Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
Windows event logs are the built-in record of authentication, process, service, and policy activity on every Windows system — and the first place any intrusion is reconstructed from.

What Are Windows Event Logs?
Every Windows system keeps a structured record of what happens on it, stored as EVTX files under %SystemRoot%\System32\winevt\Logs and readable through the Event Viewer or the wevtutil and Get-WinEvent commands. For defenders this is the foundation layer: the first evidence consulted in almost every Windows investigation, available on every host without buying anything, and comprehensively misconfigured in most estates.
The logs are organised into channels. Security, System, and Application are the familiar three, but the detection value is spread much wider, across the Applications and Services channels where PowerShell, Sysmon, Task Scheduler, WMI activity, Terminal Services, and Windows Defender each write their own stream.
| ID | Meaning | Investigative use |
|---|---|---|
| 4624 | Successful logon | Logon type distinguishes interactive (2), network (3), service (5), RDP (10) |
| 4625 | Failed logon | Password spraying appears as many accounts, few attempts each |
| 4648 | Logon with explicit credentials | A strong indicator of credential reuse during lateral movement |
| 4672 | Special privileges assigned | Marks administrative logons |
| 4688 | Process creation | With command line auditing enabled, the built-in equivalent of Sysmon Event ID 1 |
| 4698 | Scheduled task created | A common persistence mechanism |
| 4719 | Audit policy changed | Attackers disabling the logging you depend on |
| 4720, 4728, 4732 | Account created, added to groups | Privilege escalation and backdoor accounts |
| 4768, 4769, 4771 | Kerberos ticket activity | Kerberoasting shows as many service ticket requests with weak encryption |
| 5140, 5145 | Network share accessed | Data staging and tooling transferred over SMB |
| 7045 | Service installed (System channel) | Remote execution tools and persistence |
| 1102 | Audit log cleared | Anti-forensics; should always alert |
Two configuration gaps account for most disappointment. The first is that advanced audit policy subcategories control what is recorded, and the defaults omit a good deal. Process creation auditing, detailed file share access, and several Kerberos subcategories all have to be enabled deliberately through Group Policy.
The second is specific and important: Event ID 4688 records only the process name unless the policy Include command line in process creation events is enabled. Without it you learn that powershell.exe ran and nothing about what it did, which is the difference between a usable log and a log that merely exists. Enable it alongside PowerShell script block logging, which records the code itself.
Channel sizes also need attention. The defaults are measured in tens of megabytes, which a domain controller or a busy file server overwrites within hours. Raising them buys time; forwarding the events off the host solves the problem properly.
Logs that stay on the host are logs an attacker can delete, and logs nobody correlates. Windows Event Forwarding provides an agentless route — collector-initiated or source-initiated subscriptions, driven by Group Policy, with XPath filters that select only the events you want before they are sent. Most organisations instead use the agent their SIEM vendor supplies, which is simpler to operate and often filters more flexibly.
Either way, filter at the source. Forwarding the Security channel in full from every host is one of the quickest ways to exhaust a licence, and a handful of high-volume event IDs usually account for most of it. The decision about which to keep belongs in your use case catalogue, so the detections depending on each event ID are visible before anything is dropped.
Clearing the Security log raises Event ID 1102, and clearing any other channel raises Event ID 104 in System — both of which should alert without exception, since there is no routine reason for either. More subtle interference exists: stopping the Event Log service, reducing a channel’s maximum size so it rolls over immediately, disabling audit subcategories, or selectively removing records from an EVTX file. Forensic techniques for spotting these are covered in finding traces of log deletion, and the reliable defence is the same in every case: get the events off the host as they occur, because an event already in the SIEM cannot be edited on the endpoint.
The NCSC’s logging and protective monitoring guidance makes the same point for UK organisations, and treats centralised, tamper-resistant collection as a baseline expectation rather than an advanced capability. Windows event logs combined with Sysmon cover complementary ground, and most mature Windows detection programmes run both. At Privia Security, we review audit configuration and collection coverage through our SOC maturation services.
Only until the channel fills and starts overwriting, which on default sizes can be hours on a domain controller or a busy server and weeks on a quiet workstation. Local retention is never a reliable evidence strategy. Raise the channel sizes as a stopgap, and forward events to central storage where retention is a decision you control rather than a side effect of disk allocation.
Event 4624 records a successful logon and its type, which covers normal interactive, network, and service authentication. Event 4648 records a logon performed with explicitly supplied credentials, meaning someone used a different account than the one they were logged in as. That is routine for administrators using runas and also a reliable marker of lateral movement with stolen credentials.
They overlap less than people assume. Windows logs cover authentication, Kerberos, group changes, services, scheduled tasks, and policy changes that Sysmon does not record. Sysmon adds process hashes, parent command lines, network connections attributed to processes, image loads, and DNS queries. Collecting both gives materially better coverage than either alone.
Start with audit log cleared (1102 and 104), new service installation (7045), accounts added to privileged groups (4728 and 4732), and scheduled task creation (4698). All four are low volume, hard for an attacker to avoid, and rarely legitimate outside known change windows, which makes them realistic first rules for a team with limited tuning capacity.
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