Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
A certificate authority is the organisation that checks who owns a domain or identity and signs a certificate saying so. Browsers trust a few hundred of them, and that trust is the weak point.

What Is a Certificate Authority?
When your browser shows a padlock for a site, it is not verifying the site. It is verifying a signature made by a certificate authority that your browser already trusts, on a certificate that binds a domain name to a public key. A CA is therefore a commercial trust broker: it checks an applicant genuinely controls what they claim, signs a certificate recording that check, and publishes the means to revoke it later.
The model has an uncomfortable property. A browser trusts several hundred roots, operated from dozens of jurisdictions, and any one of them can issue a valid certificate for any domain in the world. The security of your bank’s website depends on the weakest CA in the store, not the one your bank chose.
Three validation levels are defined by the CA/Browser Forum’s Baseline Requirements:
None of these levels says anything about whether the site is safe. A DV certificate for a phishing domain is perfectly valid; it proves the criminal controls the domain, which they do.
CAs are not licensed by governments. They are admitted to, and removed from, the root programmes run by Mozilla, Microsoft, Apple, and Google, each with its own policy on top of the Baseline Requirements. Continued membership depends on annual WebTrust or ETSI audits, public incident reports when something goes wrong, and visible issuance through Certificate Transparency logs.
The sanctions are real, and they are commercial death sentences:
*.google.com used to intercept Iranian users’ Gmail traffic. Browsers removed its root within weeks and the company was bankrupt by September 2011.Public CAs cannot issue for names that are not real domains, so most organisations also run a private CA — Active Directory Certificate Services, EJBCA, Vault PKI, or a cloud service — for internal TLS, device identity, VPN authentication, and client certificates. These deserve the same care as the public ones. AD CS in particular has a well-documented family of escalation paths (the ESC1 to ESC16 techniques) in which a loose template lets any domain user request a certificate impersonating a domain administrator, and we find them on most internal engagements.
Private roots should live offline, issue only to intermediates, and use hardware security modules for key storage. Name constraints are worth setting so that an internal CA can only sign names in your own namespace, limiting the damage if it is compromised.
You cannot audit every CA in the browser store, but you can reduce your exposure:
Certificate inventory and private PKI configuration are standard elements of our infrastructure and architecture review services, because the gap between what an organisation thinks it has issued and what it has actually issued is usually wide.
Technically yes, which is the main weakness of the public PKI. Any trusted CA can sign for any name, so a compromised or careless authority anywhere can produce a certificate browsers accept for your site. CAA records restrict which CAs are permitted to issue, and Certificate Transparency monitoring tells you when something was issued regardless.
No. The cryptography and the browser treatment are identical; a Let’s Encrypt DV certificate and a paid DV certificate differ only in price and support. Paid OV and EV products add verified organisation details inside the certificate, which some sectors and insurers require, but they do not make the connection stronger.
Reissue from another authority before the distrust date, starting with anything public-facing, then internal systems that pin or validate those chains. Because distrust usually applies from a cut-off issuance date, certificates already issued may keep working for a while. Maintaining an accurate certificate inventory is what makes this a planned task rather than an outage.
Not necessarily. A private CA is cheaper, faster, and can issue for internal hostnames a public CA will refuse, provided you can distribute the root to every client that needs it. Use a public CA where third parties, mobile devices, or unmanaged clients connect, since they will not have your root installed.
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