Explore our new Cybersecurity Terms Glossary, explained by our experts.
Cybersecurity Terms Glossary
POS malware steals card data from the memory of a payment terminal or till system, while skimming captures it physically at the card reader; both target the moment data is briefly in the clear.

What Are POS Malware and Card Skimming?
Card data is encrypted in transit and protected at rest. There is one moment when it is neither, and that moment is at the point of sale, when the card is read and the data exists in the memory of a terminal or a till. Point-of-sale malware exists to find it there. Skimming devices exist to capture it slightly earlier, at the reader itself. Both are attacks on the same brief window, approached from software and from hardware respectively.
The techniques are decades old and persistently effective, because the window cannot be closed entirely. It can only be made shorter and harder to reach.
Point-of-sale malware searches the memory of the payment application for patterns that match card data, typically the track data read from a magnetic stripe or the equivalent fields from a chip transaction. It then exfiltrates what it finds, usually staging the data on an internal server before sending it out, because tills themselves have poor internet access.
The family history is worth knowing because the attack pattern has barely changed:
Entry is rarely clever. Remote access left open for support, a flat network connecting tills to the back office, vendor accounts with shared passwords, and tills used for email or browsing account for the overwhelming majority of cases.
Britain completed its migration to chip and PIN on 14 February 2006, and the effect on domestic counterfeit fraud was dramatic. Because a chip transaction produces a cryptogram that cannot be replayed, cloning a UK card from skimmed data is of little use at a UK terminal. Fraud moved accordingly: towards card-not-present transactions online, which is why web skimming now does the work that physical skimming used to, and towards using skimmed UK data in countries where magnetic stripe acceptance remained common.
UK Finance reports well over a billion pounds of card and payment fraud losses annually, with unauthorised card fraud dominated by remote purchase rather than face-to-face compromise. Contactless raised a separate set of questions when limits rose to £100 in October 2021, although the practical risk remains bounded by the limit and by the periodic requirement to enter a PIN.
PCI DSS is the governing standard here, with its requirements on protecting stored data, restricting access, and inspecting devices for tampering, and in the UK a loss of card data is also a personal data breach reportable to the Information Commissioner’s Office within 72 hours.
Our infrastructure security testing services assess retail store networks and till estates, including the remote access paths that most point-of-sale compromises actually use.
It stops the payoff for most domestic use. A chip transaction generates a unique cryptogram, so data copied from a card cannot simply be replayed at another chip terminal. Skimmers still capture the magnetic stripe, which remains usable in markets that accept stripe transactions, and shimming attacks the chip conversation directly. The deterrent is strong but not absolute.
Almost always through remote access or lateral movement rather than through the till itself. Exposed remote desktop services, shared vendor credentials used across every store, a flat network linking tills to back-office machines, and phishing against head office are the recurring routes. Hardening the till while leaving those paths open achieves very little.
A solution that encrypts card data inside the reader hardware and decrypts it only at the payment provider, so the data is never present in the clear on the merchant’s systems. It removes the target that RAM scraping malware looks for and substantially reduces PCI DSS scope. Only validated solutions deliver the scope reduction, so the choice of product matters.
Daily for unattended and high-traffic devices, with a documented routine rather than a casual glance: check serial numbers against the inventory, look for added overlays and loose fittings, and confirm tamper seals. Train staff to refuse engineer visits that were not scheduled through head office, because terminal substitution relies on a plausible stranger in a branded shirt.
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