Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Credential stuffing is an automated attack that replays username and password pairs leaked from one breach against other services, exploiting the habit of password reuse.

What Is Credential Stuffing?
Credential stuffing is an automated attack in which criminals take username and password pairs leaked from one breach and try them, at scale, against the login pages of other services. The attacker is not guessing anything: every pair was valid somewhere. The attack works for one reason only—people reuse passwords—and that makes it cheap, quiet, and depressingly effective.
A typical campaign starts with a “combo list”: millions of email and password pairs compiled from historic breaches and, increasingly, from infostealer malware logs traded on criminal forums and Telegram channels. The attacker loads the list into a tool such as OpenBullet or SilverBullet, adds a “config” describing the target’s login flow, and routes traffic through residential proxy networks so each attempt appears to come from a different home broadband address.
Success rates are low, often well under 1%, but the volume makes up for it. One million attempts at a 0.5% hit rate gives the attacker 5,000 working accounts. Those accounts are then drained of loyalty points or stored value, used for fraud, or sold on as verified logins.
MITRE ATT&CK lists the technique as Brute Force: Credential Stuffing (T1110.004), and the OWASP Automated Threats project catalogues it as OAT-008.
| Attack | Input | Typical defence |
|---|---|---|
| Brute force | Every possible combination for one account | Lockout, rate limiting, long passwords |
| Password spraying | A few common passwords across many accounts | Banned-password lists, MFA |
| Credential stuffing | Real leaked pairs, one attempt per account | MFA, breached-password checks, bot detection |
The last row explains why stronger password policies do not help much. A leaked password may well meet every complexity rule you have; what matters is that it is already in an attacker’s list.
In October 2023, the genetic testing company 23andMe disclosed that attackers had used reused credentials to log in to around 14,000 customer accounts. Through the platform’s DNA Relatives feature, those accounts exposed profile information about millions of other users who had never had their own passwords compromised. The ICO later fined the company £2.31 million, finding that it had not done enough to protect against this type of attack. The lesson for any organisation running customer accounts is that the attack may start with someone else’s breach, but regulators judge your controls.
Because attempts are spread across thousands of IP addresses, per-account lockouts and simple IP blocking rarely trigger. Look at the system as a whole instead:
Feeding these signals into your SIEM or fraud engine lets you spot a campaign within minutes rather than after customers complain.
The single most effective control is multi-factor authentication. A correct password without the second factor gets the attacker nothing, which removes the economic incentive. Phishing-resistant options such as passkeys and FIDO2 security keys go further still. Alongside MFA:
Under UK GDPR Article 32, the ICO expects “appropriate technical and organisational measures” proportionate to the risk, and for consumer platforms that now clearly includes protection against credential stuffing. If you want to know how your login flows hold up, our two-factor authentication solutions team can help you close the gap.
Rarely. With multi-factor authentication in place, a stolen password on its own is not enough to log in, so the attempt fails. Attackers may then try MFA fatigue prompts or real-time phishing to capture the second factor, which is why phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys and FIDO2 keys are stronger than SMS codes. Credential stuffing remains overwhelmingly a problem for accounts protected by a password alone.
Breach notification services such as Have I Been Pwned let you monitor your organisation’s email domains and receive alerts when addresses appear in new breaches. Threat intelligence and dark web monitoring services also track infostealer logs, which often contain corporate credentials. Checking passwords against breached lists at the moment they are set, rather than after an incident, prevents most reused passwords from entering your environment.
If attackers successfully log in and access personal data, that is a personal data breach, even though the passwords were stolen elsewhere. You must assess the risk and, where it is likely to affect individuals, report it to the ICO within 72 hours of becoming aware. Failed attempts alone are not a breach, but they should still be logged and investigated.
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