Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
A DMZ (demilitarised zone) is an isolated network segment that hosts internet-facing services, so that if one of them is compromised the attacker still cannot reach the internal network directly.

What Is a DMZ?
A DMZ, or demilitarised zone, is a separate network segment that sits between the internet and your internal network and holds the services outsiders need to reach. Web servers, mail relays, and remote access gateways live there, behind filtering, so that a compromise of one of them does not hand the attacker a direct route to your file servers, databases, and domain controllers.
The term borrows from the buffer strip between two opposing forces. Security architects also call it a perimeter network or a screened subnet. Whatever the name, its value depends almost entirely on how strictly traffic is controlled in and out of it.
There are two classic ways to build a DMZ:
Larger organisations often run several DMZs—one for public web services, one for partner connections, one for remote access—so that a problem in one does not spread to the others.
| Place in the DMZ | Keep on the internal network |
|---|---|
| Reverse proxies and public web servers | Databases holding customer or payment data |
| Inbound mail gateways and relays | Domain controllers and directory services |
| Public-facing DNS servers | Internal application servers |
| VPN and remote access gateways | Backup servers and management consoles |
| Managed file transfer and SFTP services | Internal DNS and certificate authorities |
A common pattern is a three-tier design: the reverse proxy in the DMZ, the application tier behind it, and the database deeper still. Each tier can only talk to the next on the specific ports it needs.
A DMZ with loose rules is just a differently numbered part of the internal network. The rules that matter most are:
Card payment environments make this explicit: PCI DSS v4.0 requirement 1.4 calls for controlled connections between trusted and untrusted networks and prevents systems storing cardholder data from being directly reachable from untrusted networks.
Everything in the DMZ accepts connections from strangers, so it attracts the most scanning and the most exploitation. Recent mass-exploitation campaigns show the pattern clearly. In 2023 the Cl0p group exploited a zero-day in Progress MOVEit Transfer (CVE-2023-34362), a file transfer product typically deployed at the edge, and stole data from hundreds of organisations, including UK payroll provider Zellis and its clients. Later that year, Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966) let attackers hijack sessions on NetScaler gateways.
In both cases, organisations with tight DMZ rules and good monitoring had a much better chance of containing the damage. Treat DMZ systems as the most exposed in your estate: harden them, patch them first, collect their logs centrally, and alert on unusual processes or outbound connections. Your intrusion detection sensors are most valuable on the boundaries of this segment.
In AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud the same idea is expressed with public and private subnets, security groups, and network security groups. Load balancers and gateways sit in public subnets, while application and database tiers stay in private ones with no direct internet route. The most frequent cloud mistake is placing a database or a virtual machine with an open management port in a public subnet. Cloud security posture management tools catch these drifts, but only if someone acts on their findings.
Many home and small-office routers offer a “DMZ” setting that forwards every unsolicited inbound port to one internal device. That is the opposite of a real DMZ: it exposes the device entirely while it remains on the same network as everything else. It should be avoided.
If you are unsure how well your segmentation holds up, our network security services test DMZ rules and boundaries from an attacker’s point of view.
You need the principle rather than the physical design. Internet-facing components should sit in public subnets or behind managed load balancers, while application logic, databases, and identity services stay in private subnets with tightly scoped security groups. The goal is the same as an on-premises DMZ: a compromise of something exposed to the internet must not give direct access to sensitive internal systems.
Generally yes. The gateway terminates connections from the internet, so it belongs in an exposed, closely monitored segment rather than on the internal network. Authenticated users are then passed inwards through firewall rules that limit what each group can reach. Keep the appliance patched promptly, require multi-factor authentication, and forward its logs to your SIEM, because edge devices are heavily targeted.
It can, but only through a narrow, explicit rule: that specific server, to that specific database, on that specific port. Use a dedicated database account with the least privilege needed and monitor the connection for unusual queries. Never place the database itself in the DMZ, because a single compromised web server would then mean immediate access to your data.
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