they created.
Treat the exported message file as an exhibit: hash it, record who extracted it and from where, and keep it under the same chain of custody as any other evidence. Our incident response services routinely start with exactly this artefact, because in fraud cases the headers often decide liability between two companies that both believe they were careful.
Partly. An attacker controls everything their own system writes and can insert convincing fake Received lines, but they cannot alter headers added later by servers you control. Read from the top entry written by your own infrastructure downwards, and treat everything added before it as an unverified claim. Cryptographic signatures from DKIM are the only part that cannot be fabricated.
No. SPF validates the envelope sender domain against the connecting IP address, and the user never sees the envelope sender. An attacker can register a domain, publish an SPF record for their own server, and pass cleanly while displaying a trusted name. Alignment between the visible From domain and the authenticated identity is what DMARC adds, and it is the result worth checking.
Ask them to forward the message as an attachment, which preserves the original intact; an ordinary forward rewrites the headers and destroys the evidence. Better still, retrieve the message server-side through Microsoft 365 content search or the Google Workspace log search, which also works after the user has deleted it and gives a defensible export.
They show legitimate authentication, because the message really did come from the real mailbox. The value then lies in the submitting IP address, the client identifier, and the timestamps, which you compare against sign-in logs to identify sessions from unexpected locations or unusual user agents. Mailbox rules created around the same time usually complete the picture.
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